Clark v. Clark
| Decision Date | 26 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 03-20-00411-CV |
| Parties | Dean Orson Clark, II, Appellant v. Joanne Crompton Clark, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
FROM THE 201ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO D-1-FM-14-005514, THE HONORABLE AMY CLARK MEACHUM, JUDGE PRESIDING
Before Justices Goodwin, Triana, and Kelly
Dean Orson Clark, II appeals the trial court's denial of his petition to modify the parent-child relationship, requesting a reduction in the amount of his monthly child-support obligation.[1] See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 156.401-.409. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to modify Dean's child-support obligation, we will affirm.
Dean and Joanne Crompton Clark were married in 2008 and divorced in 2015. During the marriage, the couple had two children who were four and two years old at the time of the divorce. In the final decree of divorce, the trial court appointed Dean and Joanne as joint managing conservators and awarded Joanne the exclusive right to determine the children's primary residence. The decree also ordered Dean to pay $1 600 a month in child support to Joanne and to maintain health, dental, and vision insurance for the children.
In November 2019, Joanne filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship, requesting that the trial court modify the decree's medical-support provision to require her and not Dean to maintain medical insurance for the children. Dean filed a counterpetition to modify the parent-child relationship, seeking to reduce the amount of his monthly child support based on his assertion that his employment had changed since the divorce and that he was now earning substantially less income.
On July 22, 2020, the trial court conducted a hearing on the parties' competing petitions to modify the decree. At the hearing, Dean testified that when he and Joanne divorced, he was earning an annual salary of $102, 648 and that after the divorce he "changed jobs a few times" but continued to earn an annual salary between $108, 000 and $202, 000 from 2015 to 2019. In October 2019, Dean was terminated from his position as Director of Human Resources, and following a period of unemployment, he accepted a position as an associate at Charles Schwab with an annual base salary of $42, 000.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied both Joanne's request to assign to her the responsibility of maintaining the children's health insurance and Dean's request to reduce his child-support obligation. The trial court later signed an order consistent with its oral pronouncement and, on Dean's request, filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Tex. R. Civ. .P 296, 297. The trial court issued the following findings of fact and conclusions of law relevant to Dean's request for modification:
Dean timely filed his notice of appeal in this Court.
We review a trial court's order setting or modifying child support for an abuse of discretion. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.1990); In re T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d 865, 872 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011); Legere v. Legere, No. 03-12-00046-CV, 2013 WL 692450, at *2 (Tex. App.-Austin Feb. 22, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court also abuses its discretion by failing to analyze or apply the law correctly. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d at 78 (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992)).
In modification suits, traditional sufficiency standards of review overlap the abuse-of-discretion standard. Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587-88 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied). Challenges to legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Coburn v. Moreland, 433 S.W.3d 809, 823 (Tex. App.-Austin 2014, no pet.). Consequently, to determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we engage in a twopronged inquiry: (1) whether the trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion, and (2) if so, whether the trial court erred in its exercise of that discretion. Id.; Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 588.
When a trial court issues findings of fact, as it did here, those findings are subject to review under the same legal and factual sufficiency standards as jury findings. Robbins v. Robbins, 550 S.W.3d 846, 854 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2018, no pet.); see Sparks v. Rutkowski, No. 03-17-00452-CV, 2018 Tex.App. LEXIS 6097, at *4 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 3, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996)). In conducting our legal-sufficiency review, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2015). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder and will uphold the finding if the evidence falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. Evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding only if the evidence adverse to the finding at issue preponderates so overwhelmingly against the challenged finding that the finding is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176, (Tex. 1986). As long as some probative and substantive evidence exists in the record to support the trial court's order, there is no abuse of discretion. Coburn, 433 S.W.3d at 823; Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 588.
In one issue on appeal, Dean asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that he failed to prove that there had been a material and substantial change in circumstances to support a modification in child support. Specifically, Dean argues that "the overwhelming weight of the evidence presented at trial" shows that his salary has decreased significantly since the divorce and that "by denying [his] requested relief, the trial court required [him] to pay child support that exceeds 50% of his net resources."
A trial court may modify a parent's child-support obligation if "the circumstances of the child or a person affected by the order have materially and substantially changed" since the date of the previous child-support order. See Tex. Fam. Code § 156.401(a)(1). The trial court determines whether a material and substantial change has occurred by examining "the circumstances of the child and parents at the time the prior decree was rendered in relation to the circumstances existing at the time modification of the prior order is sought." Sparks, 2018 Tex.App. LEXIS 6097, at *5 (citations omitted); Melton v. Toomey, 350 S.W.3d 235, 238 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.). The party seeking the modification bears the burden of establishing that there has been a material and substantial change in circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. In re N.H.N., 580 S.W.3d 440, 445 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.); Downey v. Downey, No. 03-12-00037-CV, 2014 Tex.App. LEXIS 3490, at *16 (Tex. App.-Austin Apr. 1, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 589).
It is left to the trial court's sound discretion to weigh all the relevant factors when deciding whether there has been a substantial and material change and whether that change warrants a modification of child support. Downey, 2014 Tex.App. LEXIS 3490, at *16. Section 156.402 of the Texas Family Code provides that in making this determination, the trial court may consider the child-support guidelines under Chapter 154. Tex. Fam. Code § 156.402(a). However, a trial court is not required to modify an order to conform with the statutory guidelines and, in fact, may do so only if it determines that the modification would be in the child's best interest. See id. § 156.402(b). In determining whether to modify child support, the trial court's primary consideration is always the best interest of the child. Rumscheidt v. Rumscheidt, 362 S.W.3d 661, 666 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Coburn, 433 S.W.3d at 836 (quoting Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d 414, 417 n.3 (Tex. 1993)).
In addition, Section 154.066...
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