Clark v. State
| Citation | 659 N.E.2d 548 |
| Decision Date | 29 December 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 79S05-9503-CR-00306,79S05-9503-CR-00306 |
| Parties | Stephen Leo CLARK, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Steven Knecht, Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C., Lafayette, for Appellant.
Pamela Carter, Attorney General, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.
On Petition To Transfer
Indiana Criminal Rule 4 establishes time deadlines by which trials must be held but also authorizes trial courts to exceed the deadlines when required to do so because of court congestion. Today we address the rule's requirements for priority trial scheduling, the steps which must be taken by a defendant claiming a violation of the rule and by the trial court that denies such a claim, and the standard of appellate review of such a denial.
In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant, Stephen Leo Clark, contends that the trial court erroneously denied his Motion for Discharge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. Clark v. State (1994), Ind.App., 641 N.E.2d 75, 76.
On October 26, 1992, the defendant was charged with auto theft, a class D felony. At his initial hearing on October 29, 1992, he orally requested a "fast and speedy trial," Record at 50, and the appointment of defense counsel. In accordance with Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B)(1), the trial court set jury trial to begin seventy days later, on January 7, 1993. When that day arrived, however, the trial court entered an order providing, "Due to congestion of Court's calendar, Court orders cause reassigned for pre-trial conference on May 5, 1993, at 8:30 A.M. and for firm trial by jury to commence at 8:30 A.M. on May 20, 1993." Record at 12. On February 11, 1993, the defendant, who had been incarcerated at the Tippecanoe County Jail since October 29, 1992, filed a letter with the court requesting a discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B). Record at 14-16. Thereafter, on March 29, 1993, the defendant, through his attorney, filed a formal Motion for Discharge, asserting Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B)(1), which provides in pertinent part:
If any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such motion, except where a continuance within said period is had on his motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70) calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar. Provided, however, that in the last-mentioned circumstance, the prosecuting attorney shall file a timely motion for continuance as set forth in subdivision (A) of this rule. Provided further, that a trial court may take note of congestion or an emergency without the necessity of a motion, and upon so finding may order a continuance. Any continuance granted due to a congested calendar or emergency shall be reduced to an order, which order shall also set the case for trial within a reasonable time.
Ind.Crim.Rule 4(B)(1). The defendant contends that there was in fact no court congestion on January 7, 1994, the date on which his trial was set to begin and on which the court's entry declared "congestion." At the hearing on the Motion for Discharge, the defense presented the testimony of the bailiff in charge of juries for Tippecanoe County. She testified that no jury trial was held in that court on Thursday, January 7, 1993, and that no jurors were even summoned to appear on that date. The calendar of cases scheduled for January 7, 1993, included seventeen criminal jury trials and two eviction hearings. The trial court denied the defendant's Motion for Discharge, noting the court's routine practice of assigning several cases for jury trial on the same date, with noon the previous Friday as the "cut-off" point at which the court assigns the "number one" case to be on the "ready docket" and the other cases are "continued because of congestion." Record at 72. If the case on the ready docket is continued or disposed of on Friday afternoon, no trial is held, because "the congestion would be effective as [of] the Friday noon before the trial setting." Id.
In his appeal from the denial of his Motion for Discharge, the defendant contends that no court congestion existed on January 7, 1993. He acknowledges that a trial may be continued past the seventy-day limit on the court's own motion due to a congested court calendar but argues that he demonstrated that the calendar was not, in fact, congested. Emphasizing that the continuance was not granted until the very day for which his trial was scheduled, the defendant further argues that according to the trial court's announced practice, if court congestion had actually existed, the continuance would have been made at an earlier date, when the "number one" case and "ready docket" were determined.
The State argues that the record reveals congestion of the court calendar, noting that sixteen other criminal jury trials were scheduled for January 7, 1993; that at least fourteen of these were older than the defendant's case; and that no testimony was presented as to whether or not a bench trial may have been conducted on January 7, 1993, or whether a last-minute plea agreement or continuance had occurred on the "ready docket." 1 In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals noted conflicting precedent, choosing to follow Bridwell v. State (1994), Ind.App., 640 N.E.2d 437, 439 () and declining to follow Raber v. State (1993), Ind.App., 622 N.E.2d 541, 547 ().
Writing for the majority in Bridwell, Judge Barteau, a former trial judge, observed: "[I]t is unrealistic to expect a criminal judge to be cognizant of the mathematical and chronological status of each case in relation to all others pending and to schedule them accordingly." Bridwell, 640 N.E.2d at 439. Judge Sullivan, also a former trial judge, responded in dissent:
Nevertheless, someone in a position of responsibility must take such steps as are necessary to assure defendants their speedy trial rights.... The practical difficulties in requiring trial courts to document reasons for trial continuances are minimal at best. When a trial court enters an order continuing a scheduled trial it is not unduly burdensome for that court to add a sentence or two setting forth the nature of the court congestion which dictates the continuance.
Id. at 440 (Sullivan, J. dissenting). These differing...
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