Clarke v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 07 March 1945
• Docket Number: 15095.
• Parties: CLARKE, Superintendent of Public Works, v. JOHNSON.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

33 S.E.2d 425

199 Ga. 163

CLARKE, Superintendent of Public Works, v. JOHNSON.

No. 15095.

Supreme Court of Georgia

March 7, 1945

Syllabus by the Court.

The Code Supp., § 2-3402, confers upon judges of police courts of incorporated cities and municipal court judges jurisdiction to try misdemeanor cases arising under the act known as the Georgia State Highway Patrol Act of 1937 only in those counties in which there is no city or county court.

Joshua Johnson brought habeas-corpus proceedings against A. A Clarke, superintendent of public works of Fulton County. Clarke filed a response resisting the application, and on the trial of the case the following facts were stipulated: On August 22, 1944, Johnson was arrested by police officers of the City of Atlanta and charged with the offense of operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway within the city limits of Atlanta while under the influence of intoxicating liquors. He was tried, on an accusation in the police court of the City of Atlanta, for this offense, which is a misdemeanor under the laws of Georgia. Upon the call of the case, he signed in writing a waiver of a trial by jury and requested that he be tried by the recorder of the City of Atlanta. On his plea of guilty, he was sentenced to pay a fine of fifty dollars and costs; and upon his failure to pay the fine, it was ordered that he be put to work on the public works of Fulton County, or otherwise, as the commissioners of Fulton County should direct, for six months. Under the direction of the Board of Penal Corrections, he was assigned to the public works of Fulton County and placed in the custody of the respondent for the purpose of serving the sentence. At the time the writ of habeas corpus issued, Johnson was being held in the custody of the respondent under the sentence imposed by the recorder of the City of Atlanta. The recorder's court of the City of Atlanta exists by virtue of the charter of the City of Atlanta.

The respondent excepted to a judgment releasing the petitioner.

Harold Sheats, J. C. Savage, and Bond Almand, all of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Frank Grizzard and Frank A. Bowers, both of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

WYATT, Justice.

The plaintiff in error in his brief states that, 'at the time * * * Johnson was arrested and tried for the offense of driving an automobile while intoxicated on a public highway there was in Fulton County a city or county court.' Dealing with the case from this premise, and as thus presented, the question here raised involves a construction of the amendment of 1937 to article 6, section 6, paragraph 2, of the constitution of Georgia. The amendment reads as follows: 'The court of ordinary shall have jurisdiction to issue warrants, try cases, and impose sentence thereon in all misdemeanor cases arising under that Act known as the Georgia State Highway Patrol Act of 1937, and other traffic laws of the State in all counties of this State in which there is no city or county court, provided the defendant waives a jury trial. Like jurisdiction is also conferred upon the judges of the police courts of incorporated cities and municipal court judges, for offenses arising within their respective jurisdiction.' Code Supp., § 2-3402.

Prior to the ratification of this amendment, the legislature had no power to confer jurisdiction over crimes against the State upon a court created for the trial of municipal offenses. Grant v. Camp, 105 Ga. 428, 31 S.E. 429. Therefore whatever power the recorder's court of the City of Atlanta has to try misdemeanor cases involving a violation of the Georgia State highway patrol act, or other traffic laws, exists solely by virtue of this amendment. We are called upon to construe the words, 'like jurisdiction,' in this amendment. The question is: Did the constitutional amendment of 1937 confer upon the judges of police courts of incorporated cities and municipal court judges jurisdiction over the class of misdemeanor cases mentioned in the amendment in all counties in the State without regard to whether there is a county or city court in the county?

'In interpreting the provisions of a constitution, it is to be presumed that the words therein used were employed in their natural and ordinary meaning; and, where a word has a technical as well as a popular meaning, the courts will generally accord to it its popular signification, unless the nature of the subject indicates or the context suggests that it is used in a technical sense. Constitutions are the result of popular will, and their words are to be understood ordinarily in the sense they convey to the popular mind. The presumption is that the same meaning attaches to a given word or phrase wherever it occurs in a constitution; and, where a word or phrase is used in one part of a constitution in a plain and manifest sense, it is to receive the same interpretation when used in every other part, unless it clearly appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning should be applied to it.' Epping v. Columbus, 117 Ga. 263, 43 S.E. 803.

The word 'jurisdiction' is used three times in the amendment under consideration. In the first instance, the word is used in the sense of subject matter, i. e., the class of misdemeanor cases over which the court of ordinary shall have jurisdiction; and, in the...