Labree v. Major

• Decision Date: 22 June 1973
• Docket Number: No. 1392-A,1392-A
• Citation: 111 R.I. 657,306 A.2d 808
• Parties: Francis LABREE et ux. and Colleen Labree, p.p.a. v. Susan L. MAJOR et al. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 808

306 A.2d 808

111 R.I. 657

Francis LABREE et ux. and Colleen Labree, p.p.a. v. Susan L. MAJOR et al.

No. 1392-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 22, 1973.

John F. McBurney, Pawtucket, for plaintiffs.

Swan, Keeney & Jenckes, Henry M. Swan, Conrad M. Cutcliffe, Providence, for defendants.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

This is a civil action brought to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of a collision between two motor vehicles which occurred in Fall River, Massachusetts, on February 27, 1966. At the time of the accident, the plaintiffs, Francis Labree, and his pregnant wife, Sally R. Labree, were passengers in a motor vehicle owned by the defendant, Yvonne Major, and operated by her daughter, the defendant, Susan L. Major (now Susan L. Vierra). The plaintiff Sally Labree seeks to recover for personal injuries, while Colleen Labree, her daughter born two months after the accident, seeks to recover for pain and suffering following prenatal injuries sustained at the time of the accident. Francis Labree, the husband of Sally and father of Colleen, is suing for the expenses of medical treatment and hospitalization of his wife and child.

The case was tried to a jury in the Superior Court, and at the close of evidence defendants' motion for a directed verdict was denied. Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff Colleen in the sum of $23,000 and for plaintiff Francis in the sum of $471.85. Initially, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff Sally but without any award of damages. After appropriate instructions given by the trial justice, the jury in the case of Sally Labree returned a verdict for defendants.

Subsequently, each of the parties moved for a new trial. The motion of defendants and that of Francis Labree were denied by the trial justice. However, he ordered an additur in the amount of $17,000 for the child, Colleen Labree, and granted a new trial on the issue of damages only if the additur was not consented to. Being of the opinion that the jury should have made an award of damages to plaintiff Sally Labree, he found that 'the issue of liability is so clear' and granted plaintiff Sally Labree a new trial on the issue of damages only. The defendants are prosecuting an appeal to this court from the judgments entered.

On February 27, Susan Major left her home in Cumberland, Rhode Island, to visit the Labrees at their home in North Attleboro, Massachusetts. While there, it was decided to visit the battleship Massachusetts, which is moored in Fall River harbor. The defendant Susan drove her mother's car with her fiance, Donald R. Vierra, beside her in the front seat, while Sally and Francis Labree were riding in the rear seat. While moving along Davol Street in Fall River in heavy stop-and-go traffic, the car being operated by Susan struck the rear of a car ahead of it. According to the testimony of Sally Labree, the impact threw her forward so that her stomach struck the front seat and she received a cut over her eye when she came into contact with the back of Vierra's head.

I. Choice of Law

The defendants contend that the trial justice erred in applying the law of the forum, Rhode Island, with respect to the standard of care owed to passengers in a motor vehicle and with respect to the right of recovery for prenatal injuries. The law of Massachusetts, they assert, requires that a guest in a motor vehicle prove gross negligence on the part of the operator in order to recover damages and that the law of that state permits recovery for prenatal injuries only upon a showing that at the time the injuries were sustained the unborn child was viable. They urge that the Massachusetts law should have been applied in this case and on this base their contention that the denial of their motion for directed verdict was error.

In Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917 (1968), this court abandoned the lex loci delicti doctrine for choice of laws in tort cases. In discarding lex loci, our court joined those states in the forefront of the emerging trend in the law of conflicts. While modern authorities nearly unanimously agree that lex loci was an inappropriate doctrine to use for choice of law in our mobile society, no uniformity of approach exists to determine the doctrines which should replace it.

The conflicts problem of the case at hand has proved particularly troublesome for courts and commentators. Forums which hold their drivers to a duty of reasonable care towards their passengers have had difficulty in choosing which law to apply in cases where the accident occurred in a state which only required their drivers to avoid being grossly negligent towards their guests. The variables in such cases are the residence of the host-driver, the residence of the guest-passenger, the locus of the accident, and the choice of the forum. Numerous combinations of circumstances have arisen in the reported cases. Unfortunately, no uniform pattern of decisions has emerged from these cases. However, the Court of Appeals for the State of New York has dealt with the choice-of-law issue in suits by automobile guests against their hosts on at least five occasions in the last ten years. A review of their experience illustrates the confusion and the seeming inconsistencies generated by this particular choice-of-law problem. ¹

In Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963), the plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by a friend on a week-end trip to Canada. While in the Province of Ontario, the car went off the highway into a stone wall, and the plaintiff was seriously injured. Both the plaintiff and driver were New York residents, and the car was registered and insured in New York. The plaintiff brought suit in New York. Ontario law barred automobile guests from recovering any damages from their hosts, while New York recognized no such bar. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the law of the place where the accident occurred governs and that Ontario's guest statute barred recovery. The trial court granted the motion, but the Court of Appeals, in a landmark decision, rejected the traditional lex loci rule and refused to apply Ontario law. The court reiterated its holding in Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954), that '* * * the place 'having the most interest in the problem' (should have) paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context * * * (and) the forum (should) apply the policy of the jurisdiction 'most intimately concerned with the outcome of (the) particular litigation.' (3 Utah L.Rev., pp. 498-499).' Babcock v. Jackson, supra at 481-482 of 12 N.Y.2d 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749, 191 N.E.2d at 283.

The court in Bobcock proceeded to weigh the interests of New York and Ontario in the litigation. If found that Ontario's guest statute was designed to prevent fraudulent and collusive claims by passengers against Ontario defendants and their insurance companies. Since the defendant and his insurer were from New York, Ontario had no real interest in the litigation. New York, on the other hand, required negligent tortfeasors to compensate their guests; and New York had a valid interest in granting a remedy to a New York guest against his New York host for injuries even though the tortious conduct occurred in Ontario. Since New York had the strongest interest in the resolution of the issue presented by the case, the court held that New York law applied.

Babcock v. Jackson, supra, was followed by Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965). The defendant and the plaintiff were New York domiciliaries studying at the University of Colorado. The plaintiff was injured in Colorado when an automobile driven by the defendant collided with another vehicle. The plaintiff brought suit in New York, and the defendant asserted as a defense Colorado's 'guest statute,' which permitted a guest to recover only upon a showing of gross negligence. The court found that the Colorado statute, in addition to preventing fraudulent claims against Colorado insurers, was intended to grant injured parties in other cars priority over the 'ungrateful guest' in the assets of the negligent driver. Relying on the facts that the accident involved injured third parties and that the relationship between the guest and the host arose in Colorado, the court concluded that Colorado had a sufficient interest in the case to require application of its law. However, three judges dissented. Judge Fuld, finding no material distinction in the factual situation in the Colorado case from that in Babcock, wrote: 'The view expressed by the majority is inconsistent not only with the rationale underlying Babcock but with the rule there expressly stated, that the law to be applied to resolve a particular issue in a tort case with multi-jurisdictional contacts is 'the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern' with the matter in issue and 'the strongest interest' in its resolution. (12 N.Y.2d, at pp. 481, 484 (240 N.Y.S.2d at 749, 752, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 285)).' Dym v. Gordon, supra at 129 of 16 N.Y.2d, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 470, 209 N.E.2d at 797.

The New York Court of Appeals faced a similar fact pattern for a third time in Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591, 221 N.E.2d 380 (1966). The plaintiff was visiting the defendants' summer home in Ontario, and, while there, she was injured in an automobile accident as a passenger in a car driven by one of the defendants. Both the plaintiff and the defendants were residents of New York where the car was registered and insured. Suit was instituted in New York, and the defendants interposed the Ontario guest statute as a defense. The court compared the Babcock and Dym decisions and found the notable...