Clark v. Neese

• Decision Date: 31 January 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 2016-CA-01052-SCT CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2012-CA-00653-SCT,2016-CA-01052-SCT CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2012-CA-00653-SCT
• Citation: 262 So.3d 1117
• Parties: Kathryn Schroeder CLARK, With Power of Attorney for Helen Schroeder v. Lisa Younger NEESE, Administratrix of the Estate of Harry L. Schroeder, Deceased
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

262 So.3d 1117

Kathryn Schroeder CLARK, With Power of Attorney for Helen Schroeder

v.Lisa Younger NEESE, Administratrix of the Estate of Harry L. Schroeder, Deceased

NO. 2016-CA-01052-SCT CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2012-CA-00653-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

January 31, 2019

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: DUNBAR DOWDY WATT, WAYNE DOWDY, MAGNOLIA

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: NORMA CARR RUFF, DAN W. WEBB, ROECHELLE RYANN MORGAN, TUPELO

BEFORE WALLER, C.J., MAXWELL AND ISHEE, JJ.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. The motion for rehearing is denied. The previous opinion is withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted therefor. Helen Schroeder appeals the Lowndes County Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment to the Estate of Harry Schroeder, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the Estate was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the grounds of release, res judicata, and accord and satisfaction. We reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. This is the second time we have considered an appeal by Helen Schroeder ("Helen"), after the grant of summary judgment to the Estate of Harry Schroeder ("Harry").¹ The facts regarding the car accident and the original cause of action are set out in this Court's opinion in Clark v. Neese ("Clark I "), 131 So.3d 556, 558 (Miss. 2013) :

A log truck driven by Royce Sullivan collided with the rear of an automobile being driven by Harry Schroeder, who had just pulled his car onto a highway in Lowndes County. Harry died as a result of the accident, and his wife, Helen–who was a passenger in her husband's car–suffered severe injuries, permanent disability, and diminished mental capacity. Helen–both individually, and as one of Harry's wrongful-death beneficiaries–sued Sullivan in federal court, alleging that Sullivan's negligence had caused Harry's death and her permanent disability.... Sullivan moved for summary judgment at the close of discovery, arguing that the uncontradicted evidence established Harry's negligence as the sole cause of the accident. In denying summary judgment, the federal judge stated that the evidence created a jury question as to Sullivan's fault, and that "plaintiffs do not appear to dispute Harry Schroeder's potential contributory negligence." The parties settled and agreed to a release of claims, and the district court dismissed the case.

Following the settlement agreement, release, and subsequent dismissal of the action against Sullivan, Helen filed suit against Harry in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi. Id. Helen alleged that Harry negligently had failed to yield the right of way and pulled in front of Sullivan's log truck at an extremely slow rate of speed, causing the accident which resulted in Helen's permanent disability. Id.

¶3. In response, on August 17, 2010, Harry moved for summary judgment and argued that Helen had pleaded facts in her complaint that were materially different from the facts she had alleged in the federal district court. Id. Harry asserted that the trial court should grant summary judgment based on the doctrines of judicial and equitable estoppel. Id. Harry also argued that the settlement and release of claims against Sullivan in federal court barred the circuit-court action under the doctrines of contractual release, accord and satisfaction,² and res judicata. Id.

¶4. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Harry and found that Helen was judicially estopped from bringing a claim against Harry. Id. The trial court reasoned that, although Helen discovered Harry's potential fault during discovery, she had made the conscious decision not to add Harry as a defendant to avoid losing diversity jurisdiction, and as a result, her failure to add Harry in federal court barred her from bringing suit in the circuit court.³ Id. The trial court declined to rule on the merits regarding Harry's arguments of equitable estoppel, accord and satisfaction, and merger. Id.

¶5. On December 12, 2013, this Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case. Id. at 562. In regard to whether Helen's suit was barred by judicial estoppel, this Court held

[W]e need not determine whether Helen's positions actually were knowingly inconsistent because we find it abundantly clear from the record that, when the federal district court denied Sullivan's motion for summary judgment, [it] was not required to accept or rely on Helen's prior position—an absolute requirement for the application of judicial estoppel.

Id.

¶6. In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, this Court directed the trial court to rule on Harry's claims of equitable estoppel, accord and satisfaction, contractual release, and merger. Id.

¶7. On remand, Harry again moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on the basis of res judicata, accord and satisfaction, and contractual release.

¶8. Aggrieved, Helen again has appealed, raising the following issues:

I. Whether the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi ("trial court") erred in granting summary judgment on the basis that the suit was barred by the doctrine of merger because all four elements of res judicata were satisfied.

II. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the satisfaction, release, and indemnity agreement ("release agreement") was "clear, definite, explicit, harmonious in all its provisions, and free from ambiguity throughout," and therefore, was a valid release of all claims stemming from the collision.

III. Whether the trial court improperly determined that the release agreement, coupled with the $ 300,000 payment, and the plaintiff's subsequent acceptance of the payment, operated as an accord and satisfaction of all the plaintiff's claims stemming from the cause of action.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9. We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. City of Jackson v. Shavers , 97 So.3d 686, 688 (Miss. 2012) (citing Arcadia Farms P'ship v. Audubon Ins. Co. , 77 So.3d 100, 104 (Miss. 2012) ).

DISCUSSION

I. Whether Helen's suit is barred by res judicata.

¶10. In its order granting summary judgment, the trial court found, "Because the four identities of res judicata are present, the Court rules that the doctrine of merger as it relates to res judicata applies to this action." Merger is a bar under res judicata for an action that should have been litigated, rather than a claim that actually was litigated. See Jeffrey Jackson & Mary Miller, Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law § 14:6 (2001). See also Hill v. Carroll Cty. , 17 So.3d 1081, 1084-85 (Miss. 2009). Helen argues that the trial court erred in barring her suit under the merger doctrine because the elements required for res judicata are not met. Helen asserts that, since Harry was not a party to the original suit, the identities of the parties are different in the two suits, and the federal district court's final judgment was "not a judgment on the merits" as contemplated by the doctrine of res judicata.⁴

¶11. Conversely, Harry responds that the doctrine of merger is appropriate, because Helen's claims for personal injuries resulting from the accident merged into the agreed judgment against Sullivan. As a result, Harry contends that Helen is barred from continuing to pursue her claims against Harry that could have been asserted in the federal suit.

¶12. The doctrine of res judicata operates to bar a subsequent attempt to litigate a claim already decided. Harrison v. Chandler-Sampson Ins., Inc. , 891 So.2d 224, 232 (Miss. 2005). Further, the doctrine

[R]eflects the refusal of the law to tolerate a multiplicity of litigation. It is a doctrine of public policy designed to avoid the "expense and vexation" of attending multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources and foster reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibilities of inconsistent decisions.

Little v. V & G Welding Supply, Inc. , 704 So.2d 1336, 1337 (Miss. 1997) (citing Montana v. United States , 440 U.S. 147, 153-54, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973-74, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) ).

¶13. The doctrine of res judicata generally requires the presence of four identities: "(1) identity of the subject matter of the action, (2) identity of the cause of action, (3) identity of the parties to the cause of action, and (4) identity of the quality or character of a person against whom the claim is made." Hinton v. Rolison , 175 So.3d 1252, 1258 (Miss. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. LaVere , 895 So.2d 828, 832 (Miss. 2004) ). When those identities are present, res judicata precludes "parties from litigating in a second action claims within the scope of the judgment of the first action." Anderson , 895 So.2d at 832.

A. Identity of the Subject Matter of the Action

¶14. Res judicata "bars a second action between the same parties on the subject matter directly involved in the prior action." Harrison , 891 So.2d at 232. This Court's ruling in Harrison referred to subject matter as "the substance of the lawsuit." Id. at 232-33. In the current case, the subject matter presented before both the federal and state suits is the same. In Bell v. Dixon , the Court of Appeals found that where both cases concerned the same automobile accident, the subject-matter identity of res judicata was met. Bell v. Dixon , 976 So.2d 965, 968 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) ; see also Little , 704 So.2d at 1338 (holding that the subject matter of a federal suit and state suit, both of which concerned who was responsible for the death of two welders, satisfied the subject-matter requirement of res judicata). Likewise, in the current action, the subject matter of both the federal and state lawsuits was the automobile collision that occurred between Sullivan and Harry. Therefore, this element of res judicata is met.

B. Identity of the Cause of Action

¶15. This identity requires the "cause of action" in both suits to be the same. This Court has defined "cause of action" as the underlying facts and circumstances upon which a claim has been brought. Hill , 17...