Clark v. California Employment Stabilization Commission

• Decision Date: 17 December 1958
• Citation: 166 Cal.App.2d 326,332 P.2d 716
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Clara M. CLARK, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT STABILIZATION COMMISSION, State of California, Respondent. Civ. 5776.

Page 716

332 P.2d 716

166 Cal.App.2d 326

Clara M. CLARK, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT STABILIZATION COMMISSION, State of California, Respondent.

Civ. 5776.

District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, California.

Dec. 17, 1958.

Hearing Denied Feb. 11, 1959.

Lewis Garrett and Lionel Richman, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Irving H. Perluss, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Vincent P. Lafferty, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

COUGHLIN, Justice pro tem.

This is an appeal from a judgment denying petitioner's application for a writ of mandamus entered after sustaining a general demurrer to her petition without leave to amend. At the hearing in the trial court the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board of the State of California and H. W. Stewart, Director of Employment, were substituted as parties respondent. However, the proceedings against the respondent were continued under the title 'California Employment Stabilization Commission, State of California', and for this reason no change therein has been made on appeal.

For two years prior to April 16, 1957, Clara M. Clark, a married woman, had been employed by a telephone company in San Bernardino; both she and her employer made contributions to the Unemployment Fund of the State of California as prescribed by law; on that day she left her employment, being unable to work on account of an alleged illness arising out of an existing pregnancy. Her doctor described her condition as 'I. V. pregnancy [2nd trimester]'; declared that she should terminate her work 'because of protracted nausea and vomiting of pregnancy'; gave August 21, 1957, as the probable date of delivery; and certified that she would be unable to work from April 16, 1957, until November 15, 1957. On April 17, 1957, pursuant to law, she filed a claim for disability insurance benefits, alleging that she was disabled and unable to work. Subsequently, her claim was disallowed upon the ground that her disability was caused by pregnancy and for this reason she was not eligible to receive unemployment compensation disability benefits payable under the Unemployment Insurance Code.

Disability compensation is paid under a statute, the declared purpose of which is 'to compensate in part for the wage loss sustained by individuals unemployed because of sickness or injury.' Unempl. Ins.Code, sec. 2601. Section 2627 of the Code provides that 'A disabled individual is eligible to receive disability benefits.', and section 2626 thereof defines the terms 'disability' and 'disabled' as including 'both mental or physical illness and mental or physical injury', but in no case including 'any injury or illness caused by or arising in connection with pregnancy.'

Mrs. Clark contends that the provisions of the statute which exclude her from participating in the benefits prescribed are unconstitutional in that they subject her to an arbitrary classification and deprive her of the equal protection of the law, of due process of law, of the right to the pursuit of happiness, and of the enjoyment of privileges and immunities which, upon the same terms, are granted to other citizens. In due course, she exhausted all administrative remedies provided by the Unemployment Insurance Code, seeking to recover on her claim, and failing therein, brought these proceedings in mandamus.

The sole question for determination on this appeal is the constitutionality of those provisions of section 2626 of the Unemployment Insurance Code, which exclude illness caused by pregnancy from the disability covered by the statute.

Appellant's arguments upon her variously phrased contentions resolve them into claims that the objectionable provisions of section 2626 are unconstitutional for two reasons: (1) They deprive her of the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and (2) They create an unreasonable, arbitrary and illegal classification.

Appellant states that Article 1, section 1, of the California Constitution, which guarantees her the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, includes the right 'to marry, establish a home and bring up children', citing Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042, and contends that the limitations contained in section 2626 deprive her of his right.

The exclusionary provisions in question are part of a legislative program conferring unemployment compensation disability benefits upon a defined group of employees. Persons sustaining disability caused by pregnancy, by the terms of the statute, are not within this group. Although the law does not confer benefits upon these persons, neither does it take benefits away from them. It can be said of this statute that it did not assist appellant in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed her by the Constitution, but it cannot be said of this statute that it deprived her of these rights. Whether such disability benefits should be extended to pregnant women is a matter solely for legislative determination, and is not within the scope of judicial decision.

A statute which excludes individuals of a specified class from benefits conferred thereby does not violate constitutional guarantees of due process of law, equal protection of the law, or uniform application of the law, providing the classification adopted is reasonably related to the purpose of the statute and is based on some natural, intrinsic or constitutional distinction which suggests a reason for and justifies the exclusion. County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal.2d 378, 388, 196 P.2d 773; Sacramento Municipal Utility Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 20 Cal.2d 684, 693, 128 P.2d 529; Rainey v. Michel, 6 Cal.2d 259, 270, 57 P.2d 932, 105 A.L.R. 148; In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 629, 12 P.2d 446; Martin v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 93, 100, 227 P. 762; Ex parte Sohncke, 148 Cal. 262, 263, 82 P. 956, 2 L.R.A., N.S., 813; Vail v. San Diego County, 126 Cal. 35, 37, 58 P. 392. Such a classification must not be arbitrary or unreasonable, but must be characterized by some substantial qualities or attributes which render the particular exclusion from benefits necessary or appropriate. Martin v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal. 93, 100, 227 P. 762; Deyoe v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. 476, 481, 74 P. 28.

The rules which govern a court in passing upon the constitutionality of a statutory classification are well settled. 'Wide discretion is vested in the Legislature in making the classification and every presumption is in favor of the validity of the statute; the decision of the Legislature as to what is a sufficient distinction to warrant the classification will not be overthrown by the courts unless it is palpably arbitrary and beyond rational doubt erroneous.' Sacramento Municipal Utility Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., supra, 20 Cal.2d 684, 693, 128 P.2d 529, 535; '* * * before an act of a coordinate branch of the government can be declared invalid by the judiciary for the reason that is in conflict with the Constitution, such conflict must be clear, positive, and unquestionable; and in case of a fair and reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality, the statute should be upheld and the doubt resolved in favor of the expressed wishes of the people...