Clark v. Groose, 94-1174
| Decision Date | 14 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-1174,94-1174 |
| Parties | Vance Roy CLARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael GROOSE, George Adams, Gerald Bommell, James Eberle, John Sydow, Donald Kempker, Petters, Stanley Chris Swicord, Defendants-Appellees, John Doe, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Chuck D. Brown, Joplin, MO, argued, for appellant.
Bruce Farmer, Jefferson City, MO, argued (Barbara Michelle Ward, on the brief), for appellees.
Before FAGG, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
Vance Roy Clark, a Missouri inmate, appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants in this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. We affirm.
On June 23, 1992, pursuant to an order from Michael Groose, Superintendent of the Jefferson City Correctional Center, Clark was placed in Temporary Administrative Segregation Confinement (TASC). Separate boxes were marked on the TASC form indicating that Clark was being placed in temporary administrative segregation because of a "serious wrongdoing" he was observed to have committed, the existence of an "immediate security risk," and the "urgent need" to separate him for his safety and that of the other inmates. Appellant's App. at 2. On June 29, 1992, Clark was brought before an Adjustment Board, which cited a pending first-degree murder charge as the reason for Clark's placement in temporary administrative segregation. A week later a classification team heard Clark's case and confirmed the Adjustment Board's finding that Clark was placed in TASC because of a pending first-degree murder charge.
Clark argues that (1) he was impermissibly placed in administrative segregation for punitive reasons; (2) the district court erred in refusing to disclose certain in camera documents; and (3) he was treated disparately in that he was held in administrative segregation when other inmates, who also had pending first-degree murder charges, were released into the general prison population.
It is well settled that an inmate is entitled to certain due process rights prior to the imposition of punishment for past misconduct. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-70, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-82, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Brown-El v. Delo, 969 F.2d 644, 647 (8th Cir.1992). Thus, an inmate facing disciplinary proceedings is entitled to, among other things, advance written notice of the claimed misconduct and a hearing at which he may call witnesses and present documentary evidence. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 562-67, 94 S.Ct. at 2978-80. However, provided the reasons for segregation are not punitive, an inmate may be placed in administrative segregation without a hearing, 1 unless a statute creates a liberty interest for the prisoner. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 474-76, 103 S.Ct. 864, 872-77, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Brown-El, 969 F.2d at 647; Haley v. Groose, 873 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Mo.1994) (en banc). A state statute creates such a liberty interest if it uses " 'mandatory language in connection with particularized substantive standards or criteria that significantly guide administrative decisions.' " Haley, 873 S.W.2d at 223 (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472, 103 S.Ct. at 871).
Under Missouri's relevant statutory provision, Mo.Ann.Stat. Sec. 217.375.1, 2 the chief prison administrator's decision to place a prisoner in administrative segregation is discretionary. Therefore, "[b]y not using mandatory language in Sec. 217.375.1, the General Assembly does not give [an inmate] a liberty interest in his initial placement in protective custody." Id. Under these circumstances, an inmate is entitled only to an informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting his transfer to administrative segregation within a reasonable time after being confined in order for due process to be satisfied. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472, 103 S.Ct. at 871-72.
We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Sperry v. Bauermeister, Inc., 4 F.3d 596, 597 (8th Cir.1993). We find no evidence in the record that supports Clark's contention that he was placed in administrative segregation for punitive reasons. Clark relies on the fact that the TASC form listed a "serious wrongdoing" (an infraction that ordinarily would require a hearing) among the reasons he was assigned to administrative segregation when in fact he committed no wrongdoing, and information he received from his attorney...
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