Clark v. State
| Decision Date | 13 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. S94A1430,S94A1430 |
| Citation | 454 S.E.2d 492,265 Ga. 243 |
| Parties | CLARK v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Stephen Bailey Wallace, II, Albert B. Wallace, Jonesboro, for Ricky Williams Clark.
Robert E. Keller, Dist. Atty., Jonesboro, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Per B. Normark, Asst. Dist. Atty., Jonesboro, for State.
Rachelle L. Strausner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Susan V. Boleyn, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta, Attorney Register.
This appeal follows Ricky William Clark's conviction of the offense of felony murder in the shooting death of his wife, Rebecca Diane Clark, with aggravated assault being the underlying felony. 1
1. Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence showed that police were called to the Efficiency Lodge at 1:30 a.m. to investigate a shooting in room 110. The responding officer was flagged down by the resident manager who informed him that a tenant in room 110 had been shot by her husband. The officer found the victim on the floor of her room in a pool of blood. The defendant was sitting next to her, holding her shoulders, and exclaiming, "I didn't mean to shoot her." The officer observed the defendant push a long-barreled gun under a table with his foot. The weapon contained one empty cartridge casing and two live rounds of ammunition.
Earlier that evening, the victim appeared at the door of the resident manager; she was crying, her face was bruised, and she complained of a possible broken hand. The manager tried to console her and urged her not to return to her room. Based on the victim's statements, and other complaints about fights between the Clarks, the manager went to room 110, where she found the defendant on the bed in an apparently inebriated state. The dead-bolt lock had been removed from the door; the defendant admitted removing it because he was afraid his wife would lock him out. The manager told him that she would call the police if she had more trouble with him that night. She then returned to her own apartment. She stated that the victim was afraid to leave and remained there with her for about two hours; she ultimately departed at about midnight.
At about 1:00 a.m., the manager observed the defendant in the parking lot; he stated that he was telephoning 911 because his wife had been shot. The two returned to room 110 together where the manager observed the victim lying face down on the floor, bleeding from a wound in her back. The manager asked what had happened and the defendant replied that they had been wrestling with a gun when it discharged.
The defendant testified in his own defense that he picked up his rifle to secure it in its case after his wife threatened to pawn it. He described the shooting as follows:
An autopsy examination revealed that death had resulted from a single gunshot wound through the left upper chest, which traveled slightly upward and exited through the midline of the back. Considerable bruising and abrasions were present throughout the body; some a week or more old and some less than a day old. A severe sprain or hairline fracture of the left wrist was also present.
The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that while in the commission of an aggravated assault, defendant caused the death of his wife. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Defendant contends that evidence of two prior altercations between himself and the victim was erroneously admitted in evidence.
A pre-trial hearing was held pursuant to USCR 31.3, to determine admissibility under Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991), Stewart v. State, 263 Ga. 843(1), 440 S.E.2d 452 (1994), and Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 73(2), 414 S.E.2d 470 (1992).
With respect to the first incident, the victim's seventeen-year-old daughter testified that in April 1989, she witnessed a fight between her mother and the defendant (her step-father), during which he held her mother by the throat and threatened to kill her. There was a rifle on the bed. The victim's sister described the victim's physical condition three days later as follows: "chunks of hair had been pulled out of her head; she had bruises, scratches, a black eye."
The second incident occurred six months prior to the shooting. A police officer testified that she responded to a family violence call at the Clark residence. Mrs. Clark told the officer that her husband had beaten her repeatedly in the course of an argument. Her eyes were blackened and swollen; she was bleeding and had a large cut on her forearm. Charges were brought against the defendant under the Family Violence Act.
The proffer was sufficient to establish that the defendant was the perpetrator of the independent acts. The trial court ruled the evidence admissible to show motive and state of feeling between the parties. We agree that the evidence was offered for an appropriate purpose, particularly in light of the defendant's defense at trial that the shooting was accidental. See Cooper v. State, 256 Ga. 234(1), 347 S.E.2d 553 (1986). There was sufficient probative connection between the crime charged and the prior difficulties to justify admission of the evidence under Williams, supra, Maxwell, supra, and Stewart, supra.
3. The defendant takes issue with the trial court's charge to the jury in several respects.
(a) The trial court properly denied defendant's request to charge on misdemeanor grade involuntary manslaughter (lawful act--unlawful manner), OCGA § 16-5-3(b). 2 If the gun discharged accidently in the absence of criminal negligence, then no crime was committed and, as the jury was instructed, acquittal was required. Use of the deadly weapon in any other manner consistent with the evidence negates the theory that a lawful act was committed. Thus, the requested charge was not adjusted to the evidence. See Bangs v. State, 198 Ga.App. 404, 401 S.E.2d 599 (1991).
(b) Defendant asserts error in giving a charge on voluntary manslaughter over his objection. The State contends there was some evidence of provocation, and therefore the charge was authorized. Even assuming error, an erroneous charge on a lesser included offense does not constitute reversible error unless harmful to the defendant. Hayes v. State, 261 Ga....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Luke v. Battle
...circumstance of the case, as opposed to an inference that could be drawn from other particular circumstances. See Clark v. State, 265 Ga. 243, 246, 454 S.E.2d 492 (1995), on which we relied in Harris. Indeed, after Harris, juries are free to infer that a person who uses a deadly weapon has ......
-
Thomas v. State
...of Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, Second Edition, p. 101 (1991). 4. Taborn cites Clark v. State, 265 Ga. 243, 454 S.E.2d 492 (1995), as "a case of improper inference." Clark was critical of the "use of a deadly weapon charge" because the charge emphasi......
-
Wall v. State
...difficulties and the crime with which the defendant is charged. Hull v. State, 265 Ga. 757(5), 462 S.E.2d 596 (1995); Clark v. State, 265 Ga. 243(2), 454 S.E.2d 492 (1995); Prince v. State, supra, 264 Ga. 867, 452 S.E.2d 497; Hawkins v. State, 264 Ga. 484(2), 448 S.E.2d 214 (1994); Bohannon......
-
Jackson v. State
...that Jackson was drinking on the evening of the murder and the charge on intoxication was, therefore, proper. Clark v. State, 265 Ga. 243, 246(3)(d), 454 S.E.2d 492 (1995); Robinson v. State, 258 Ga. 279, 281(4), 368 S.E.2d 513 (1988); McKenzie v. State, 249 Ga. 582(2), 292 S.E.2d 692 (1982......
-
A Better Orientation for Jury Instructions - Charles M. Cork, Iii
...38, 39, 561 S.E.2d 806, 808 (2002). 262. Kinnebrew v. State, 80 Ga. 232, 239, 5 S.E. 56, 59 (1887) (emphasis added). 263. Clark v. State, 265 Ga. 243, 246, 454 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1995), overruled on other grounds by Wall v. State, 269 Ga. 506, 500 S.E.2d 904 (1998) (holding that the trial cou......