Clarks v. State
| Decision Date | 27 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. CR 09-716,CR 09-716 |
| Parties | TEDDY LEE CLARKS APPELLANT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appellant Teddy Lee Clarks appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2011). He makes two arguments in his pro se brief on appeal: (1) that the circuit court erred in concluding that the record conclusively showed the postconviction relief was not warranted due to ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) that the circuit court denied him fundamental fairness and meaningful access to the courts in violation of the federal and state constitution. We find no error that warrants a reversal and affirm.
In May 2007, appellant was convicted of two counts of rape following a jury trial in Pulaski County Circuit Court. His convictions were affirmed by the Arkansas Court of Appeals, which rejected appellant's challenge to the denial of his continuance at trial so that he could pursue his own DNA testing and expert evidence to counter the State's DNA proof. Clarks v. State, CACR 07-1041 (Ark. App. Sept. 10, 2008) (unpublished). Appellant filed atimely pro se Rule 37.1 petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel as to procuring DNA testing and other claims. The circuit court denied relief on each claim, and appellant filed his notice of appeal.
We do not reverse a denial of postconviction relief unless the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. Gaye v. State, 2009 Ark. 201, 307 S.W.3d 1 (2009). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. In making a determination on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, the totality of the evidence before the fact-finder must be considered. Id.
For his first point on appeal, appellant asserts that the circuit court erred in denying his petition for postconviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel because his defense counsel should have sought a second independent DNA test and forensic expert testimony to prevent, or at least rebut, the admission into evidence by the State of DNA test results showing that appellant was the father of the fourteen-year-old victim's unborn child; that defense counsel failed to adequately investigate the administrative policies and procedures with regard to the collection, storing, and testing of the State's biological evidence; and that defense counsel failed to make appropriate objections regarding limitations on DNA evidence when the State's expert witnesses testified.
In an appeal from a trial court's denial of postconviction relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the sole question presented is whether, based on a totality of theevidence under the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the trial court clearly erred in holding that counsel's performance was not ineffective. Carter v. State, 2010 Ark. 231,____S.W.3d____; Watkins v. State, 2010 Ark. 156,_____S.W.3d____; see Jammett v. State, 2010 Ark. 28,___S.W.3d___ (per curiam). Actual ineffectiveness claims alleging deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice. State v. Barrett, 371 Ark. 91, 263 S.W.3d 542 (2007). Under the Strickland test, a claimant must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and the claimant must also show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense to the extent that the appellant was deprived of a fair trial. Walker v. State, 367 Ark. 523, 241 S.W.3d 734 (2006) (per curiam). With respect to the requirement that prejudice be established, a petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that the fact-finder's decision would have been different absent counsel's errors. Watkins, 2010 Ark. 156,____S.W.3d____; Sparkman v. State, 373 Ark. 45, 281 S.W.3d 277 (2008). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Sparkman, 373 Ark. 45, 281 S.W.3d 277.
The decision of whether or not to call a witness is generally a matter of trial strategy that is outside the purview of Rule 37.1. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001). Trial counsel must use his or her best judgment to determine which witnesses will be beneficial to his client. Id. When an allegation rests on whether a witness should have been called, it is incumbent on the petitioner to name the witness, provide a summary of thetestimony, and establish that the testimony would have been admissible into evidence. Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004). When assessing an attorney's decision not to call a particular witness, it must be taken into account that the decision is largely a matter of professional judgment that experienced advocates could endlessly debate, and the fact that there was a witness or witnesses who could have offered testimony beneficial to the defense is not in itself proof of counsel's ineffectiveness. Nelson, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791. Nonetheless, such strategic decisions must still be supported by reasonable professional judgment. Id. Moreover, the manner of questioning a witness is by and large a very subjective issue about which different attorneys could have many different approaches. Id. Even if a decision proves unwise, matters of trial tactics and strategy are not grounds for postconviction relief. Id.
He...
To continue reading
Request your trial