Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. AZ Metro Distribs., LLC
| Decision Date | 16 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | 15-CV-05370 (ENV) (PK) |
| Parties | EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. AZ METRO DISTRIBUTORS, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
VITALIANO, D.J.
On September 16, 2019, a jury found that AZ Metro Distributors, LLC ("AZ Metro") unlawfully terminated the employment of Archibald Roberts and Cesar Fernandez, on the basis of claimants' ages, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). The jury found that the violations were willful and awarded approximately $458,000 in back pay damages between the two claimants. Presently before the Court are dueling post-trial motions. For the reasons that follow, each motion is granted in part and denied in part.
On January 31, 2014, the employment of Archibald Roberts, 66 years of age at the time, and Cesar Fernandez, then 64 years old, was terminated. Both had been regional swing salesmen for beverage distributor AZ Metro. In the ordinary course of their work, Roberts and Fernandez would fill in for absent regular route salespersons and cover the salespersons' territory, which required them to meet with the grocers and bodegas along the route, check their inventory, and try to make sales wherever they saw a gap in product.
Roberts claims his supervisor, Glenford Barsattee, fired him and explained on a call during his last day that upper-level management sought to move AZ Metro's salesforce in a younger direction and to hire more women. Fernandez, claiming he was also fired the same day, attached Barsattee's explanation of Roberts's termination to his own termination. AZ Metro, however, denied any such plan and claims rather that Roberts and Fernandez resigned. The two had received performance write-ups in the past and, so AZ Metro proffered, simply gave up on improving their own performance and decided it would be better to resign than deal with another write-up.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed a complaint against AZ Metro with Roberts and Fernandez as claimants on September 17, 2015, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination and Employment Act ("ADEA"). Having survived over four years' of hotly contested motions to dismiss, discovery disputes, and potential settlement arrangements, EEOC's claim made it to trial on September 17, 2019. This trial resulted in a verdict in favor of EEOC, finding that AZ Metro had willfully terminated Roberts and Fernandez on the basis of their ages, and awarded full back pay to each in the amounts of $207,704.78 and $250,288.96, respectively.
Following the trial, both parties filed bundled post-trial motions. EEOC moves for injunctive relief and judgment as a matter of law with respect to back pay, front pay, prejudgment interest, liquidated damages,1 and mitigation. AZ Metro moves for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of back pay and mitigation, or in the alternative a new trial conditioned on the EEOC's refusal of remittitur. Additionally, AZ Metro moves for a new trial on the prima facie ADEA claim as a result of the individual and cumulative effect of a set ofclaimed errors made by the court in admitting evidence.
"Under Rule 50, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for a party." Malmsteen v. Berdon, LLP, 595 F. Supp. 2d 299, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd, 369 F. App'x 248 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Merrill Lynch Interfunding v. Argenti, 155 F.3d 113, 120 (2d Cir.1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). A "district court may set aside a jury's verdict pursuant to Rule 50 only where [1] there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or [2] there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [jurors] could not arrive at a verdict against him." Levitant v. City of New York Human Res. Admin., 914 F. Supp. 2d 281, 295-96 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), aff'd, 558 F. App'x 26 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free Sch. Dist., 691 F.3d 119, 127-28 (2d Cir.2012)) (alterations in original). In deciding a Rule 50 motion, the trial court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and accords all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Black v. Finantra Capital, Inc., 418 F.3d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir.2001)). In reaching its ruling, the trial court "cannot assess the weight of conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury." Id. (quoting Tolbert, 242 F.3d at 70).
When a court grants a "renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law underRule 50(b), the court 'must also conditionally rule on any motion for a new trial by determining whether a new trial should be granted if the judgment is later vacated or reversed' and state the grounds for its conditional ruling." Levitant v. City of New York Human Res. Admin., 914 F. Supp. 2d 281, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(c)(1)).
Under Rule 59, the Court may, on motion, grant a new trial "for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court," Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A), and a new trial "ordinarily should not be granted unless the trial court is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice," Kosmynka v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 462 F.3d 74, 82 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 365 (2d Cir.1992) (internal citation omitted)). The Second Circuit has instructed that "[w]here there is no particular discernable error ... a jury's damage award may not be set aside ... unless the [amount of the award] shock[s] the judicial conscience and constitute[s] a denial of justice." Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir.1998).
"The general grounds for a new trial are that (1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence; (2) the trial court was not fair; (3) substantial errors occurred in the admission or rejection of evidence or the giving or refusal of instructions to the jury; or (4) damages are excessive." EEOC v. United Health Programs of Am., Inc., No. 14-CV-3673 (KAM) (JO), 2020 WL 1083771, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2020) (quoting Lawson v. Cty. of Suffolk, 920 F. Supp. 2d 332, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)).
Critically, "[t]he Rule 59 standard is less stringent than the Rule 50 standard for judgment as a matter of law in two respects: '(1) a new trial under Rule 59(a) may be granted even if there is substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict, and (2) a trial judge is free to weigh the evidence himself, and need not view it in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.'" In reVivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F.Supp.2d 512, 574 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (quoting Manley v. AmBase Corp., 337 F.3d 237, 244-45 (2d Cir.2003)). "In weighing the evidence, however, the Court should not ordinarily ignore the jury's role in resolving factual disputes and assessing witness credibility." Mugavero v. Arms Acres, Inc., 680 F.Supp.2d 544, 558-59 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (internal quotation omitted).
If the court finds that a verdict appears excessive and against the weight of the evidence, the trial judge has discretion to order a new trial without qualification or may condition a new trial "on the verdict winner's refusal to agree to a reduction (remittitur)." Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 433, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996)). In other words, "[r]emittitur is the process by which a court compels a plaintiff to choose between reduction of an excessive verdict and a new trial." Stampf v. Long Island R. Co., 761 F.3d 192, 204 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir.1984)).
With this guidance, "[r]emittitur is appropriate in two situations: '(1) where the court can identify an error that caused the jury to include in the verdict a quantifiable amount that should be stricken, and (2) more generally, where the award is "intrinsically excessive" in the sense of being greater than the amount a reasonable jury could have awarded, although the surplus cannot be ascribed to a particular, quantifiable error.'" Anderson Group, LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs, 805 F.3d 34, 51 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Kirsch, 148 F.3d at 165) (identifying a specific error in that the "lost opportunity" category of damages was "impermissibly speculative" on the evidence). "[A] district court should remit the jury's award only to the maximum amount that would be upheld by the district court as not excessive." Earl v. Bouchard Transport Co., 917 F.2d 1320, 1330 (2d Cir. 1990).
Defendant alleges that it is entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law pursuant to Rule 50(b), claiming that plaintiff failed to establish legally sufficient evidence at trial to support the ADEA claim. Dkt. 209 ("Def's Mem.") at 15. Plaintiff counters that the evidence clearly establishes a prima facie case. "To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA . . . a plaintiff must demonstrate the following: (1) [claimant] was within the protected class; (2) [claimant] was qualified for the position; (3) [claimant] was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." Claudio v. Mattituck-Cutchogue Union Free Sch. Dist., 955 F. Supp. 2d 118, 130-32 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137-38 (2d Cir.2003)); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411...
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