Clark v. Department of Labor and Industries

• Decision Date: 14 November 1924
• Docket Number: 18559.
• Citation: 131 Wash. 256,230 P. 133
• Parties: CLARK v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

230 P. 133

131 Wash. 256

CLARK v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES.

No. 18559.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 14, 1924

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Webster, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Ruth Clark for personal injury, opposed by the Diamond Match Company employer. Decision of the Department of Labor and Industries rejecting claim, was reversed by the superior court, and the Department appeals. Affirmed.

John H Dunbar and M. H. Weght, both of Olympia, for appellant.

Roy A. Redfield, of Spokane, for respondent.

HOLCOMB J.

Respondent, an employee of the Diamond Match Company, while engaged in extra hazardous work in its factory, was injured. Her work consisted of sorting blocks conveyed from saws. The blocks measured 2 inches by 2 3/8 inches, and from 6 to 20 inches in length. While so engaged, at about 10 o'clock in the morning, on June 7, 1923, one of the blocks was thrown from a saw and struck respondent on the right side of the abdomen. Almost immediately she complained of severe pain, and suffered from nausea. The following morning her doctor determined that she was suffering from acute appendicitis, which condition continued for 11 days, at which time an operation for the removal of the appendix was performed. The appendix was found to be three times normal size, and had reddened veins, showing it to be in a condition of inflammation. Her claim was presented to the Department of Labor and Industries, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and was by it rejected, on the ground that 'claimant's condition was not the result of the accident, within the meaning of the Compensation Act.' An appeal was taken from that decision to the superior court, which, after a trial without a jury, found and concluded, in favor of respondent, that her injury was the cause of the appendicitis, and that she was entitled to recovery. From a judgment thereupon this appeal comes.

Appellant contends that two conditions must exist in order to allow compensation: (1) An accident must have occurred; (2) the disability must have resulted from such accident. Section 7675, Rem. Comp. Stat., defines the words 'injury' and 'injured' as follows:

'The words 'injury' or 'injured' as used in this act refer only to an injury resulting from some fortuitous event as distinguished from the contraction of disease.'

Section 7679 provides that:

'Each workmen who shall be injured * * * shall receive * * * compensation in accordance with the following schedule. * * *'

Appellant asserts that the simple fact that the accident occurred, followed by a disability, is not compensable, where the disability was the result of disease, and the disease was not the result of, or caused by, the accident.

It is conceded that the direct cause of the disability was appendicitis. Respondent contends that the blow received was the cause of appendicitis, while appellant contends that the blow did not, and could not, produce appendicitis, or be its contributing cause. Appellant further contends that the findings of the Department of Labor and Industries are prima facie correct, and the conclusion reached by it must be sustained, unless the evidence clearly preponderates against such conclusion--citing Marney v. Industrial Insurance Department, 98 Wash. 483, 167 P. 1085, and Tomovich v. Department of Labor and Industries, 126 Wash. 287, 218 P. 197.

Appellant also contends that the question involved is purely a medical one, and the only testimony respondent...