Clark v. Commissioner of Correction

• Decision Date: 20 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 17434.,17434.
• Citation: 281 Conn. 380,917 A.2d 1
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Kenneth CLARK v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

917 A.2d 1

281 Conn. 380

Kenneth CLARK v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

No. 17434.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 15, 2006.

Decided February 20, 2007.

Robert J. Scheinblum, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief,

was Michael Dearington, state's attorney, for the appellant (respondent).

Kent Drager, senior assistant public defender, for the appellee (petitioner).

Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Robert F. Vacchelli, assistant attorney general, filed a brief for the office of the attorney general as amicus curiae.

BORDEN, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

PALMER, J.

Under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (act), General Statutes § 54-157 et seq., the governor of this state has a mandatory duty to comply with a demand by the executive authority of another state for the extradition of a person who, having been charged with a crime in the demanding state, is a fugitive from justice and is found in this state. By contrast, the governor of this state has discretion to comply with a demand for the extradition of a person who, although found in this state, is not deemed to be a fugitive from justice under the act. The sole issue raised by this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the petitioner, Kenneth Clark, who was charged with a crime in Texas and thereafter removed to this state under legal compulsion, is not subject to extradition to Texas under the mandatory provisions of the act because, having been removed from Texas involuntarily, he is not a fugitive from justice for purposes of the act. See Clark v. Commissioner of Correction, 88 Conn.App. 178, 192, 868 A.2d 798 (2005). We disagree with the conclusion of the Appellate Court and, therefore, reverse its judgment.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following undisputed facts and procedural history." In 1996, the petitioner had been extradited involuntarily from Texas to this state because of an outstanding parole violation. After having been returned to this state, the petitioner was incarcerated here until April, 2000.

"In pursuit of his request for extradition in the present case, the governor of Texas sent to our governor a written demand, dated April 17, 2003, for the extradition of the petitioner. See General Statutes § 54-157 et seq. In accordance with General Statutes § 54-159,¹ the extradition demand stated that the petitioner had been charged with the commission of a crime in the state of Texas,² `was present in [Texas] at the time of the commission of said crime,' `thereafter fled from the justice of [Texas],' and had taken refuge in Connecticut. The extradition demand consistently referred to the petitioner as a `fugitive.' In response, on April 29, 2003, our governor exercised his power, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-163,³ to issue a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner. The petitioner was arrested on May 2, 2003.

"The petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his status as a fugitive was heard by the habeas court, Hon. William L. Hadden, Jr., judge trial referee. [The habeas court] found that `the extradition papers [were] in order in satisfaction of ... § 54-159, that the petitioner has been identified as the individual the state of Texas seeks to extradite, [that] there is probable cause to believe he committed a crime in that state, and [that] he is a fugitive from justice.'⁴ Accordingly, [the habeas court] dismissed the habeas petition and ordered the petitioner extradited to Texas." Clark v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 88 Conn.App. at 180-82, 868 A.2d 798.

Thereafter, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that, under General Statutes § 54-161,⁵ a person who is removed involuntarily from the demanding state by government compulsion is not a fugitive, and, therefore, the extradition demand by Texas, which identified the petitioner as a fugitive, was invalid. Id., at 183, 868 A.2d 798. In essence, the petitioner maintained that his designation as a fugitive by the Texas authorities misled our governor into believing that he had no discretion in deciding whether to extradite the petitioner, and that the extradition demand should have been made under § 54-161, which, according to the petitioner, vests the governor with discretion to comply with Texas' demand. See id., at 183-84, 868 A.2d 798. The respondent, the commissioner of correction (commissioner), claimed that General Statutes §§ 54-158⁶ and 54-159, not § 54-161, are the governing statutory provisions, and, therefore, our governor has a mandatory duty to comply with Texas' demand for the petitioner's extradition to that state. See id., at 184, 868 A.2d 798. In support of that contention, the commissioner maintained that § 54-158 embodies the principle, adopted and applied by this court in Moulthrope v. Matus, 139 Conn. 272, 277-78, 93 A.2d 149 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 926, 73 S.Ct. 785, 97 L.Ed. 1357 (1953),⁷ some five years prior to the passage of the act,⁸ that a person is a fugitive from justice no matter why that person left the demanding state, even when he is removed from that state involuntarily by government compulsion, and, further, that the act did not purport to overrule that well established principle. See Clark v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 88 Conn.App. at 184, 868 A.2d 798. The commissioner further maintained that this interpretation of the act is buttressed by § 54-159, which requires that all demands for extradition, except those made for nonfugitives under General Statutes § 54-162,⁹ shall allege, inter alia, that the person whose extradition is sought has "fled from" that state thereby reflecting a legislative intent that all persons who commit a crime in the demanding state and thereafter are found in another state, including those persons who were removed involuntarily from the demanding state, shall be treated as fugitives subject to mandatory extradition.

The Appellate Court framed the issue before it as one requiring a determination of whether Moulthrope had been overruled by the act and, in particular, by § 54-161. Id. Relying on the language of General Statutes § 54-161, pursuant to which our governor "may ... surrender ... any person in this state who is charged ... with having violated the laws of [another] state ... even though such person left the demanding state involuntarily"; (emphasis added); and on the basis of its analysis of case law from other jurisdictions, the Appellate Court concluded that the act did, indeed, overrule Moulthrope, such that, under the act, the governor has discretion to extradite a person who had been removed from the demanding state by government compulsion. Clark v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 88 Conn.App. at 184-92, 868 A.2d 798. The Appellate Court further concluded that, because the petitioner had been returned to Connecticut from Texas involuntarily by compulsory process, the petitioner was a nonfugitive, and, consequently, Texas' extradition demand describing the petitioner as a fugitive was void.¹⁰ Id., at 192, 868 A.2d 798. We granted the commissioner's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the extradition warrant in the present case was void and that the extradition was governed by ... § 54-161?" Clark v. Commissioner of Correction, 273 Conn. 940, 875 A.2d 42 (2005).

On appeal to this court, the commissioner claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the petitioner is not a fugitive from justice subject to mandatory extradition pursuant to § 54-158. Specifically, the commissioner contends that, in light of the purpose of the drafters of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (uniform act), on which our act is modeled,¹¹ and the great weight of authority from other states, our legislature, in passing the act, did not intend to overrule this court's holding in Moulthrope that a person is a fugitive from justice, and therefore subject to mandatory extradition under § 54-158, even though that person departed the demanding state involuntarily under legal compulsion. The commissioner further contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the legislature had intended to overrule Moulthrope because our holding in that case was predicated on principles embodied in the extradition clause of the United States constitution.¹² With respect to the language of § 54-161, which embodies § 5 of the uniform act, the commissioner maintains that the drafters of the uniform act added that provision merely to clarify the law in response to several state court decisions holding that a person leaving the demanding state under government compulsion is not a fugitive subject to extradition. We agree with the commissioner that the petitioner is a fugitive from justice whom the governor of this state is required to extradite to Texas.

Before proceeding to the merits of the certified question, we note, preliminarily, that the issue of whether the petitioner is a fugitive from justice for purposes of the act presents a question of statutory interpretation over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Kinsey v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 277 Conn. 398, 404, 891 A.2d 959 (2006). Furthermore, "[w]hen construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z¹³ directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,...