Clark v. Mask, 40577
| Decision Date | 18 November 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 40577,40577 |
| Citation | 98 So.2d 467,232 Miss. 65 |
| Parties | George CLARK, Minor, by Cecil and Bessie Clark, Father and Mother and Next Friends, v. V. B. MASK. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Sam Lumpkin, Tupelo, Byrd P. Mauldin, Pontotoc, for appellant.
J. B. Doty, Pontotoc, Mitchell & McNutt, Tupelo, for appellee.
The appellant, George Clark, a minor, appearing by his father and mother as next friends, brought this suit in the Circuit Court of Pontotoc County against the appellee, V. B. Mask, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him as a result of a collision between an automobile in which he was riding as a guest and a pickup truck driven by the appellee, V. B. Mask. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the defendant below, and the plaintiff below appeals to this Court.
The collision occurred at about 6:15 o'clock on the evening of December 4, 1954, on Highway 45 about 3 1/2 miles east of Shannon, Mississippi, in Lee County. The automobile in which the appellant was riding was a 1953 Chevrolet owned by Condie Oliver and driven by his son, Marvin Lee Oliver. The appellant was sitting on the right side of the front seat. The automobile was proceeding in an easterly direction. The pickup truck was a 1954 Chevrolet driven by the appellee and also traveling in an easterly direction on said highway and preceding the vehicle in which the appellant was riding. It was dark and the lights of both vehicles were on. The appellant and Marvin Lee Oliver, the driver of the Chevrolet automobile, were of the ages of about 18 and 17 years respectively. They were going to Nettleton where they had dates with two girls. The collision occurred at or near an intersection. The intersection is formed by a north and south gravel road crossing paved Highway 45, which runs in an east and west direction. The impact of the collision caused the driver of the automobile to lose control and to run off the highway. The automobile turned over one or more times and came to rest upside down on the north side of the paved highway and about 20 feet east of the intersection.
We need not further detail the evidence. It is sufficient to state, in substance, the proof for the respective parties and to say that the evidence was conflicting and presented two contradictory versions of the accident.
The proof for the appellee showed that he was driving his pickup truck east on Highway 45 at a rate of speed of about 15 miles per hour, approaching the intersection and traveling on his righthand side of the highway; that when he reached a point about 50 or 60 feet from the intersection he slowed down and signalled for a left turn at the intersection, and just before he started to turn and while his truck was still on his righthand side of the highway, the automobile in which the appellant was riding approached from behind at a rate of speed of about 65 or 70 miles per hour, and in undertaking to pass, struck the left rear of the appellee's truck and ran off the highway and turned over, causing the appellant's injuries.
The proof for the appellant showed that the driver of the automobile in which appellant was riding was traveling east on Highway 45 at a rate of speed of about 45 or 50 miles per hour; that when he was about 200 feet from the point of collision he saw the truck ahead of him and blinked his lights to indicate his intention to pass; that he then began to turn into his left lane of the highway for the purpose of passing; that the driver of the truck, without giving any signal of his intention to turn left, drove his truck to the left across the center of the highway, with his left front and rear wheels across the center line of the highway, and then as the automobile got about opposite him, turned his truck sharply to the right, causing the left rear of the truck to strike the right rear of the automobile and resulting in the appellant's injuries.
In this state of the evidence, the trial court in its instructions submitted to the jury, and we think properly so, the issue as to whether the injuries of the appellant were proximately caused or contributed to by the negligence of the appellee, or whether such injuries were solely caused by the negligence of the driver of the automobile in which the appellant was riding.
It is urged by the appellant, however, as grounds for the reversal of the judgment of the court below that the verdict of the jury is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. We do not agree. The evidence was clearly conflicting and presented an issue of fact for the determination of the jury, and the verdict of the jury is supported by substantial evidence.
The appellant further complains tht the trial court erred in refusing his request for the following instruction:
'The Court instructs the Jury for the Plaintiff that under the law it is a violation of the Statutes to leave the scene of an accident and the fact that the Defendant left the scene of the accident is a strong presumption that he was guilty of negligence by failing to stay at the scene of the accident and render first aid to the Plaintiff and assist in calling an ambulance and discharging other duties owed to the Plaintiff.'
In support of this complaint, the appellant invokes Section 8163, Vol. 6, Recompiled, Mississippi Code of 1942, which reads as follows:
'The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall give his name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and shall upon request and if available exhibit his operator's or chauffeur's license to the person struck or the driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle collided with an shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying of such person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the injured person.'
It is not disputed that the appellee failed to comply with this statute. We are of the opinion, however, that no presumption or inference of negligence arose from such failure. We have recently so interpreted this statute in the case of Meadows v. State, 211 Miss. 557, 52 So.2d 289, 291, wherein the Court said:
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Rock v. McHenry
...113 Nev. 824, 942 P.2d 134 (1997). 3. Arkansas: Schlosberg v. Doup, 187 Ark. 931, 63 S.W.2d 337 (1933); Mississippi: Clark v. Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So.2d 467 (1957); Minnesota: Gertken v. Farmers Elevator of Kensington, Minn., Inc., 411 N.W.2d 550 (Minn.Ct.App.1987)(fact issue); and Vermon......
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Gore v. Patrick, 42541
...any intersection. When the proof is sufficient, it is proper to instruct that the violation of this statute is negligence. Clark v. Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So.2d 467. But a driveway leading off a highway to a store is not such an intersection contemplated in the statute. Frizell v. Guthrie, ......
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McHale v. Daniel
...the duty to give signals is not confined to places where such signals are expressly required by statute.' In the case of Clark v. Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So.2d 467 (1957), this Court pointed out that it is not the law that one overtaking another in a motor vehicle is compelled to sound his h......
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Peterson v. Henning
...to plaintiff Peterson's injuries and cites several cases from other jurisdictions in support of this argument. See Clark v. Mask (1957), 232 Miss. 65, 98 So.2d 467; Schlosberg v. Doup (1933), 187 Ark. 931, 63 S.W.2d 337; Springer v. Adams (1927), 37 Ga.App. 344, 140 S.E. 390. Plaintiff coun......