Clark and Stephenson v. State Personnel Bd., s. 40517
| Decision Date | 17 April 1984 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 40517,40518,s. 40517 |
| Citation | 314 S.E.2d 658,252 Ga. 548 |
| Parties | CLARK AND STEPHENSON v. STATE PERSONNEL BOARD et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Edward W. Killorin, Nathaniel G. Slaughter III, Killorin & Schroder, Atlanta, for E.R. Stephenson and H.H. Clark.
Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Daryl A. Robinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Victoria H. Soto, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State Personnel Bd. et al.
The primary issues in this appeal are whether a legislative act removing a position from merit system classification is constitutional and whether under the act the state is authorized to move an employee holding the previously classified position to a lower position. Additionally, we face questions regarding the procedures for demoting state employees under the merit system.
Before 1982 the highest merit system position in the Department of Public Safety was that of major. In 1982 OCGA § 45-20-2 (Code Ann. § 40-2202) was amended so as to remove the rank of major in the Department of Public Safety from classified status under the state merit system. At the time of this action there were six majors in the department. Four of these officers were offered and accepted the newly unclassified position of major. Appellants were not offered the position of major but were offered the highest merit position available, captain. Appellants contested this action, and the Superior Court of Fulton County affirmed the adverse administrative decision of the State Personnel Board. We reverse.
Appellants contend that the act relied upon is unconstitutional as special legislation and as a law impairing the obligation of contracts. Appellants also argue that the Department of Public Safety violated their rights by its failure to follow the regulations of the State Personnel Board.
The issues presented in this case may be divided into three categories: threshold, substantive and procedural. The threshold issue is whether the 1982 statute offends the constitutional prohibition against special legislation. The substantive issue is whether the statute unconstitutionally impairs the contractual rights of Clark and Stephenson. The procedural issue is whether the demotion of Clark and Stephenson was accomplished within the provisions of their contract as a result of the state's compliance with the existing State Merit System Act and rules and regulations properly promulgated under it.
1. Dealing with the first question, we recognize that general laws must have uniform operation and cannot be varied by a special law. Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII, of the 1976 Constitution of Georgia (Code Ann. § 2-207). We do not, however, find the statute in question here to be special in nature. The merit system is a comprehensive scheme dealing with state employees in a wide range of jobs. The diversity of jobs and employees covered by or excluded from the act defies uniform treatment. The amendment to the merit system which deals with only one category of positions does not constitute forbidden special legislation because it relates to a position and not to an individual. As such, it has general application.
2. The substantive issue of whether the 1982 amendment to the Merit System Act unconstitutionally impairs the contractual rights of the appellant presents an intriguing question. We begin with the words of the constitution: "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or law impairing obligation of contracts, or making irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed." Art. I, Sec. I, Para. VII, 1976 Constitution of Georgia (Code Ann. § 2-107).
From this point, we proceed to consider the several questions involved in a determination of whether the 1982 amendment to the Merit System Act as applied to Clark and Stephenson offends the constitution. The first question is whether the Merit System Act amounts to a contract between the state and merit system members so as to vest rights in the members. Second, there is the question of whether the Merit System Act may be constitutionally amended to declassify a position. Finally, we must consider the effect of declassification upon persons presently holding an affected position.
(a) Among the stated purposes for enactment of the Merit System Act was the establishment of a system of personnel administration based on merit principles and scientific methods governing the classification of positions and the employment, conduct, movement, and separation of public officers and employees. The legislature declared a further purpose to be to build a career service in government which would attract, select and retain the best employees on the basis of merit, free from coercive political influences. In order to achieve these purposes, the merit system would afford reasonable job security for the competent employee and a systematic classification of all positions through adequate job evaluation. OCGA § 45-20-1 (Code Ann. §§ 40-2201, 40-2202). The Act goes on to use such phrases as "merit system protection" [OCGA § 45-20-6(e) (Code Ann. § 40-2206) ] and provides that permanent status employees may not be dismissed or otherwise adversely affected as to compensation nor employment status except by action taken in accordance with the rules and regulations of the State Personnel Board. OCGA § 45-20-8(a) (Code Ann. § 40-2207).
To say that the Merit System Act does not create a constitutionally protected contract between the merit system members and the state would overlook the obvious purpose of the Act itself. We, therefore, hold that the Act is the basis of such a contract.
(b) This leads to the question of whether a position once classified under the merit system may be...
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