Clarke v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States

• Decision Date: 06 November 1902
• Docket Number: 410.
• Citation: 118 F. 374
• Parties: CLARKE et al. v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

118 F. 374

CLARKE et al. v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF UNITED STATES.

No. 410.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

November 6, 1902

Gans &amp Haman, for plaintiffs in error.

W Irvine Cross, for defendant in error.

The point presented for review on this writ of error arises out of the following facts and proceedings: The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, on March 25, 1899 issued to William E. Clarke two policies of insurance, each conditioned for payment of $10,000 upon the death of said William E. Clarke to his wife, Sallie F. Clarke, and, on certain contingencies, to the other plaintiffs in error. Among other provisions, each of these policies contains the provision that 'self-destruction, sane or insane, within one year from the date of the issuance of the policies, is a risk not assumed by the society in this contract. ' On December 14, 1899, said William E. Clarke died from the effects of a pistol shot wound, which was inflicted on his head while the pistol was in his own hands. Due proofs of loss were furnished to the defendant company, and payment of said policies was demanded, and upon the refusal of said company to recognize this liability plaintiffs in error filed in the superior court of Baltimore city a declaration in the usual form against the defendant. The defendant appeared in that court, and had the case removed to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Maryland, in which latter court it filed four pleas, the first two of which were general issue pleas, on which issue was joined by the plaintiff. The third and fourth pleas were as follows: For a third plea it says that 'said policies were made subject to a proviso that the defendant did not assume the risk of self-destruction, sane or insane, of the said William E Clarke, within one year from the date of the issuance of the said policies, and that the said William E. Clarke committed self-destruction on or about the 14th day of December, 1899, by shooting himself through the head with a pistol, by Reason of which self-destruction of said William E. Clarke said policies became null and void: ' and for a fourth plea it says that it was 'a condition of said policies that the said defendant should be liable to pay said insurance only on the receipt of satisfactory proofs of the death of the insured, and that proofs have been furnished to said defendant by said plaintiffs, which proofs show the death of said William E. Clarke on or about the 14th day of December, 1899, and states the cause of his death as follows: Grippe, during the last month of his life, together with grief over the loss of his daughter four years ago, and overwork in business, combined to bring on mental derangement. Pistol shot ended his life during a temporary aberration'; and also as follows: 'He had grippe about a month previously, and was weak and depressed, and during an attack of despondency shot himself in the head, and died in a few minutes.' And the said policies were subject to a proviso that the said defendant did not Assume the risk of self-destruction, sane or insane, of the said William E. Clarke within one year from the date of the issuance of the said policies. Thereupon the plaintiffs filed special replications to each of the said third and fourth pleas, which replications were as follows: 'As to the defendant's third plea, the plaintiffs say that they admit that said policies were made subject to the proviso mentioned in said plea, and they further admit said William E. Clarke on said 14th day of December, 1899, shot himself in the head with a pistol, in consequence of which he died on said day; but said plaintiffs deny that said act by said William E. Clarke constituted the self-destruction of said William E. Clarke within the meaning of said proviso in said policies; and said plaintiffs further say that at the time said William E. Clarke, so shot himself in the head his mind was so affected and impaired by insanity that he, the said William E. Clarke, was then and there not conscious of the physical nature and consequences of the act he then committed, and did not intend by it to cause his death, but was moved and impelled to commit said act by an irresistible, insane impulse.' 'As to the defendant's fourth plea, the plaintiffs say that they admit that said policies contained the condition in reference to self-destruction mentioned in said plea, and that they submitted to said defendant proof showing the death of said William E. Clarke on the 14th day of December, 1899, and that said proof of death contained the statements set out in said plea; but said plaintiffs say that at the time said William E. Clarke so shot himself in the head his mind was so impaired and affected by insanity that he, the said William E. Clarke, was then and there not conscious of the physical nature and consequences of the act he then committed, and did not intend by it to cause his death, but was moved and impelled to commit said act by irresistible impulse.' To each of these replications the defendant demurred, and these demurrers being sustained by the circuit court, the plaintiffs filed notice that they declined to amend said replications, and elected to stand thereupon, whereupon the circuit court entered final judgment for the defendant, and, writ of error having been granted, the case is here upon assignments of error, which present but one question, and that is whether the court below erred in sustaining the demurrer interposed by the defendant to the replications filed by the plaintiffs to the third and fourth pleas of the defendant.

Before SIMONTON, Circuit Judge, and BRAWLEY and WADDILL, District Judges.

BRAWLEY District Judge (after stating the case as above).

If it was an open question, there is much to be said as to the injustice of contracts of this nature, for a person ought no more to be held responsible for the loss of his life when taken by himself under the ravings of delirium, or impelled by the hallucinations of melancholy, than if he dies from an ordinary disease, or from an accident; but that question is not before us, and it seems to be well settled that insurance companies may avoid altogether this class of risks, and that being at liberty to stipulate against hazardous occupations, unhealthy climates, or deaths from consumption or other excepted diseases, they may also contract not to assume a risk of a certain mode of death, and presumably the premiums are calculated on the elimination of that risk. If the assured is informed in apt words of the extent of the limitation, it is not perceived that there is any good reason why such contract should not be governed by the same rules of interpretation which control courts in all other cases of contract, and why plain and unambiguous words should be frittered away by casuistry and refinement. Something of the cloud which seems to obscure the natural interpretation of contracts like this arises from certain...