Clark v. Uniroyal Corp., Docket No. 60470

• Decision Date: 06 January 1983
• Docket Number: Docket No. 60470
• Citation: 119 Mich.App. 820,327 N.W.2d 372
• Parties: William CLARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNIROYAL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. 119 Mich.App. 820, 327 N.W.2d 372, 39 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1368, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,476
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 372

327 N.W.2d 372

William CLARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNIROYAL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 60470.

119 Mich.App. 820, 327 N.W.2d 372,

39 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1368,

31 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,476

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 24, 1982.

Decided Sept. 23, 1982.

Released for Publication Jan. 6, 1983.

[119 MICHAPP 822] Walter A. Lucken, Jr., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

The Fishman Group by Steven J. Fishman and Malcolm D. Brown, Bloomfield Hills, for defendant-appellee.

Before CYNAR, P.J., and KAUFMAN and MAHINSKE ^*, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order of summary judgment dismissing his cause of action for racial discrimination. Plaintiff had alleged that defendant, his former employer, discriminated against him in violation of both the Fair Employment Practices Act, M.C.L. Sec. 423.301, et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 17.458(1) et seq., ¹ and the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq.

Plaintiff, a black male, alleged that he began working for defendant on or about April 9, 1966, as an assistant manager in defendant's employee store. In April of 1974, when the manager of the employee store became disabled, plaintiff took over the manager's duties in addition to continuing his own work. Subsequently, plaintiff was advised that he would be promoted to the position of store manager effective October 31, 1974. Plaintiff alleged that he was not only not awarded the promotion, but was demoted to an hourly employee effective December 9, 1974, and then laid off effective [119 MICHAPP 823] December 12, 1974. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that similarly situated white employees were promoted and permitted to continue their employment with defendant.

In its motion for summary judgment, defendant contended that it had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions toward plaintiff. According to defendant, late 1974 was the time of a massive reduction in its workforce, during which 800 employees were laid off and 300 others were transferred. Defendant indicated that it had an employment policy that prohibited employees from moving up in pay grade during a workforce reduction. Defendant claimed that the workforce reduction necessitated that one person be laid off from the Industrial Relations Department, of which plaintiff was a part. Plaintiff was laid off despite the fact that he had more seniority than another white department employee for the reason that plaintiff would have had to have been awarded a promotion to replace that employee. Defendant contended that the rule prohibiting "upward bumps" was applied even-handedly and submitted affidavits indicating that the rule had been used to the disadvantage of numerous white employees.

The summary judgment was granted pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(3). A motion under subsection 3 tests whether there is factual support for a claim, requiring a court to consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions and other available documentary evidence. Rizzo v. Kretschmer, 389 Mich. 363, 207 N.W.2d 316 (1973); Partrich v. Muscat, 84 Mich.App. 724, 730-731, 270 N.W.2d 506 (1978). Before judgment may be granted the court must be satisfied that it is impossible for the claim asserted to be supported at trial because of some deficiency that cannot be overcome. Since the motion[119 MICHAPP 824] has the limited function of determining whether material issues of fact exist, the court must carefully avoid making findings of fact under the guise of determining that no material issues of fact exist. Partrich v. Muscat, supra.

Section 3 of the Fair Employment Practices Act ² made it an unfair labor practice to discriminate in any matter related to employment because of race. Similarly, subchapter VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq., prohibits racial discrimination in employment. Both parties have relied extensively on federal decisions in constructing their respective arguments. We agree that federal precedent, although not binding upon our interpretation of the Fair Employment Practices Act, is persuasive in determining what the substantive law of racial discrimination in employment is. Cf. Civil Rights Comm. v. Chrysler Corp., 80 Mich.App. 368, 375, fn. 4, 263 N.W.2d 376 (1977).

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the United States Supreme Court described the burdens and order of proofs in a discrimination case. Initially, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing by the preponderance of the evidence that a prima facie case of discrimination exists. If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. If the defendant is able to articulate such a reason, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons put forth by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a mere pretext for discrimination. Id. An initial prima facie case of discrimination is established when the plaintiff proves by a [119 MICHAPP 825] preponderance of the evidence that he applied for an available position for which he was qualified but was rejected under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Requiring a defendant to rebut the initial prima facie case serves to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. Id. A plaintiff may succeed in establishing that the defendant's proffered reason was a pretext--that is, establishing that he was actually the victim of intentional discrimination--either directly by persuading the trier of fact that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or, indirectly, by showing that the proffered reason is not worthy of credence. Burdine, p. 255, 101 S.Ct. at 1094. For example the plaintiff might introduce evidence tending to show other discriminatory treatment by the defendant toward the plaintiff or other similarly situated employees or a general pattern of discrimination against such employees. Boyd v. Madison County Mutual Ins. Co., 653 F.2d 1173, 1178 (CA 7, 1981).

The shifting burden of proof in an employment discrimination case does not preclude the granting of summary...