Shoemaker v. Central Business Men's Association, a Corp.
| Decision Date | 14 April 1925 |
| Citation | 271 S.W. 867,218 Mo.App. 374 |
| Parties | MARY C. SHOEMAKER, Respondent, v. CENTRAL BUSINESS MEN'S ASSOCIATION, a Corporation, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Reporter's Note: Certiorari issued in the above cause by the Supreme Court, on hearing, was quashed, December--, 1925. See 278 S.W. ___.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.--Hon. Wilson A. Taylor, Judge.
REVERSED.
Judgment reversed.
Jones Hocker, Sullivan & Angert, for appellant.
(1) It is not permissible for medical experts to answer hypothetical questions which do not contain material and necessary facts or which contain immaterial and unnecessary facts, when the expert has no personal knowledge of the subject. Seelig v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. (Mo.), 230 S.W. 92, 102; Marshall Livery Co. v. McKelvey, 55 Mo.App. 240; Palmer v. Railroad, 142 Mo.App. 440; 1 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 682; People v. Vanderhoff, 71 Mich. 176; Opp. v. Pryor, 294 Ill. 538. (2) It is improper for a medical expert to give his opinion and state conclusions as a fact in answer to a hypothetical question which contains merely hypothetical facts and not the element of personal knowledge by the expert and when the expert did not know and never saw the patient. Castanie v. Railroad, 249 Mo. 192, 155 S.W. 38; O'Leary v. Southern Steel Co., 260 S.W. 55; Kinchlow v. Railroad, 264 S.W. 416. (3) Expert testimony, when it degenerates into mere guess or conjecture, ceases to be admissible. 11 Ruling Case Law, sec. 35, p. 613, sec. 13, p. 582; Newmark v. Insurance Co., 30 Mo. 166. (4) Delirium is not presumed to continue. Richardson v. Smart, 65 Mo.App. 19. (5) Under an accident insurance policy which exempts the insurer from liability, if the insured comes to his death by "suicide, sane or insane," any physical act of the insured inflicted by himself which results in death, is covered by the exemption and the insurer is not liable, regardless of the mental condition of the insured at the time and regardless of whether he knew or appreciated the nature of the act or its consequences, and regardless of the nature or degree of his mental unsoundness or irresponsibility, and regardless of whether that mental condition was the result of sickness, delirium, intoxication, heredity, shock or injury. Under such a clause, where the insured dies by his own act, the insurer does not assume the risk of self-destruction. Grand Lodge v. Wieting, 168 Ill. 408; Supreme Lodge v. Gelbke, 198 Ill. 365; Dickerson v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 200 Ill. 270; Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Churchill, 105 Ill.App. 159; Supreme Lodge v. Zerulla, 98 Ill.App. 630 (first case); Supreme Lodge v. Zerulla, 118 Ill.App. 191 (second case); Seitzinger v. Modern Woodmen of America, 106 Ill.App. 449; Seitzinger v. Modern Woodmen of America, 204 Ill. 58; Supreme Counsel v. Pels, 110 Ill.App. 409; Supreme Court of Honor v. Buxton, 111 Ill.App. 187; Blasingame v. Royal Circle, 111 Ill.App. 202; Supreme Court Knights of Maccabees v. Marshal, 111 Ill.App. 312; Zerulla v. Supreme Lodge, 223 Ill. 518; Kiesewetter v. Supreme Tent of Knights of Maccabees, 227 Ill. 48; Haynie v. Knights Templar, 139 Mo. 416; Brower v. Supreme Lodge, 74 Mo.App. 494; United States F. & G. Co. v. Blum, 258 F. 897; Sovereign Camp v. Hunt, 98 So. 62; Scarth et al. v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 75 Iowa 346; Spruill v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 120 N.C. 141; Billings v. Accident Ins. Co. of N. Am., 64 Vt. 78; Jenkins v. Nat'l Union, 118 Ga. 587; Kunse v. Knights of the Modern Maccabees, 45 Ind.App. 30. (6) Authorities cited in connection with meaning of "delirium," "insanity" and "suicide." Owings Case, 1 Bland's Ch. 370 (Md.), 17 Am. Dec. 311; State v. Nowells, 135 Iowa 53; 2 Century Dictionary, p. 1518; 3 Oxford Dictionary; Webster's International Dictionary; Clark's Heirs v. Ellis, 9 Or. 128, 132; 18 Corpus Juris, 475; Johnson v. Maine & N. B. Ins. Co., 83 Me. 182; Meyers v. Commonwealth, 3 Wkly. Notes Cas., 506, 508, 83 Pa. 131, 136; Cundall v. Haswell, 23 R. I. 508; Seitzinger v. Modern Woodmen of America, 204 Ill. 58; Spruill v. N.W. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 120 N.C. 141; State v. Leeman, 2 S.D. 171; Warner v. State, 114 Ind. 137; Gunter v. Note, 83 Ala. 96; Erwin v. State, 10 Tex.App. 700; American Board of Comr's, 102 Me. 72.
J. D. Wilson and F. H. Bacon for respondent.
(1) There was no error in the admission or exclusion of evidence. The hypothetical question asked Dr. Wolfort, the expert witness, was not objected to when the question was completed. (2) The exception in the policy sued on should be strictly construed. Mathews v. Modern Woodmen, 236 Mo. 326; McMaster v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183 U.S. 25; Turley v. North American Ins. Co., 25 Wend. 377. (3) Delirium and insanity, under the definitions of accepted standard authorities, are distinctive terms, and in no way synonymous. The words "suicide, sane or insane," are contradictory; they may mean, if anything, that to constitute suicide, within the proviso, the insured must have had the intent to destroy himself, even though the intent was that of an insane person. A man delirious from the effects of drugs or illness to such an extent as to be unable to know what he is doing is not an insane person, nor can he commit suicide. 1. The finding of the jury was that at the time of his death Shoemaker was delirious and did not know what he was doing. The verdict is conclusive as to the facts. Consequently, in applying the law, we must assume that at the time of his death Shoemaker did not know what he was doing. 2. The words used in the policy are "suicide, sane or insane." Suicide is the act of voluntarily and intentionally destroying one's own life by a person of years of discretion and of sane mind. A death by accident, even though it be the result of one's own act, is not suicide. 37 Cyc. 518. To the same effect are other definitions: Bouvier's Law Dictionary--Suicide; Webster's Dictionary--Suicide; Standard Dictionary--Suicide; Century Dictionary--Suicide. The Standard Dictionary defines "delirium" as a morbid condition, often the result of fever, in which mental action is irrational and incoherent. The definition in the Century Dictionary is a disordered state, more or less temporary, of the mental faculties occuring during illness. To the same effect are other definitions: 18 Corp. Jr., p. 475. Other authorities distinguish between insanity and delirium: 14 Encyl. Brit., Insanity (11 Ed.); 2 Hamilton's Medical Jurisprudence, p. 52; Wharton & Stille, Medical Jurisprudence, (4 Ed.), sec. 240; Grand Lodge v. Mode, 247 S.W. 386; Supreme Lodge v. Lapp's Admx., 74 S.W. 656. 3. The Illinois cases are conflicting, and some express views in conflict with those found in Seitzinger v. Modern Woodmen, 204 Ill. 558, 68 N.E. 478, viz.: Supreme Lodge v. Gelbke, 198 Ill. 365; Dickerson v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 200 Ill. 270; Knights Templar, etc., Co. v. Crayton, 209 Ill. 550. 4. Many courts have held that death resulting from an act committed in delirium is not suicide. Blackstone v. Standard Life & Acc. Co., 74 Mich. 952; Cady v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 134 Wis. 322, (see, also, explanatory note to this case, 17 L. R. A. [N. S.] 263); Dean v. American Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Allen 96; Parker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 125 S.E. 6; Bohaker v. Travelers Ins. Co., 215 Mass. 32, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 543. (4) There can be no suicide, sane or insane, unless there is an intent to take one's own life; otherwise it is an accidental death. Where death results from an unintentional act it is an accident. To commit suicide, sane or insane, there must be an intent, even though that of an insane person. Counsel ask to have this court hold that what was meant by the Supreme court of Illinois in the opinion in the Seitzinger case is that the definition of suicide must be changed so that if death results from a man's own act it is suicide. (5) It is impossible to fix the exact boundary line between sanity and insanity, or between suicide and accident. Each case must be decided on its own facts. The jury found from the evidence that Shoemaker, when he threw himself from the window, did not know what he was doing, consequently there was no intent to commit suicide, and his death was accidental. (6) In determining the value to be given to legal precedents, the facts in each case must be considered. A slavish regard for so-called precedents leads to confusion and uncertainty unless this is done. The facts in the case under consideration differ from those in the cases claimed by counsel for appellant to govern in this case.
This is an action upon an accident insurance policy. The cause was tried to a jury. There was a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount of the policy and interest, and judgment was given accordingly. The defendant appeals.
The policy sued on insures Dr. Samuel E. Shoemaker "against loss resulting from bodily injuries effected directly or independently of all other causes, through accidental means (suicide, sane or insane, is not covered), as specified in the following schedule: . . . For loss of life, $ 5,000." The plaintiff is the beneficiary named in the policy. The insured died on the 11th day of October, 1919, as a result of self-inflicted injuries. Plaintiff notified defendant of said death and made proof thereof in May, 1921, and this suit was brought June 28, 1921.
It is alleged in the petition that the insured "lost his life from the result of bodily injuries effected independent and exclusive of all other causes through accidental means, to-wit, on that day said Samuel E. Shoemaker, while a patient at St. John's Hospital in the city of Springfield,...
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