Clark v. Dept. of Public Safety
| Decision Date | 12 November 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 3565.,3565. |
| Citation | 353 S.C. 291,578 S.E.2d 16 |
| Parties | Ronald E. CLARK, Sr., individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Amy Danielle Clark, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY and Charles Clyde Johnson, Defendants, Of whom South Carolina Department of Public Safety is the Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Andrew F. Lindemann and William H. Davidson, II, both of Columbia, for Appellant.
Sammy Diamaduros, of Union; Suzanne E. Coe, of Atlanta, for Respondent.
This case arises out of the death of a motorist who was struck and killed by a suspect fleeing from a high-speed police pursuit. Ronald Clark, as personal representative of the estate of his daughter, Amy Clark, sued the South Carolina Department of Public Safety (the Department) and Charles Clyde Johnson, the suspect, after Amy was fatally injured when Johnson crossed the center line and struck her vehicle. Clark alleged the Department's employees failed to properly supervise the pursuit and to terminate it before the fatal accident. The jury returned a verdict for Clark against both the Department and Johnson. The Department appeals. We affirm.
In the early morning hours of April 5, 1997, state trooper Greg Bradley of the South Carolina Highway Patrol observed a van driven by Johnson traveling 57 m.p.h. in an area with a posted speed limit of 45 m.p.h. Johnson, who was under the influence of drugs and alcohol, was driving erratically and not using his turn signals. Bradley activated his blue lights and siren and attempted to stop the van, but Johnson refused to stop. Bradley called in the van's license plate number to dispatchers and advised he was commencing pursuit.
Johnson made several turns, disregarded a stop sign, and eventually stopped in a gravel parking lot. As Bradley exited his vehicle and approached the back of the van, Johnson suddenly put the van into reverse and tried to run over him. Johnson hurriedly drove off, throwing gravel into the air. Bradley advised the dispatchers that he had almost been hit, and he resumed the pursuit. Bradley saw Johnson run off the left side of the road and spin around while traveling at a high rate of speed. Bradley radioed that he believed Johnson was going to wreck the vehicle.
Trooper Thomas Justice joined the pursuit and attempted to slow the van down by pulling in front of it. Johnson went around him by driving into the opposing lane of traffic. It was approximately 1:30 a.m. and there was no traffic at that time. Bradley continued following Johnson, and Justice fell into position behind Bradley. As the secondary officer involved in the pursuit, Justice took over most of the radio communications so Bradley could focus on the pursuit.
Around the time Justice joined the pursuit, dispatchers notified the troopers that the van had been reported stolen. Bradley observed light traffic as they drove through a straight portion of the road. Bradley attempted to pass Johnson on the left and get in front of the van in order to slow it down, but Johnson tried to run him off the road. As they approached an intersection, Johnson ran a red light and almost "T-boned," or broadsided, another car. The troopers slowed down to safely clear the intersection. The troopers traveled at speeds of 80 and 85 m.p.h. in their attempt to catch Johnson.
As Johnson proceeded toward the North Carolina border, then only five or six miles away, he came upon a pickup truck. Johnson tried to pass the truck on the right using the emergency lane, but the truck also pulled to the right. Johnson immediately jerked the van to the left, crossed the center line, and crashed head-on into a vehicle driven by Amy Clark. The van became airborne before crashing into some nearby woods and catching on fire. The troopers' cars did not make contact with the other vehicles. The entire chase occurred over an area of approximately eight miles and lasted from six to eight minutes.
Amy died at the scene.1 Sergeant John Vaughn was the district supervisor on call that night. Vaughn called in and inquired whether a supervisor was needed when he heard Bradley tell the dispatchers he was initiating a pursuit. Vaughn could not recall, however, whether he had actually monitored any portion of the pursuit. Trooper Lonnie Plyler, the supervisor for the second shift,2 did not monitor the pursuit because he was handling the administration of a breathalyzer examination. Plyler was unaware who the third-shift supervisor was for that evening, but Plyler did go to the scene of the accident after Justice radioed for a supervisor.
Clark brought this action under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act against the Department and Johnson for the death of his daughter. Johnson went into default and was unable to contest his liability. At trial, the jury returned a verdict for Clark for $3.75 million in total damages against both Johnson and the Department on his wrongful death claim. The jury apportioned 80 per cent fault to Johnson and 20 per cent to the Department, resulting in a verdict against Johnson for $3.0 million and against the Department for $750,000. The trial court reduced the verdict against the Department to $250,000 in accordance with the limit imposed by the Tort Claims Act.3
Although it is not clear from the transcript, at some point the jury submitted a note regarding its verdict, which reads as follows:
The Vehicle [and] Foot Pursuit Policy of SCDPS [the Department] dictates supervision of all pursuits. During this pursuit no supervisors were present or notified until after the pursuit was ended. It is our decision that this designates gross neglect on the behalf of SCDPS.
The Department thereafter moved for JNOV, new trial absolute, and new trial nisi remittitur. The trial court denied the motions. The Department appeals.
The Department first contends Clark was unable to sustain his burden of proof regarding its liability for Amy's death. Specifically, the Department argues the trial court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict and for JNOV because Clark failed to demonstrate Bradley was grossly negligent in initiating, continuing, or failing to terminate the pursuit of Johnson. The Department also asserts the jury's note constituted a special verdict indicating the jury did not find the trooper was grossly negligent, and there could be no "derivative" or "cumulative" liability by the supervisor in the absence of gross negligence by the trooper. The Department argues it is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Tort Claims Act renders state agencies and governmental entities "liable for their torts in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, subject to the limitations" and exemptions contained within the Act.4
In addition to the Tort Claims Act, section 56-5-760 of the South Carolina Code addresses the civil liability of operators of authorized emergency vehicles. This statute authorizes police officers using a vehicle equipped with a siren and flashing light to exceed the maximum speed limit and to disregard certain traffic regulations during a police pursuit.5 The statute further provides, however, that these provisions "do not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons."6 At trial, the parties agreed the applicable standard for liability in this case was gross negligence, and the trial court charged the jury that it was to determine whether the defendants' gross negligence proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.7 Because no issue is raised on appeal regarding the standard for culpability, it becomes the law of the case and we will, therefore, apply the gross negligence standard agreed to by the parties.8
Gross negligence has been defined a number of ways. Our supreme court recently stated "[g]ross negligence is the intentional, conscious failure to do something which is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do."9 "It is the failure to exercise even the slightest care."10 It has also been defined as "the absence of care that is necessary under the circumstances."11
The existence of gross negligence is ordinarily a mixed question of both law and fact.12 "When the evidence supports but one reasonable inference, it is solely a question of law for the court[;] otherwise it is an issue best resolved by the jury."13
"In ruling on motions for directed verdict and JNOV, the trial court is required to view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions and to deny the motions where either the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt."14 "The trial court can only be reversed by this Court when there is no evidence to support the ruling below."15
As noted above, the jury submitted a statement at trial regarding its verdict. The statement suggested the jury found the Department grossly negligent because of the failure of supervisors to monitor the pursuit and the failure to call it off. In its brief, the Department argues the statement served the same purpose as a special verdict. The Department also argues the trial court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict and JNOV because the allegations regarding the lack of supervision only gave rise to "derivative" or "cumulative" liability and do not independently support the jury's verdict in the absence of gross negligence by the trooper.
We hold, however, the note did not transform the verdict into a special verdict and there was evidence to warrant submission of the question of the Department's liability to the jury. The statement does not exclude a finding of gross negligence on...
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