Clark v. CSX Transp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. 29A02-9902-CV-139.,29A02-9902-CV-139.
• Parties: George N. CLARK, Hamilton County Farm Bureau Cooperative Association, Inc. Britton Farms, Inc., Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

737 N.E.2d 752

George N. CLARK, Hamilton County Farm Bureau Cooperative Association, Inc. Britton Farms, Inc., Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Appellee-Defendant.

No. 29A02-9902-CV-139.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

October 12, 2000.

Rehearing Denied December 7, 2000.

Nels J. Ackerson, Cecilia Fex, The Ackerson Group, Chartered, Washington, D.C., John D. Proffitt, Campbell Kyle Proffitt, Noblesville, Indiana, Henry J. Price, Arlene G. Anderson, Price, Potter & Mellowitz, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellants.

Christopher G. Scanlon, Mark A. Voigtmann, Thomas M. Fisher, April E. Sellers, Baker & Daniels, Indianapolis, Indiana, Richard McMillan, Jr., Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, D.C., Michael A. Howard, Noblesville, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

VAIDIK, Judge

Case Summary¹

Appellants, George N. Clark, et al. ("Subclass") appeal the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX). Specifically, the Subclass contends that the trial court erred in construing certain deeds as conveyances of fee simple title to CSX rather than as easements.

CSX cross-appeals the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to the Subclass. CSX contends that the trial court erred in construing two deeds as conveyances of an easement rather than fee simple. CSX also asserts that its due process rights were violated. In particular, CSX contends that the trial court erred when it entered judgment in favor of the Subclass without the requisite proof to quiet title and erred in creating a claims process.

The trial court followed well established rules of deed construction. In application of the rules, the trial court determined that certain deeds conveyed fee simple to CSX and others conveyed easements to CSX. With the exception of the deed to parcel 4 on map 21, we find no error in the court's interpretation of the deeds under the rules of construction. Further, the Subclass requested declaratory relief and did not seek to quiet title in the land. Because the court granted only declaratory relief, CSX's due process rights were not violated. We affirm in part, and reverse in part.

Facts and Procedural History²

In August 1993, a group of landowners filed a class action complaint against CSX. The class action was certified by the trial court in May 1994, and certification was affirmed by this court on appeal in 1995.³ The class alleged that CSX received only an easement in the property along the railroad corridor, and therefore, upon abandonment of the railroad, the easement was extinguished, thereby terminating any interest CSX had in the property. The complaint sought damages for slander of title based upon CSX's conduct in allegedly selling the land to third parties. The class also sought declaratory relief to remove the cloud on title to the class members' land and determine that CSX had no interest in the land.

On December 19, 1996, the trial court created a subclass consisting of class members who "own land that lies on or between the north side of 96th Street and south side of 146th Street in the Clay Township of Hamilton County, which adjoins the former Monon corridor." Record at 360. The City of Carmel sought to acquire the land to be converted to a recreational trail. The purpose of the Subclass was "to determine whether the land to be acquired by the City of Carmel is owned by the members of the Subclass or by CSX, and in the process, resolve one portion of the statewide class action." Record at 368.

The parties agreed to a procedure for determining whether the conveyances related to the Monon corridor constituted a grant of fee simple to the railroad or only an easement. The parties reviewed the conveyances, upon which CSX conceded that it did not have a fee interest in 11 of the 34 parcels. The remaining 23 parcels were submitted to the trial court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Both parties claimed fee ownership of the disputed property. The disputed deeds were separated into eight categories based upon similarities in the language of the conveyances.

On August 4, 1997, the trial court issued an order on burden of proof, which set forth the burden that the Subclass members must meet to prove their individual quiet title claims. Record at 790. The court also issued its order on the cross-motions for summary judgment which concerned only the issue of deed construction and identified the interests held by CSX. Record at 796-828. After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Tazian v. Cline, 686 N.E.2d 95 (Ind.1997), the trial court issued a revised partial summary judgment order incorporating the holdings of that case. The court concluded that CSX had a fee interest in 11 of the 21 disputed deeds and an easement in the remaining parcels.

A trial on the Subclass's claims was held on September 22, 1998. Record at 3737. The Subclass offered substantially the same evidence as was designated for the partial summary judgment motions. CSX moved for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(B), arguing that the Subclass had not met its burden of proof to quiet title in the individual members of the Subclass. On January 6, 1999, the court issued its order on the Carmel Subclass Claim to Quiet Title as to Defendant CSX. The court denied CSX's motion for involuntary dismissal, stating that "CSX's arguments are unpersuasive at the present stage of this litigation because the judgments rendered in this Order are as to the Carmel Subclass as a class, not as to the specific title to specific property of any specific member of the Carmel Subclass. Determinations on the specific titles of specific members of the Carmel Subclass must necessarily be reserved for the subsequent claims process." Record at 2899. The trial court entered judgment in CSX's favor on the parcels previously determined to be owned by CSX in fee. The court entered judgment in favor of the Subclass and against CSX as to the other parcels because fee simple title to the land reverted to the landowners upon the abandonment of the railroad. Upon CSX's motion, the trial court entered final judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 54(B).⁴ This appeal now ensues.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

Our summary judgment standard of review is well settled. Upon review of the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same legal standard as the trial court. Erie Insurance Co. v. American Painting Co., 678 N.E.2d 844, 845 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). Summary judgment shall be granted if the designated evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Sizemore v. Arnold, 647 N.E.2d 697, 698-99 (Ind.Ct. App.1995), reh'g denied. Once the moving party has sustained its initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue and the appropriateness of judgment as a matter of law, the party opposing summary judgment must respond by designating specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Stephenson v. Ledbetter, 596 N.E.2d 1369, 1371 (Ind.1992). We will resolve any doubt as to fact or inference to be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion. Frye v. Trustees of Rumbletown Free Methodist Church, 657 N.E.2d 745, 747 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995), reh'g denied. The fact that the parties make cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter our standard of review. Hendricks County Bank & Trust Co. v. Guthrie Building Materials, Inc., 663 N.E.2d 1180, 1183 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied.

Where, as here, the material facts are essentially undisputed, our sole task is to determine whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts. Laux v. Chopin Land Associates, Inc., 615 N.E.2d 902, 905 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. denied. Although the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, they are not binding upon this court. Eck & Associates, Inc. v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1163, 1166 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998), trans. denied. However, the findings facilitate our review by providing valuable insight into the court's decision. Id.

I. Deed Construction

Both the Subclass and CSX challenge the trial court's interpretation of particular deeds. To determine whether the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment, we must consider whether CSX's predecessors-in-interest held fee simple title to or easements over the parcels of land in question. We rely on the methodology established by our supreme court to construe the meaning of deeds conveying a strip of land to a railroad.

The object of deed construction is to ascertain the intent of the parties and where there is no ambiguity in the deed, the intention of the parties must be determined from the language of the deed alone. Brown v. Penn Central Corp., 510 N.E.2d 641, 643 (Ind.1987). In construing a deed, courts "should regard the deed in its entirety, considering the parts of the deed together so that no part is rejected." Tazian v. Cline, 686 N.E.2d 95, 97 (Ind. 1997) (citing Brown, 510 N.E.2d at 643). We are constrained by the "four corners" rule in interpreting deeds. This rule provides that in construing written instrument, the language of the instrument, if unambiguous, determines the intent of the instrument such that parol or extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to expand, vary, or explain the instrument unless there has been a showing of fraud, mistake, ambiguity, illegality, duress or undue influence. Even if ambiguity exists, extrinsic evidence is only admissible to explain the instrument and not contradict it.

Lippeatt v. Comet Coal and Clay Co., Inc., 419 N.E.2d 1332, 1335 (Ind.Ct.App.1981).

Further, in interpreting the deed, we do not consider the cover and title of the instrument where the granting language is clear and unambiguous. See Brown v. State, 130 Wash.2d 430, 924 P.2d 908, 915 (1996)

(concluding that deed, which followed statutory...