Claudio v. Mattituck-Cutchogue Union Free Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 24 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 09–CV–5251 (JFB)(AKT).,09–CV–5251 (JFB)(AKT).
• Parties: Anthony M. CLAUDIO, Plaintiff, v. MATTITUCK–CUTCHOGUE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

955 F.Supp.2d 118

Anthony M. CLAUDIO, Plaintiff,

v.MATTITUCK–CUTCHOGUE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

No. 09–CV–5251 (JFB)(AKT).

United States District Court,

E.D. New York.

July 24, 2013.

Frank J. Blangiardo, Frank J. Blangiardo, Esq., Cutchogue, NY, for Plaintiff.

Jeltje DeJong, Joshua S. Shteierman, and Kelly E. Wright, Devitt Spellman Barrett, LLP, Smithtown, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

Plaintiff Anthony M. Claudio (“plaintiff” or “Claudio”) filed the instant action against defendant Mattituck–Cutchogue Union Free School District (“defendant” or “District”), alleging gender and age discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), as well as under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and New York laws against discrimination.

Plaintiff withdrew his federal claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act and his claims under New York State law. On September 29, 2011, the Court denied orally on the record defendant's motion for summary judgment on both plaintiff's ADEA claim and gender discrimination claim under Title VII; the Court granted the motion as to all other federal claims. The Court stated that a written opinion would follow, and the Court's analysis is contained in this Memorandum and Order.

The remaining claims—namely, gender discrimination under Title VII and age discrimination under the ADEA—were tried before a jury, commencing on October 9, 2012. On October 22, 2012, the jury returned a unanimous verdict for plaintiff on his age discrimination claim, finding that the District discriminated against plaintiff based upon his age in connection with its termination of his employment as a special education teacher. Regarding his gender discrimination claim, the jury returned a verdict in defendant's favor. With respect to damages, the jury awarded $70,000.00 as back pay damages, and one dollar in nominal damages, against the District.¹

Presently before the Court are defendant's post-trial motions, as well as plaintiff's cross-motion for reinstatement of a position or, alternatively, for front pay and lost benefits. The cross-motion also includes a request for attorneys' fees and costs. Defendant's post-trial motions consist of: (1) a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), in which defendant argues that plaintiff failed to present legally sufficient evidence showing that defendant's employment decision was pretextual, i.e., motivated by discriminatory animus, and (2) a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 because (a) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and (b) plaintiff's counsel's improper conduct pervaded trial to such an extent that it improperly influenced the jury's verdict.

For the reasons that follow, with the exception of vacating the nominal damage award, defendant's Rule 50 and Rule 59 motions are denied in their entirety. Specifically, there was sufficient evidence from which a rational jury—if it credited plaintiff's evidence—could have found that plaintiff was terminated as a special education teacher on account of his age. As discussed more fully infra, there were several categories of evidence introduced at trial upon which the jury could have rationally based such a verdict.

First, plaintiff was age 47 at the time of his termination; he was replaced by an individual who was 25 years old. Second, there were several statements attributed to Superintendent James McKenna that, if credited and reasonably construed in plaintiff's favor, could support an age discrimination claim. These include the following: (1) plaintiff's wife testified that, after her husband was denied tenure, she inquired of Superintendent McKenna why this had occurred, and he responded, before walking away, that he “can't teach an old dog new tricks” (Tr. 543:19–544:8); (2) a board member, Janique Nine, testified that prior to the April 16, 2009 board Meeting, in which the decision to deny plaintiff tenure was made, Superintendent McKenna commented to Nine that they “were going in a new direction with special ed and that Mr. Claudio was, he had an old school style” (Tr. 523:12–19); (3) Barbara Smith, a teacher at Cutchogue East Elementary School and plaintiff's sister-in-law, testified that she saw Superintendent McKenna hand a pile of resumes, consisting of individuals to interview, to the employment committee, and this pile largely contained young, female applicants in it; and (4) Smith also testified that, on one occasion, Superintendent McKenna had expressed to her that he wanted to hire young people whom he could mold. (Tr. 201:23–203:7.) Third, there was evidence that Superintendent McKenna initially agreed that plaintiff should receive tenure, but that he then decided not to grant plaintiff tenure, electing instead to terminate plaintiff's employment. Fourth, not only did plaintiff contest at trial the validity of the performance reasons offered in support of Superintendent McKenna's termination decision, but plaintiff also introduced testimony from several witnesses, including two school board members, who believed that, based upon plaintiff's performance, plaintiff should have received tenure. Additionally, school principal Shawn Petretti testified that, at least initially, he supported the position that plaintiff should receive tenure, and also, told plaintiff that he believed plaintiff would receive tenure. Fifth, plaintiff presented the testimony of other witnesses—including the school psychologist, the school guidance counselor coordinator, and a teaching assistant in the special education department—that undermined the validity of one or more of the reasons articulated by Superintendent McKenna for plaintiff's termination. Lastly, Petretti testified that, in McKenna's eight years as Superintendent, Petretti was not aware of any male over 40 hired by McKenna who had received tenure. In short, when all of the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there was certainly more than sufficient evidence to permit a rational jury to find in plaintiff's favor on the age discrimination claim. Thus, there is no basis for relief under Rule 50.

With respect to the Rule 59 motion, although plaintiff's counsel engaged in courtroom antics and theatrics that were unprofessional and inappropriate, the Court has no reason to believe that counsel's conduct improperly prompted the jury to return a verdict in plaintiff's favor. There are several reasons for this conclusion. First, at times counsel's conduct was so clearly inappropriate and unprofessional that, if a rational juror were to have improperly considered such conduct in reaching a verdict, he or she would have been less likely to return a verdict for the plaintiff, not more likely. Second, counsel's antics primarily related to trivial and/or collateral issues in the case that could not possibly have influenced the jury's verdict. Third, when the Court warned counsel about certain behavior, counsel generally avoided repeating the same conduct. Fourth, the Court, sometimes sua sponte, gave extremely strong and specific instructionsto the jury during the course of the trial to alleviate any potential prejudice to defendant from plaintiff's counsel's conduct; defendant never requested any additional relief during the trial (such as additional instructions, a mistrial, or other sanction). Finally, the fact that the jury found no liability on the gender discrimination claim illustrates that the jury was not blindly influenced by counsel's conduct when returning a verdict favorable to plaintiff. In sum, having presided over the entire trial (and having observed the evidence, the jury, and the conduct of plaintiff's counsel), the Court concludes that plaintiff's counsel's conduct did not unfairly influence the jury's verdict in any way. In fact, the Court believes that plaintiff did not prevail because of counsel's inappropriate conduct, but rather, prevailed despite such conduct. Accordingly, the Rule 59 motion is denied.

Finally, the Court requires supplemental briefing on the issues of reinstatement, front pay, and lost benefits before a decision may be made on such issues. Similarly, plaintiff's counsel shall submit supplemental documentation supporting the attorneys' fees and costs requested.

I. Procedural Background²

Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action on December 1, 2009. On February 4, 2011, defendant requested a pre-motion conference in anticipation of filing a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The parties engaged in motion practice, and oral argument was heard on September 29, 2011. At the conclusion of oral argument, the Court granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion for summary judgment for the reasons set forth orally on the record; it also noted that a written memorandum and order would follow. In particular, the Court orally denied on the record defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ADEA claim and the gender discrimination claim under Title VII, but it granted the motion as to all other claims. The remaining claims were tried before a jury. Trial subsequently was held, beginning on October 9, 2012, and concluding on October 22, 2012. On October 22, 2012, the jury returned a unanimous verdict for plaintiff on his age discrimination claim, finding that the District had discriminated against plaintiff based upon his age in connection with its termination of his employment as a special education teacher. In regards to plaintiff's gender discrimination claim, the jury returned a verdict in defendant's favor. With respect to damages, the jury awarded $70,000.00 as back pay damages, and one dollar in nominal damages,...