Clark v. Ellerthorpe

• Citation: 552 A.2d 1186
• Decision Date: 30 January 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-53-C,88-53-C
• Parties: Sidney A. CLARK v. Donald E. ELLERTHORPE. A.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Page 1186

552 A.2d 1186

Sidney A. CLARK v. Donald E. ELLERTHORPE.

No. 88-53-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 30, 1989.

Matthew F. Medeiros, Flanders & Medeiros, Providence, for plaintiff.

James E. O'Neil, Atty. Gen., Jeffrey J. Greer, and Annie Goldberg, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendant.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner, Sidney A. Clark (Clark), the defendant in State v. Clark, 423 A.2d 1151 (R.I.1980), appeals from a Superior Court judgment denying his application for postconviction relief. The case came before this court on December 12, 1988, pursuant to an order directing both parties to show cause why the issues raised by this appeal should not be summarily decided. After careful consideration of the record and memoranda submitted by both parties and after hearing the arguments of counsel, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown.

In November of 1974 Clark attacked a fellow inmate, Claude Saunders, at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), viciously stabbing him to death with a "shank" or makeshift knife. The gory details of the prison slaying and our subsequent affirmance of petitioner's second degree murder conviction are contained in State v. Clark. Clark, currently serving a life sentence in prison, advances two arguments in favor of reversing the trial court's decision and granting his application for postconviction relief.

The first issue raised by petitioner challenges the improper admission of evidence obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. During the course of the murder investigation, the State Police directly applied benzidine, a carcinogenic substance, to the bodies of inmates suspected of killing Saunders. As used by law enforcement authorities to detect the presence of otherwise undetectable blood, benzidine is a rust-colored chemical which turns blue upon contact with certain enzymes in blood. The police, although knowing of the carcinogenic properties of benzidine, nevertheless liberally swabbed the chemical solution on Clark's skin. Clark tested positive for traces of blood. The petitioner argues that the compelled benzidine test violated his federal and state constitutional rights. The admission of evidence procurred from such an egregious constitutional infraction, Clark argues, cannot be considered harmless error.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals examined the constitutionality of this incident in Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4 (1st Cir.1983), a civil rights action brought by the inmates under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1981), and upheld District Court judgments against the prison warden and the police officers for violating the inmates' Fourteenth Amendment rights. ¹ Our only line of inquiry, therefore, is to determine whether the admission of the results of the benzidine test constituted harmless error. In denying Clark's application for postconviction relief, the trial court found that the benzidine evidence was cumulative and that any error committed in admitting it was harmless. We agree.

The erroneous admission of constitutionally tainted evidence is harmless only in situations in which there is proof "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967); see State v. Smith, 446 A.2d 1035, 1036 (R.I.1982). The state bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless. See generally State v. Carmody, 471 A.2d 1363, 1366 (R.I.1984). To determine whether reversible error occurred, "it is necessary to review the facts of the case and the evidence adduced at trial." Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 11 L.Ed.2d 171, 173 (1963). In the case at bar, the undisputed facts establish that petitioner entered Saunder's cell and brutally stabbed him to death. Earlier that day Clark had approached the victim's brother, Charles Saunders, also an inmate at the ACI, and stated that he intended "to scare" the victim because Saunders owed him an ounce of marijuana. Clark then threatened to kill Charles with a knife if he attempted to defend his brother. Later that afternoon two inmates observed Clark entering the victim's cell with a knife in hand. One of these witnesses testified that he saw Clark repeatedly stabbing Saunders about his upper torso. Shortly after the time of the murder, the police found the murder weapon wrapped in a towel behind a dislodged ceiling tile. Prior to conducting the benzidine test, the police, having probable cause, searched Clark's cell and discovered a shirt and a shoe stained with blood matching the victim's bloodtype.

We are satisfied that there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence concerning the benzidine test contributed to Clark's conviction. Although obtained in violation of petitioner's constitutional rights, the benzidine evidence was cumulative and of minimal significance. The evidence of guilt against Clark was overwhelming and the benzidine test results merely provided additional cumulative and inconsequential proof. Consequently we hold that the error committed in admitting the benzidine evidence was harmless.

The second issue raised by petitioner addresses ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Because trial counsel failed to assert a constitutional challenge to the admission of the benzidine evidence on the specific ground of its carcinogenicity, Clark claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. ² We find petitioner's argument unpersuasive.

It is well settled that the Federal and State Constitutions guarantee persons accused of a crime the right to effective assistance of counsel in their defense. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Santos v. Laurie, 433 F.Supp. 195 (D.R.I.1977); State v. D'Alo, 477 A.2d 89 (R.I.1984). As we noted in State v. Desroches, 110 R.I. 497, 293 A.2d 913 (1972), " 'Effective' does not mean successful. It means conscientious, meaningful representation wherein the accused is advised of his rights and honest, learned and able counsel is given a reasonable opportunity to perform the task assigned to him." Id. at 501, 293...