Clatsop Cnty. Dist. Attorney v. City of Astoria
Decision Date | 13 November 2014 |
Docket Number | 112430,A152486. |
Parties | CLATSOP COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY and Joshua Marquis, Plaintiffs–Respondents Cross–Appellants, v. CITY OF ASTORIA, Defendant–Appellant Cross–Respondent. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Blair J. Henningsgaard, Astoria, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant-cross-respondent.
Paul L. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents-cross-appellants. With him on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General.
Before ARMSTRONG, Presiding Judge, and NAKAMOTO, Judge, and EGAN, Judge.
This case involves a dispute between defendant, the City of Astoria (the city) and the Clatsop County District Attorney (the district attorney),1 over the control of the prosecution of misdemeanor driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) offenses committed within the city. The trial court denied the city's motion to dismiss the district attorney's complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and entered a judgment declaring the rights of the parties. Both parties appeal. The city assigns error to the trial court's denial of the city's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the district attorney had failed to join all necessary parties, as required by ORS 28.110. The city also contends that the trial court erred in ruling that “the district attorney is mandated to appear and prosecute criminal cases in the Astoria Municipal Court” and “has exclusive authority to control and direct the prosecution of DUIIs filed in the Astoria Municipal Court with authority to allow the city attorney to conduct those prosecutions.” The district attorney cross-appeals, agreeing with the city that the trial court erred in declaring that the district attorney is required to “attend and prosecute” cases in the municipal court. We conclude that the trial court correctly denied the city's motion to dismiss; however, we agree with the city on the merits. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in part and remand with instructions to enter judgment omitting those parts of the judgment challenged by the city and declaring the parties' rights in accordance with this opinion.
The city moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that (1) the district attorney is not the real party in interest, (2) the complaint failed to allege a justiciable controversy, and (3) the complaint failed to join necessary parties under ORS 28.110 —namely “other cities that would be affected by the declarations requested in the complaint.” The court denied the city's motion to dismiss the case.
The parties proceeded to trial, after which the court issued a letter opinion concluding, in part:
After skirmishes between the parties over the proposed form of judgment, the trial court ultimately entered a judgment declaring, as relevant to this appeal:
(Some formatting altered.)6 This appeal ensued.
Because it is jurisdictional, we first must address the city's contention—in its second assignment of error—that the trial court erred in denying the city's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the district attorney had failed to join all necessary parties under ORS 28.110. See, e.g., Vance v. Ford, 187 Or.App. 412, 425, 67 P.3d 412 (2003) .7 There is no dispute as to the relevant facts. We review for legal error the trial court's conclusion under ORS 28.110 on the joinder of necessary parties. Sergeant's Towing, Inc. v. City of Portland, 173 Or.App. 359, 364–67, 22 P.3d 237, rev. den., 332 Or. 558, 34 P.3d 1176 (2001) (so reviewing). As explained below, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the city's motion.
ORS 28.110 provides, as relevant:
“When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding.”
The city's argument that ORS 28.110 has not been satisfied in this case is cursory. It argues that dismissal was required because “[t]his judgment and its rationale will have an effect on which agency controls, and what government pays for, prosecutions in Clatsop County and across the state.” It relies solely on Smith v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 242 Or.App. 202, 255 P.3d 615 (2011), and contends that the court erred in not dismissing the action because “[r]elitigating this claim for other municipal courts creates a risk of a city-by-city procedural patchwork statewide.”
Noting that other cities in Clatsop County that have municipal courts already permit the district attorney to prosecute DUII offenses committed in those cities, the district attorney responds that “[t]he declaration sought in this case involves only the district attorney's authority to direct and control the prosecution of DUIIs committed in the City of Astoria.” (Emphasis in original.) Thus, in its view, “[t]he dispute is solely between the Clatsop County District Attorney and the City of Astoria” and no other municipalities, either inside or outside of Clatsop County, have a direct interest in the outcome of the litigation for purposes of necessary-party status under ORS 28.110. We agree with the district attorney.
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Clatsop Cnty. Dist. Attorney v. City of Astoria
...266 Or.App. 769340 P.3d 71CLATSOP COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY and Joshua Marquis, Plaintiffs–Respondents Cross–Appellants,v.CITY OF ASTORIA, Defendant–Appellant Cross–Respondent.112430; A152486.Court of Appeals of Oregon.Argued and submitted on Jan. 03, 2014.Decided Nov. 13, Reversed and reman......