Rollins v. Peterson Builders, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 April 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 88-0482P.
• Citation: 761 F. Supp. 943,1991 AMC 2286
• Parties: Philip A. ROLLINS, as the personal representative of the Estate of Alison Rollins; Priscilla Rollins, Individually, Plaintiffs, v. PETERSON BUILDERS, INC., Defendant, The United States of America; The Board of Governors for Higher Education, Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs, v. JOHN W. GILBERT ASSOCS., INC., Third Party Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

761 F. Supp. 943

1991 AMC 2286

Philip A. ROLLINS, as the personal representative of the Estate of Alison Rollins; Priscilla Rollins, Individually, Plaintiffs, v. PETERSON BUILDERS, INC., Defendant, The United States of America; The Board of Governors for Higher Education, Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs, v. JOHN W. GILBERT ASSOCS., INC., Third Party Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 88-0482P.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

April 11, 1991.

John T. Walsh, Jr., Providence, R.I., for plaintiffs.

Howard E. Walker, Hinckley, Allen, Snyder & Comen, Providence, R.I., for Peterson Builders.

Irving A. Pianin, Torts Branch, Civil Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Suzanne G. Curt, Asst. U.S. Atty., Providence, R.I., for U.S.

Berndt W. Anderson, Roberts, Carroll, Feldstein & Peirce, Providence, R.I., Louis Saccoccio, Mary Kennard, Gen. Counsel, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, R.I., for Board of Governors.

Barbara S. Cohen, Goldenberg & Muri, Providence, R.I., Augustus F. Wagner, Jr., Nutter, McClennen & Fish, Hyannis, Mass., Leonard W. Langer, Marshall J. Tinkle, Thompson, McNaboe, Ashley & Bull, Portland, Me., for John W. Gilbert Associates, Inc.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PETTINE, Senior District Judge.

The above-captioned case has been extensively litigated over the past several years. For clarity's sake, I will repeat the basic premises of this action. Alison Rollins, the daughter of Philip and Priscilla Rollins, died after being electrocuted while working on board the research vessel "Endeavor." The United States owned, the Board of Governors for Higher Education leased, Peterson Builders built, and John W. Gilbert Associates designed the ship. Alison's parents sued the Board under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982) for negligence and unseaworthiness under general maritime law; the United States under the general maritime law for the unseaworthiness of the "Endeavor" and under the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1982) and Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 741-52 (1982); and Peterson under diversity and the general maritime law for unseaworthiness and products liability. The Board and the United States filed a third party complaint against Gilbert for contribution and indemnity.

During the course of litigation, this Court has issued several major opinions on motions in limine and for summary judgment. In an opinion issued on May 2, 1990, 761 F.Supp. 918, this court held that Rollins could receive compensation for the loss of Alison's society, Alison's estate, however, could not recover damages for Alison's lost future wages, Mrs. Rollins could not maintain an action for negligent infliction of emotional harm, and the United States and the Governing Board could not receive indemnity and contribution from Gilbert for punitive damages. On October 17, 1990, 761 F.Supp. 930, this Court denied the Board of Governors motion for summary judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity and on March 27, 1991, 761 F.Supp. 933, set down for hearing the Board's motion for summary judgment with regard to the exclusivity clause of the Public Vessels Act and the Suits in Admiralty Act. Prior to that, on January 10, 1991, upon a motion for reconsideration, this Court struck the Rollins' loss of society claim on the basis of Miles v. Apex Marine Corporation, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990), decided on November 6, 1990.

The defendants Board of Governors and the United States now bring another motion in limine on the basis of the Apex decision. They move that this Court strike plaintiff's punitive damages claim; not because the Supreme Court specifically discussed the issue but because "the import of the Court's decision is that such damages are not recoverable" in the instant case.

The defendants' argument, based on the language, not the holding of Apex, is two-pronged. First, they contend that punitive damages are non-pecuniary in nature and are, therefore, not available under the Jones Act. Second, they contend that if such damages are not available under the Jones Act, then, in keeping with the desire to create uniformity in maritime law, punitive damages should not be available under general maritime law. For the reasons discussed below, defendants motion is granted.

A. Miles v. Apex Marine Corporation

In Apex, the Supreme Court considered "the scope of damages under general maritime law." Id. 111 S.Ct. at 320. The issues presented were whether a non-dependent parent could recover for loss of society pursuant to a wrongful death claim under general maritime law and whether general maritime law permits a survival action for lost future wages. Id. The Court held "that there is a general maritime cause of action for the wrongful death of a seaman, but that damages recoverable in such an action do not include loss of society. The Court further held that a general maritime survival action cannot include recovery for decedent's lost future earnings." Id. at 328.

In reaching these conclusions, the Court discussed the maritime common law and statutory history of negligence and wrongful death actions for seamen which culminated in the case of Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970). In Moragne, the central issue was whether the statutory limits on recovery in the Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA"), 41 Stat. 537, 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq., proscribed a more general maritime cause of action. Id. 111 S.Ct. at 321. "The Moragne Court found no such proscription." Id. at 322.

Prior to Moragne, there were certain anomalies in maritime law caused primarily by the fact that the Supreme Court had "transformed the warranty of seaworthiness into a strict liability obligation."¹ Id.

First, in territorial water, general maritime law allowed a remedy for unseaworthiness resulting in injury, but not for death. Second, DOHSA allowed a remedy for death resulting from unseaworthiness on the high seas, but general maritime law did not allow such recovery for a similar death in territorial waters. Finally, in what Moragne called the `strangest' anomaly, in those States whose statutes allowed a claim for wrongful death resulting from unseaworthiness, recovery was available for the death of a longshoreman due to unseaworthiness, but not for the death of a Jones Act seaman. (citations omitted). This was because wrongful death actions under the Jones Act are limited to negligence, and the Jones Act pre-empts state law remedies for the death or injury of a seaman. Id. (citations omitted).

"To remedy these nonuniformities that could not have been anticipated when the statutes were passed....the Court ... created a general maritime wrongful death cause of action." Id. "This result was not only consistent with the general policy of both 1920 Acts² favoring wrongful death recovery, but also effectuated `the constitutionally based principle that federal admiralty law should be `a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country.'" Id. at 322-23.

The Apex Court used its discussion of Moragne as the groundwork for its conclusions. The Court noted that Moragne indicates that a court in admiralty "may supplement ... statutory remedies where doing so would achieve the uniform vindication of such policies consistent with the constitutional mandate, but courts must also keep strictly within the limits imposed by Congress." Apex, 111 S.Ct. at 323. With regard to these limits, the Court held that "the Jones Act evinces no general hostility to recovery under maritime law and that it does not disturb seamen's general maritime claims for injuries resulting from unseaworthiness."³ Id. at 324.

As to the type of remedies available under the Jones Act, the Court stated that the Act incorporates the recovery provisions of the Federal Employees Liability Act ("FELA") and that under FELA recovery is only available for pecuniary loss. Id. at 325. "Incorporating FELA unaltered into the Jones Act, Congress must have intended to incorporate the pecuniary limitation on damages as well." Id. The Court stated, therefore, that "there is no recovery for loss of society in a Jones Act wrongful death action." Id. From this, the Court concluded that a loss of society action was also precluded in an action under general maritime law because "it would be inconsistent ... to sanction more expansive remedies in a judicially-created cause of action in which liability is without fault than Congress has allowed in cases of death resulting from negligence pursuant to the Jones Act." Id. at 325-26. The Court stated that with this decision it was "restoring a uniform rule applicable to all actions for the wrongful death of a seaman, whether under DOHSA, the Jones Act, or general maritime law." Id. at 326.

With regard to survival actions, the Court noted that the "Jones Act incorporates FELA's survival provision, but, as in most States, recovery is limited to losses suffered during the decedent's lifetime." Id. at 327. The Court, refused to adopt a "distinctly minority view," id., when it was obliged to balance the "special solitude that admiralty courts have always shown for the welfare of seamen and their families," id., against the fact that "maritime tort law is now dominated by federal statute." Id. The Court held that the defendant's estate could not recover for lost future income under the Jones Act and, therefore, could not do so under general maritime law. Id. at 328.

B. Discussion

1. Introduction

In Karvelis v. Constellation Lines, 806 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987), the court remarked that the arguments regarding seamen's claims "plunge us into the Serbonian Bog, that is the law relating to a seaman's recovery for death and injury. We use this term advisedly, for the leading commentators refer in their treatise to the fact that `the perils of the sea, which mariners...