Clark v. N.Y., N. H. & H. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 July 1911
• Citation: 80 A. 406,33 R.I. 83
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Parties: CLARK v. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. CO.

80 A. 406

33 R.I. 83

CLARK

v. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 8, 1911.

Blodgett, J., dissenting.

Exception from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; George T. Brown, Judge.

Action by Mary Clark against the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company. The court denied plaintiff's motion for new trial on the question of damages alone on the ground that the verdict in her favor was inadequate, and she brings exceptions. Exceptions sustained, and cause remitted with directions.

A. B. Crafts, for plaintiff.

Joseph C. Sweeney and Eugene J. Phillips, for defendant.

JOHNSON, J. This is an action of trespass on the case for negligence, brought by the plaintiff to recover damages sustained by her by reason of an injury received while a passenger on a train of the defendant. The case was tried before a justice of the superior court and a jury, on June 20, 1910, and succeeding days, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of $2,000. The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion for a new trial, as follows: "And now after verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of two thousand dollars, the plaintiff moves that a new trial of said cause be granted her on the question of damages, and as grounds therefor says: First. That under the law and the evidence, the damages allowed by said verdict are grossly inadequate and insufficient. Second. That the verdict of the jury for $2,000 in favor of the plaintiff is grossly inadequate, and insufficient, and contrary to the evidence, and the weight thereof in its inadequacy. Third. That according to the law and the evidence, the plaintiff should have recovered a very much larger sum than two thousand dollars, and that the verdict for no more than $2,000 as found by the jury is grossly inadequate, and contrary to the evidence and the weight thereof. Wherefore the plaintiff prays that a new trial of said action on the question of the amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled may be granted her."

The trial justice denied the motion of the plaintiff, and in his decision said: "This motion, as understood by the court, is to grant a new trial, limiting such trial to the assessment of damages for the plaintiff by another jury. Upon the question as to whether the amount awarded is inadequate, or what would be the action of the court if the motion filed was to grant a new trial upon that ground, the court now expresses no opinion. Its action is limited to the motion filed." After quoting sections 12 and 485 of the court and practice act, he continues: "It will be observed that the jurisdiction of this court in the matter of granting a new trial is limited to setting aside the verdict and ordering a new trial, and is not extended so as to authorize the granting of a new trial for the assessment of damages merely. * * * Acting upon the assumption that this court has no jurisdiction to grant the motion filed, motion for a new trial on the question of damages' is denied." The plaintiff excepted to the decision of the court denying said motion for a new trial.

The plaintiff's bill of exceptions was seasonably filed and was specially allowed, as follows, by the justice who presided at the trial: "Aug. 3, 1910. The plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the question of damages was denied on the ground that this court had no jurisdiction to grant the motion as stated in its decision on file. To this decision the plaintiff excepted, which exception is hereby allowed." The case is therefore before this court on said exception.

Under the charter, and under the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to new trials has always depended entirely upon statute. Under the authority given by the charter "also to appoint, order and direct, erect and settle such places and courts of jurisdiction for the hearing and determining of all actions, cases, matters and things happening within the said colony and plantation, and which shall be in dispute and depending therein as they shall think fit," the General Assembly in 1677 passed a law entitled "A rehearing after judgment granted," providing that "either the plaintiff or defendant shall each of them have liberty of one rehearing if either of them desire it, and no more." Pub. Laws, R. I. 1636-1705, p. 26. And under various statutes new trials as of course were provided for until 1878. But to come to the power of the courts to grant new trials given them by statute. In Pub. Laws, R. I. 1798, p. 143, the Supreme Judicial Court is given "power to grant new trials in cases where there has been a trial by jury, for reasons for which new trials have been usually granted at common law." In Pub. Laws, R. I. 1822, p. 109, the Supreme Judicial Court is given the same power in the same words. In 1843, the Constitution was adopted. Article 10, § 1, provided that "the judicial power of the state shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the General Assembly may, from time to time, ordain and establish." Section 2 provided, that "the several courts shall have such jurisdiction as may, from time to time, be prescribed by law." In Pub. Laws, R. I. 1844, p. 89, the Supreme Court is given "power to grant a new trial in any case where there has been a trial by jury, for reasons for which new trials have been usually granted at common law," being the same language in which the power had been given to the Supreme Judicial Court before the adoption of the Constitution. In the next revision (Revised Statutes, R. I. 1857) the power to grant new trials is given to the Supreme Court, by chapter 193, § 3, for the same reasons as in the previous revisions since 1798; and chapter 164, § 4, provides that "the said court shall have general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction for the prevention and correction of errors and abuses, where no other remedy is expressly provided by law." The same power as to granting new trials is given to the Supreme Court in Gen. Stats. 1872, c. 210, § 3, and in Pub. Stats. 1882, c. 221, § 3. By the Judiciary Act, passed May 19, 1893, the Supreme Court was separated into two divisions, chapter 1, § 5, providing that "there shall be an appellate division and a common pleas division of the Supreme Court." By chapter 2, § 4, the Supreme Court in its Appellate Division was given "exclusive cognizance and jurisdiction of all motions and petitions for a new trial in any court." By chapter 31, § 5, of said act, a party to a civil suit tried by a jury if he "deem himself entitled to a new trial for reasons for which a new trial is usually granted at common law * * * shall be entitled * * * to have his petition for a new trial * * * heard before and decided by the appellate division of the Supreme Court," upon complying with the course of procedure set out in the succeeding sections of said chapter.

By chapter 23, § 7, of said act, it was provided, inter alia, that: "The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court may, on motion of any party made and filed, together with a statement of the evidence in such cause at said trial in manner as is elsewhere provided in cases of petitions for new trial, set aside any general verdict and order judgment to be entered by the common pleas division in favor of either party upon any special verdict found in any cause; or it may order a new trial generally, or upon any issue submitted at such trial, as upon inspection of all the evidence adduced, and the general and special verdict found therein, to it shall seem just."

In the next revision (Gen. Laws 1896), the same provision as to divisions of the Supreme Court was retained (chapter 221, § 5). The Appellate Division had exclusive jurisdiction of all motions and petitions for a new trial in any court. Chapter 222, § 4. The right of any party deeming himself entitled to a new trial for reasons for which a new trial is usually granted at common law, etc., is preserved in chapter 251, § 5, which is in the same words as chapter 31, 8 5, of the judiciary act, cited supra. And chapter 251, § 11, of said Gen. Laws of 1896, provided that: "The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, having considered any petition for a trial or new trial, or for judgment on special verdict, or motion in arrest of judgment, or any motion of a similar nature or purpose, preferred under the provisions of this chapter, may grant or deny the same; and shall, after deciding all questions raised by the petition or motion, remit the cause and the papers therein to the common pleas division of the Supreme Court, or district court, respectively, with direction to award a new trial therein, and direction when the same may come up for assignment, or direct entry of judgment, and the date thereof, as the case may be. and may make such other or further orders as to costs or otherwise, in the cause, as to law and justice shall appertain."

In November, 1903, section 2 of article 10 of the Constitution, providing that "the several courts shall have such jurisdiction as may, from time to time, be prescribed by law" was annulled by the adoption of article 12 of Amendments of the Constitution, the first section of which was substituted in place of said section 2 and is as follows: "The Supreme Court shall have final revisory and appellate jurisdiction upon all questions of law and equity. It shall have power to issue prerogative writs, and shall also have such other jurisdiction as may, from time to time, be prescribed by law. A majority of its judges shall always be necessary to constitute a quorum. The inferior courts shall have such jurisdiction as may, from time to time, be prescribed by law." Prior to the adoption of this amendment, the Supreme Court had only such jurisdiction as was from time to time prescribed by law. Since that time it has, under the Constitution, final revisory and appellate jurisdiction upon all questions of law and equity, and the power to issue prerogative writs, ...