Clark v. Maxwell

Citation150 S.E. 190,197 N.C. 604
Decision Date30 October 1929
Docket Number252.
PartiesCLARK v. MAXWELL, Commissioner of Revenue.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

Appeal from Superior Court, Wake County; Harris, Judge.

Action by W. C. Clark against A. J. Maxwell, Commissioner of Revenue. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed. Action to recover a sum of money paid by plaintiff, under protest, to defendant, as a license tax, for the privilege of engaging in the business of operating a motor-propelled truck for the transportation of property over the public highways of this state, for compensation.

Payment of said license tax was demanded by defendant, as commissioner of revenue of this state, under the provisions of subsection 3, section 165, c. 345, Public Laws of North Carolina 1929. This chapter is entitled "An Act to Raise Revenue." Section 165 of said act is included under Schedule B, which is entitled "License Taxes." Subsection 3 of said section is in words as follows:

"Every person, firm, or corporation, their lessees, trustees receivers, engaged in the business of operating automobiles or other motor vehicles, trucks, tractors, trailers, or semi-trailers, for the transportation of property over the public highways of this State for compensation between termini for a distance of greater than fifty (50) miles either upon call, prearrangement, contract, lease, or other arrangement, shall apply for and procure from the Commissioner of Revenue a State license for the privilege of engaging in such business and shall pay for such license an annual tax as follows:
"For each such motor-propelled vehicle, truck, tractor, trailer, or semi-trailer of a rated carrying capacity of less than three tons, at the rate of forty-five dollars ($45) per ton.
"For such motor-propelled vehicle, truck, tractor, trailer, or semi-trailer of a rated carrying capacity of three tons or over at the rate of seventy-five dollars ($75) per ton."

Plaintiff is a citizen of this state, and the owner of a one-ton, motor-propelled truck. He is engaged in the business of operating said truck for the transportation of property over the public highways of this state for compensation. He operates said truck sometimes between termini which are less, and sometimes between termini which are more, than 50 miles distant from each other, dependent upon the special contract or arrangement made by him with each customer.

He was engaged in such business on June 1, 1929, and since said date he has continued, and now proposes to continue, in such business. Upon defendant's demand, plaintiff has paid to defendant the sum of $45, for which sum a state license has been issued to him, in accordance with the provisions of subsection 3, § 165, c. 345, Public Laws of North Carolina 1929.

Plaintiff conceded that he was liable, under subsection 2, § 165, c. 345, Public Laws of North Carolina 1929, for a license tax of $15. He contended that he is not liable for a license tax, under subsection 3, § 165, c. 345, Public Laws of North Carolina 1929, for the reason that said statute is unconstitutional and void. Plaintiff paid to defendant the sum of $30, under protest.

This action to recover the sum of $30 was begun in the court of a justice of the peace of Wake county, and was heard in the superior court of said county, upon plaintiff's appeal from the judgment of said court.

From the judgment in accordance with the opinion of the court that the statute, under which the license tax was demanded by defendant and paid by the plaintiff, is unconstitutional and void, defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Dennis G. Brummitt, Atty. Gen., and Frank Nash, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Albion Dunn, of Greenville, for appellee.

CONNOR J.

The only question presented for decision by this appeal is whether the statute under which plaintiff has been required to pay a license tax for the privilege of engaging in the business of operating a motor-propelled truck for the transportation of property over the public highways of this state, for compensation, is in violation of section 3 of article 5 of the Constitution of North Carolina, or of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Plaintiff contends that the license tax which he has been required to pay under the provisions of the statute is not uniform, in that the said license tax exceeds the amount of the tax imposed by other statutes upon persons engaged in the same business, and that therefore the statute is in violation of section 3 of article 5 of the Constitution of North Carolina.

Plaintiff further contends that the enforcement of the said statute deprives him of his property without due process of law, and of the equal protection of the law, in that he is required by its provisions to pay a larger sum of money as a license tax than is required of others engaged in the same business, and similarly situated, and that therefore the statute is in violation of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

In reply to the contrary contentions of defendant, plaintiff alleges that the classification made by the statute for the purpose of taxation is unreasonable and arbitrary, in that there is no just or reasonable ground for the classification. If these contentions of the plaintiff are well founded, the judgment should be affirmed; otherwise it must be reversed.

Upon full consideration of these contentions, and of the principles of law, established by authoritative decisions of this court and of the Supreme Court of the United States, we are of opinion that they are not well founded, and that the judgment must be reversed.

There is no express provision in the Constitution of North Carolina that taxes levied by the General Assembly of this state, on trades, professions, franchises, or incomes, as authorized by section 3 of article 5 of said Constitution, shall be uniform. The rule of uniformity, as therein prescribed, is applicable only to taxes on property, real or personal including moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock companies, or otherwise. It is well settled, however, that a tax imposed or authorized by the General Assembly on trades, professions,...

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