Clark v. Baker
| Decision Date | 24 October 1913 |
| Citation | 76 Wash. 110,135 P. 1025 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | CLARK v. BAKER et al. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County.
Suit by Nancy E. Clark against Marion Baker and others. From a decree in part for plaintiff, plaintiff and defendants each appeal. Reversed and remanded, with instructions.
H. M Stephens, of Spokane, for appellant.
Hanna & Hanna, of Colfax, and Geo. E. Canfield, of Spokane, for respondents.
The plaintiff filed a bill in equity for the purpose of establishing a community interest in the estate of her deceased husband, George N. Clark. Both the plaintiff and the defendants have appealed from the final decree, and they will be referred to as plaintiff and defendants.
George N. Clark died testate on the 17th day of April, 1910. He left a nonintervention will. His estate was adjudged solvent, and the will is being executed by the defendants as his executors. The only mention of the plaintiff in the will appears in the following language: Whereas my wife, Nancy E Clark, and I prior to our marriage entered into a marriage contract affecting the property which we severally owned at that time, and whereas her property so affected by said contract and the natural increase thereof is ample to support her in comfort during her lifetime, it is my will and desire and I hereby direct that my executors or the survivor of them shall execute to her a quitclaim deed of all property that she owned at the time of her said marriage and all that has been a natural outgrowth of the same (in case there is any not heretofore quitclaimed by me to her), so that her title thereto will not be clouded on account of our said marriage and that my entire estate pass as hereinbefore provided.' The testator left all of his estate to the children and grandchildren, the issue of himself and a former wife.
The plaintiff and George N. Clark were married in the state of Oregon on the 21st day of May, 1890. Clark then resided at Oakesdale in this state. At the time of the marriage, they mutually intended to make this state the family domicil. In obedience to that intention, they went to Oakesdale a few days after their marriage and resided there until some time in March, 1891, when they moved upon a farm belonging to the husband near St. John in Whitman county, where they resided until November, 1899, when they moved to Spokane, where they resided until the decease of the husband. The plaintiff has since continued to live upon the homestead in Spokane which had been the family hom for 11 years before her husband's death.
Both the plaintiff and Clark had been married before, and each had children by the former marriage. The plaintiff at the time of her marriage to Clark owned real estate in the state of Oregon. Clark at that time owned about 390 acres of land in that state. He also owned 480 acres of land in Whitman county, this state, and had a contract with the Northern Pacific Railway Company for the purchase of 320 acres of land in Whitman county. This contract was made in 1887. He had made at least one payment on this contract at the time of his marriage. He acquired the legal title to the railroad land in 1897. At the time of the marriage he owned personal property in Whitman county, this state, consisting of about 250 head of mixed cattle, 26 work horses, 9 colts, and about $800 in money.
The plaintiff and the deceased lived upon the Whitman county land from March, 1891, until November, 1899, and farmed the land from 1891 to 1896, inclusive. Between the harvest of 1896 and the death of the deceased, the land was rented, upon a cash rental for two years, and for either one-third or one-half the crop the remaining time. The farming operations of 1891 and 1892 were confined to less than 100 acres a year, and little or no profit was made. In 1893 about 500 acres were cropped and harvested, but, owing to the unprecedented rains of that year, while the crop was large, it was so damaged that it did not pay harvesting expenses. In 1894, 1895, and 1896, the crop was light, and the prices were so low that no profit was made. The record shows conclusively that no profit resulted from the farming operations of the plaintiff and her husband during the period that they actually conducted the farm. The testimony accords with the experience and observation of those who were in touch with the farming conditions in Eastern Washington at that time.
Immediately prior to the marriage the plaintiff and Clark executed the following antenuptial contract:
It will be observed that the essential features of the contract are: (1) That Clark disclaims all interest in the property, both real and personal, then owned by the plaintiff, including 'courtesy': (2) that the plaintiff makes a like disclaimer as to all property, both real and personal, then owned by Clark, including 'dower'; (3) that they agreed that 'all property acquired after marriage by the mutual endeavor and labor of both parties, over and above what is required for their support, shall be joint property of both parties in equal parts.' It will also be observed that the contract is silent as to the rents, issues, and profits of the separate property of the contracting parties.
'Property and pecuniary rights' owned by the husband before marriage and that acquired by him afterwards 'by gift, bequest, devise or descent, with the rents, issues and profits thereof,' is his separate property. 2 Rem. & Bal. Code, § 5915.
'Property and pecuniary rights' owned by the wife before her marriage and that later acquired by her in the manner set forth in section 5915 is her separate property. 2 Rem. & Bal. Code, § 5916.
Property not acquired or owned as prescribed in the two preceding sections, acquired after the marriage by either husband or wife or both, is community property. 2 Rem. & Bal. Code, § 5917.
The court admitted testimony of the declarations of the deceased in his lifetime respecting the purpose of the contract on the theory that the contract is ambiguous, but later reached the conclusion that it is not ambiguous. The court concluded that the railroad land was presumably paid for after marriage, in part with community funds and in part with the separate funds of the deceased; that these funds had been so commingled that they could not be separated, that the railroad land was community property, and that the rents, issues, and profits arising from that land was commingled with those arising from the separate property of the deceased, and hence that all property thereafter acquired was community property.
The court was right in holding that the contract is unambiguous. It is plain, specific, and direct in its terms, and clearly speaks the minds of the contracting parties. The court however, was wrong...
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Hamlin v. Merlino
...to alter or adjust the property rights of prospective spouses after marriage are not in themselves invalid in this state. Clark v. Baker, 76 Wash. 110, 135 P. 1025. Indeed such contracts are recognized in most, if not all, jurisdictions. However, our research reveals very few cases decided ......
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Bayer v. Bayer
...jurisdiction to direct and control his acts in the premises.' See, also, In re Guye's Estate, 63 Wash. 167, 114 P. 1041; Clark v. Baker, 76 Wash. 110, 135 P. 1025. voluntary appearance' of a defendant is equivalent to a personal service of the summons upon him. Rem. & Bal. Code, § 238. In t......
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Hoefer v. Probasco
...The Supreme Court of Washington, in a case very similar to the one at bar, in construing the contract in the case of Clark v. Baker, 76 Wash. 110, 135 P. 1025, stated follows: "Where it is desired to provide by an antenuptial contract for property acquired in a state foreign to the place of......
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