Clarke v. Com.

Decision Date24 May 1935
Citation259 Ky. 572,82 S.W.2d 823
PartiesCLARKE v. COMMONWEALTH ex rel.
CourtKentucky Court of Appeals

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Chancery Branch, First Division.

Disbarment proceeding by the Commonwealth, on relation, against Dudley L. Clarke. From a judgment of disbarment, Dudley L. Clarke appeals.

Reversed.

Dudley L. Clarke, of Louisville, for appellant.

Gilbert Burnett and Frank Ropke, both of Louisville, and Bailey P Wootton, Atty. Gen., and S. H. Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

DRURY Commissioner.

Dudley L. Clarke appeals from a judgment disbarring him from practicing law in the courts of this commonwealth.

This proceeding was begun on September 20, 1934, by the filing of information by the Louisville Bar Association and the issue of a rule against Dudley L. Clarke to show cause why he should not be disbarred, which rule was made returnable October 4, 1934. This rule was served on Dudley L. Clarke September 21, 1934.

The Motion to Vacate.

On October 4, 1934, and as his first step, Clarke filed a motion (section 971-3, Ky. Stats.) that the presiding judge vacate the bench, and in support of that motion filed his own affidavit and that of Robert W. Taylor, in which affidavits this appears: "The said judge on or about September 12 1934, in a conversation he had with one Robert W. Taylor about this matter, made the following statement to said Taylor: 'Mr. Taylor you're out of the picture, but I'm going to disbar Clarke if it's the last thing I ever do'." The court overruled the motion and refused to vacate the bench. We are constrained to hold that was error. This remark cannot be distinguished from the remark alleged to have been made by Judge Moss in Givens v. Lord Crawshaw, 55 S.W. 905, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1618 because of which this court held Judge Moss should have vacated the bench; that of Judge Denhardt, because of which he was prohibited from trying certain cases. Rush v. Denhardt, 138 Ky. 238, 127 S.W. 785, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1199; the remark made in Ky. Journal Pub. Co. v. Gaines, 139 Ky. 747, 110 S.W. 268, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 402, or Massie v. Com., 93 Ky. 588, 20 S.W. 704, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 564. If, in fact, the judge did make the remark attributed to him, and under our well-established rule it must be taken as true, it indicated he had already prejudged the case against Clarke, and he should have vacated the bench.

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8 cases
  • Brown v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 23 Agosto 1991
    ...in advance of the disbarment hearing that " 'I'm going to disbar [the attorney] if it's the last thing I ever do.' " Clarke v. Com., 259 Ky. 572, 82 S.W.2d 823, 823 (1935). (He did not: it was the last thing he ever did--at least for that subject). The appellate court If, in fact, the judge......
  • Knapp v. Kinsey
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 1 Mayo 1956
    ...favored. Crowe v. Di Manno, 1 Cir., 225 F.2d 652; In re Parkside Housing Project, 290 Mich. 582, 598-599, 287 N.W. 571; Clarke v. Commonwealth, 259 Ky. 572, 82 S.W.2d 823. As said by the Supreme Court in Berger v. United States, supra, 255 U.S. 22, 35, 41 S.Ct. 230, 234, "* * * the tribunal......
  • National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ransdell
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • 24 Mayo 1935
  • Branham v. Caudill, Judge
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 15 Mayo 1936
    ...passing on the sufficiency of the facts alleged, and, of course, his ruling thereon is subject to review on appeal. Clarke v. Commonwealth, 259 Ky. 572, 82 S.W. (2d) 823; Jasper v. Jasper, 229 Ky. 137, 16 S.W. (2d) 787; Lester v. Commonwealth, 250 Ky. 227, 62 S.W. (2d) 469; Chreste v. Commo......
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