Clark v. State
| Decision Date | 17 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 79A05-9304-CR-139,79A05-9304-CR-139 |
| Citation | 641 N.E.2d 75 |
| Parties | Stephen Leo CLARK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
In this interlocutory appeal, Defendant-Appellant Stephen Leo Clark challenges the trial court's denial of his motion for discharge. He phrases the issue as follows: whether the trial court violated Stephen Clark's right to a speedy trial.
We affirm.
The facts reveal that on October 26, 1992, Clark was charged with Auto Theft, a Class D felony. 1 At an initial hearing on October 29, 1992, Clark orally requested a speedy trial pursuant to Crim.R. 4(B)(1). 2 The trial court requested a written motion for a speedy trial, but nonetheless set the trial for January 7, 1993, seventy days from the October 29 oral motion. On January 7, 1993, the trial court continued the trial until May 20, 1993, "[d]ue to congestion of Court's calendar." Record at 12. On March 29, 1993, Clark filed his motion for discharge and dismissal of the information alleging that the delay was not due to court congestion and thus dismissal was proper because he was not tried within seventy days. During the hearing on Clark's motion, the court bailiff testified that no jurors were called for service on January 7, 1993, and no jury trial was held that day. Clark's motion for discharge was denied and this interlocutory appeal ensued in due course.
Clark complains that his right to a speedy trial was violated when the trial court continued the trial beyond the seventy-day period mandated by Crim.R. 4(B)(1). Clark acknowledges that a trial may be continued on the court's own motion due to a congested court calendar but argues that he carried his burden of demonstrating that the calendar was not in fact congested.
The State first responds by contending that Clark's oral motion was insufficient to preserve his right to a speedy trial. According to the State a speedy trial motion must be presented to the trial court in writing. In McGowan v. State (1992), Ind., 599 N.E.2d 589, our supreme court noted that although Crim.R. 4 does not specify that a speedy trial motion must be in writing, Ind. Trial Rule 7(B) provides in essence and in part that "[u]nless made during a hearing, or trial or otherwise ordered by the court, an application to the court for an order shall be made by written motion." Id. at 591. Thus, Defendant McGowan's oral motion would have been sufficient except the trial judge instructed the defendant to make the motion in writing. McGowan's written motion was made after his oral motion and thus for purposes of time computation the later date prevailed. Id. at 591 citing Minneman v. State (1982), Ind., 441 N.E.2d 673, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933, 103 S.Ct. 2099, 77 L.Ed.2d 307 ().
In this case the State seems to suggest that because the trial court directed Clark to file a written motion for speedy trial which Clark failed to do, then his speedy trial rights were never properly asserted and thus Clark's motion for discharge was premature. We disagree. Unlike McGowan, here the trial court accepted the defendant's oral motion for speedy trial and scheduled a trial within seventy (70) days of the date on which the oral motion was made. Although the trial court directed Clark to file a written motion, the trial court admirably scheduled a trial without waiting for the written motion. Clark's oral motion was sufficient to preserve his right to a speedy trial.
Turning now to the merits of Clark's complaint, the law is well-settled that a trial court may on its own motion schedule a trial for a date beyond the seventy-day period, when the congested nature of its calendar precludes a trial date within the early trial period. Gillie v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1380, 1386; Jordan v. State (1982), Ind., 435 N.E.2d 257, 258; Gill v. State (1977), 267 Ind. 160, 164, 368 N.E.2d 1159, 1162. As our supreme court noted in Loyd v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 404, 408, 398 N.E.2d 1260, 1265, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 881, 101 S.Ct. 231, 66 L.Ed.2d 105 "[t]he court calendar may be congested by a variety of circumstances ... We hold that any exigent circumstances may warrant a reasonable delay beyond the limitations of Ind.R.Crim.P. 4 ..."
In the case before us Clark infers that because no jury trial was actually held on January 7, 1993, then the court's calendar was not congested. Clearly the law is to the contrary. The court's calendar may be congested for a variety of reasons. Here, the defendant's own exhibit, a summary of the court's calendar for January 7, sets forth nineteen (19) separate matters that were scheduled to proceed on that date. Clark does not contend and the record is silent concerning whether the trial court disposed of those cases on the date in question, whether the matters had been pending as long as Clark's, or whether the matters had lesser speedy trial concerns. In any event, we agree with Judge Barteau's observations in Bridwell v. State (Ind.App. 5th Dist., 1994), 640 N.E.2d 437, that 640 N.E.2d at 439 declining to follow Raber v. State (1993), Ind.App., 622 N.E.2d 541 ().
Clark further asserts that even if the trial court's calendar was indeed congested, a 133-day delay was unreasonable. The reasonableness of a delay must be judged in the context of the particular case, and the decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Loyd, 398 N.E.2d at 1265. Here, the trial judge continued Clark's case due to a congested calendar and scheduled a trial at the next available date. Clark has shown no abuse and we find none. The motion for discharge was properly denied.
Judgment affirmed.
In holding that Clark's motion for discharge was properly denied, the majority expressly declines to follow the opinion of this court in Raber v. State (1993), Ind.App., 622 N.E.2d 541, and concludes the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it continued Clark's scheduled trial date of January 7, 1993, "[d]ue to congestion of Court's calendar." Record at 12. I believe, as in Raber, that the record before us is inadequate to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.
There are two basic constitutional rights at issue in this case. First, the right to a speedy trial is guaranteed a defendant by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article 1, Section 12, of the Indiana Constitution. In Indiana, Criminal Rule 4 was adopted to establish "a reasonable time in which an accused must be brought to trial." State v. Moles (1975), 166 Ind.App. 632, 646, 337 N.E.2d 543, 552, trans. denied. While Criminal Rule 4 does not create the substantive right to a speedy trial, the Rule implements that basic right for all defendants. Huffman v. State (1987), Ind., 502 N.E.2d 906, 907. The other constitutional right at issue here is the right of every defendant in Indiana to have meaningful appellate review of his claim. See Indiana Constitution, Article 7, Section 6. Accordingly, the question which Clark presents must be given close scrutiny.
A court may, on its own motion, continue a trial date due to a congested court calendar. Biggs v. State (1989), Ind.App., 546 N.E.2d 1271, 1276. The reasonableness of that delay must be judged in the context of the circumstances, and the trial court's decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. In Raber, we considered whether the defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated when the court continued Raber's scheduled trial date beyond the one-year time period under Criminal Rule 4(C) because of a "congested calendar." Raber, 622 N.E.2d at 545. Because there was "no indication in the record showing how the trial court's calendar was congested," we concluded that the record was inadequate for us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Raber's trial continued due to court congestion. Id. at 547.
In reaching our holding in Raber, we stated:
Because a trial court speaks only through its record, it is necessary for the court to make an adequate record indicating why a defendant's trial cannot be conducted on the date scheduled. Staples v. State (1990), Ind.App., 553 N.E.2d 141, 143, trans. denied. Here, there is an order stating that a "congested calendar" prevented the trial from taking place on July 1. However, we are unable to determine from the record the factual basis for the court's order denoting congestion. The order is conclusory and devoid of any supporting information. We stress the importance of complete docket entries to justify postponement of jury trials under Criminal Rule 4, as we cannot assume that the trial court acted according to the mandate of the Rule. See Pillars v. State (1979), 180 Ind.App. 679, 390 N.E.2d 679, 683, trans. denied.
* * * * * *
Under our standard of review, it is incumbent upon the trial court to articulate clearly on the record its reasons for postponing the trial. The finding of congestion should be sufficiently specific to assure meaningful appellate review and to assure that use of the congestion exception does not eviscerate the Rule itself.
Id. at 547 (emphases added). Therefore, in Raber, we retained jurisdiction and remanded to the trial court with instructions to "make written findings which articulate the factual basis...
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Clark v. State
...contends that the trial court erroneously denied his Motion for Discharge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. Clark v. State (1994), Ind.App., 641 N.E.2d 75, 76. On October 26, 1992, the defendant was charged with auto theft, a class D felony. At his initial hearing on October 29, 19......
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Bridwell v. State
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