Clark v. Kern
| Decision Date | 31 March 1893 |
| Citation | 146 Ill. 348,35 N.E. 60 |
| Parties | CLARK v. KERN, County Treasurer. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Cook county court; Frank Scales, Judge.
Application by Charles Kern, county treasurer, for judgment for delinquent special assessment. Robert R. Clark, a property owner, filed objections, which were overruled, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Montgomery & Montgomery, for appellant.
F. W. C. Hayes, (John S. Miller, of counsel,) for appellee.
This was an application to the county court of Cook county by the county collector for judgment against the land of the appellant for the delinquent special assessment levied for the purpose of paying the costs of laying drains in Belmont avenue, in the city of Chicago. The appellant appeared specially for the purpose of questioning the validity of the judgment of the county court confirming the assessment, and interposed certain objections to the effect that the commissioners who made the assessment knew that the appellant was the owner of the premises in question, and knew his name and residence, but neglected to send to him the notice of the assessment which was required by the statute to be sent to him by mail. In support of his objections the appellant offered evidence tending to show that at the time the assessment was levied he was, and for 30 years prior thereto had been, the owner of the premises assessed; that one or more of the commissioners who made the assessment knew that he was the owner thereof, and knew his name and residence, but that the appellant received no notice of the assessment by mail, and that no notice was in fact sent to him on that matter. This evidence was excluded, and the appellant's objections were thereupon overruled, and judgment was rendered for the sale of his land for the assessment. It appears that one of the commissioners filed his affidavit of the mailing of notices of the assessment to the owners whose premises had been assessed in the statutory form, viz. ‘that the said commissioners did cause to be sent by mail to the owners whose premises have been assessed by said commissioners, and whose names and places of residence were known to them, or either of them, the notice required by law to be sent by mail to the owners of premises assessed,’ (giving a substantial copy of the notice thus sent by mail.) With this evidence before it, the court rendered a judgment of confirmation against the appellant by default.
Sufficient proof was made of the posting and publication of notice by the commissioners, and the only question is whether in this collateral proceeding the appellant will be permitted to impeach the judgment of confirmation by showing that in point of fact no notice was sent by mail to him. The evidence before the court at the time that judgment was rendered was sufficient, prima facie, to show compliance by the commissioners with all the provisions of the statute in relation to notice, and to establish the jurisdiction of the court to render a judgment of confirmation; and we are of the opinion that, after having acted upon such evidence, its judgment is not open to collateral attack. It is the general rule that, where the court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter in a particular case, its judgment, unless reversed or annulled in a direct proceeding, is conclusive, and is not open to collateral impeachment by the parties thereto or their privies. 1 Black, Judgm. § 345. This rule has been applied by this court to judgments confirming special assessments so frequently that it is unnecessary for us to do more than cite the cases where such application has been made. People v. Brislin, 80 Ill. 423; Lehmer v. People, Id. 601; Prout v. People, 83 Ill. 154; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. People, Id. 467, Andrews v. People, Id. 529; Gage v. Parker, 103 Ill. 528;Blake v. People, 109 Ill. 504;Riverside Co. v. Howell, 113 Ill. 256;Schertz v. People, 105 Ill. 27...
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