Clark v. State ex rel. Rubin, 59-673
| Decision Date | 12 September 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 59-673,59-673 |
| Citation | 122 So.2d 807 |
| Parties | George T. CLARK, Frank B. Dowling, W. F. Blanton, as Judges of the County Court in and for Dade County, Florida, and the Administrator of Jackson Memorial Hospital, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida ex rel. Kate RUBIN, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Darrey A. Davis, County Atty., and Wm. W. Gibbs, Asst. County Atty., Miami, for appellants.
Stanley S. Stein and Julius J. Perlmutter, Miami Beach, for appellees.
This is an authorized appeal, by respondents in a habeas corpus action in the circuit court, from an order discharging the petitioner from the custody to which she had been committed by the county judge.
In the proceeding before the county judge, under § 394.22, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., relating to adjudication of persons mentally or physically incompetent, the county judge had made an order under subsection 12 thereof 'certifying' the petitioner to Institute-Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami, Florida, for care and treatment and observation for a period not to exceed 90 days, upon finding her to be temporarily incompetent. The complete order as entered by the county judge was as follows:
'In the County Judges' Court in and for Dade County, Florida
'In Re:
File No. 10304 Kate Rubin
'This Cause came on for hearing before the Court upon inquisition of incompetency of Kate Rubin, and the Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses appearing at the said hearing and having considered the report of the Examining Committee heretofore appointed by this Court to ascertain the mental and physical condition of the said Kate Rubin, and it appearing unto the Court that the said Kate Rubin is temporarily incompetent and, through specialized care and treatment, may be restored to competency; upon consideration thereof, it is now therefore:
'Ordered and Adjudged that the said Kate Rubin be, and she is hereby certified to Institute-Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami, Florida, for admission to Institute, Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami, Florida, there to be subject to intensive care, treatment, and observation for a period not to exceed 90 days as provided by law, and for such further and other disposition as may be provided by law.
'Done and Ordered in Chambers at Miami, Dade County, Florida, this 24th day of September, 1959.
'George T. Clark
(County)
(Judge)
(Seal)'
The statute under which the petitioner was ordered temporarily confined in the hospital, § 394.22(12), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., as amended and enlarged in 1959 (Ch. 59-42, § 1) is entitled 'Temporary hospitalization and confinement; procedure for adjudication of mental incompetency; discharge; temporary guardian.' That section of the statute covers several pages and it would unduly lengthen this opinion to quote it. The statute provided for the action which was taken by the county judge; provided that a party so committed or 'certified' to a hospital could be discharged by the head of the hospital when the staff of the hospital regarded him as competent; or when within a certain period after such a commitment, the hospital staff is of the opinion that the party is mentally incompetent and should be retained longer, further proceedings are outlined to be had before the county judge; further determinations and procedures by the head of the hospital and by the county judge are specified depending upon the subsequent condition of the party; and the guardian provided for in that section of the statute is a temporary guardian to be appointed by the county judge, of the property of the party, but not of the person of such party unless such party thereafter shall be adjudged incompetent.
On October 15, 1959, approximately three weeks after she was ordered into custody of the hospital by the county judge, the petitioner filed in the circuit court a petition for writ of habeas corpus. She named as respondents the three judges of the county judge's court and the administrator of Jackson Memorial Hospital. In passing it should be noted that the person to be named as the respondent in a habeas corpus action is the party holding custody and who is in a position to produce the petitioner physically. 1 In this instance that was the administrator of the hospital. The judge or judges of the court who entered the order as a result of which the petitioner was placed in the custody of the hospital should not have been made respondents. 2
The writ was issued on October 15, 1959, and made returnable the next day. An answer and motion to quash were filed by the county attorney on behalf of the respondent hospital administrator. The answer disclosed that the petitioner was being held pursuant to the county judge's order shown hereinabove.
On October 16, 1959, the court heard testimony of a Dr. Michael M. Gilbert and then the hearing was recessed to October 20. After being identified and qualified, the testimony given by the doctor on direct examination was as follows:
'Q. In narrative fashion, Doctor, will you tell the Court what examination you made of Kate Rubin and what your findings were, if any? A. I examined Mrs. Rubin at the Jackson Memorial Hospital on September 22, 1959, at which time I reviewed the hospital records. My examination revealed that she was suffering from manic depressive reaction and was in partial remission. At the time I saw her she was in a fairly good state of remission though she required some additional treatment. I felt that she should or could be treated as an out-patient with psychotherapy and medication.
'Q. What was your diagnosis? A. Manic depressive reactions are not so difficult to handle. It is a condition something like diabetes, which is never cured, but it certainly can be cured. I have many patients suffering from this condition for many years--housewives, mothers and businessmen, and they get along without difficulty so long as they are under some supervision.
'Q. Take the patient Kate Rubin. Is it your opinion that her incarceration under lock and key might have some effect on her condition? A. Generally speaking, the idea of her being locked up in a mental ward would disturb a patient and cause a lot of emotional distress.
'Q. Do you know how much it costs per day for the treatment of Mrs. Rubin at the Jackson Memorial Hospital? A. Not exactly. I think it is $26. a day, plus medication.
'No further questions.
The cross-examination was equally brief, viz.:
'Q. Doctor, how long did you spend with Mrs. Rubin on the occasion you recently examined her? A. I didn't time it; probably an hour and a half.
'Q. Did you make any report to County Judge Clark in connection with this particular individual? A. Yes, I testified on September 24th at a hearing before the County Judge.
'Q. Had you ever seen, examined or treated this woman before? A. No.
'The Court: How old is she, Doctor?
'The Witness: I don't have any clinical records with me. I think she is in her fifties.
'The Court: This certificate says she is 54. Is that about right?
'The Witness: Yes.
'Q. I take it that it is your position that you will confirm the testimony you gave before Judge Clark? A. Yes.
'The Court: What was that testimony?
'Mr. Gibbs: It has not been transcribed. I believe Mr. Colman was the Reporter at the hearing.
'The Court: Maybe the doctor can remember it.
'The Witness: It was substantially the same as I have given here.
'The Court: Is it your recommendation that she be incarcerated?
'The Witness: I feel that she should be treated as an out-patient.
'The Court: Why was she incarcerated, if you know?
'The Witness: The report was read at the trial under Dr. Corwin's signature, but, as I understand the procedure, the Resident probably examined her and wrote the report.'
The hearing was resumed on October 20. No further testimony was taken, and the matter was argued by counsel. Thereafter the court entered its judgment discharging the petitioner from the custody of the hospital, and appointing a guardian for the petitioner, after making the following statement in the record
The order entered thereupon by the circuit judge in the habeas corpus action was as follows:
'This matter having come on regularly upon the respondent's return to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus herein, wherein petitioner alleged that she was competent and not dangerous to herself or to the general public within the meaning of the statute authorizing confinement, and expert testimony of medical witnesses support such petition, and the Court having heard argument from counsel, and being fully advised in the premises,...
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