Clausen v. Minnesota Steel Co.
| Decision Date | 22 April 1932 |
| Docket Number | 28,918 |
| Citation | 242 N.W. 397,186 Minn. 80 |
| Parties | HILDING E. CLAUSEN v. MINNESOTA STEEL COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Certiorari upon the relation of the Minnesota Steel Company to review an order of the industrial commission awarding compensation to Hilding E. Clausen for an accidental injury arising out of and in course of his employment. Affirmed.
Workmen's compensation act -- timely notice of latent injury.
1. Where an employe in the course of his employment is hurt in an accident producing at the time injury to the physical structure of the body, which injury does not result in present disability but remains inactive and undisclosed for some period of time and then causes disability, the time for the employe to comply with the conditions prescribed by G.S 1923 (1 Mason, 1927) § 4280, begins to run from the occurrence of the disability or the time the injury manifests itself as likely to cause disability. The evidence sustains the findings of latent injury and timely notice after discovery thereof.
Workmen's compensation act -- award for medical treatment.
2. Since the employer after notice of disability denied the employe compensation and, by its own doctor, advised the employe to return to the doctor he first consulted for treatment, the commission was justified in awarding the employe the reasonable expenses incurred for medical and surgical treatment.
Workmen's compensation act -- violation of rule as to report of injury.
3. Even if respondent violated a rule of relator with respect to reporting and receiving treatment for the slightest accidental injury at relator's infirmary, from such violation the commission could not find the accident "intentionally self-inflicted."
Dennis F. Donovan, for relator.
J. H. Whitely, for respondent.
Cobb, Hoke, Benson, Krause & Faegre, amici curiae, filed a brief in support of the contention of relator.
Certiorari to review a decision of the industrial commission awarding compensation for an accidental injury.
In the latter part of November, 1929, respondent was in relator's employ, and while trying to turn a nut on a bolt struck the wrench with a sledge held in the left hand. The nut loosened unexpectedly, and the knuckle of the forefinger of the right hand received a blow. Respondent was wearing canvas gloves. On taking off the glove the knuckle showed some abrasion of the skin but no bleeding. This happened near quitting time, and respondent kept on with his work until his day was finished. He went home and bathed the hand in hot water, which reduced the swelling that had appeared. A certain soreness remained in or close to the joint when pressure was applied, but this did not incapacitate respondent from performing his usual work. He deemed the injury trivial and did not report it to relator or to any of its foremen. The hand caused him no inconvenience or pain until about March 8, 1930. Two days thereafter he consulted a doctor. At that time it was much swollen and had two discharging sinuses. X-rays were taken, disclosing osteomyelitis of the metacarpal bone of the finger. A few days later a representative of relator procured a statement from respondent, and shortly thereafter informed respondent that because of his failure to report the accident "right away" relator declined to pay any compensation. Relator's doctor, although he examined the hand and took X-rays, advised respondent to continue with the doctor first employed and who had operated on the finger, chiseling out affected parts of the bone. Medical science has not been able to arrest the progress of the injury, and the evidence indicates that amputation of the hand and perhaps the arm is unavoidable.
The findings are that respondent sustained an accident in the latter part of November, 1929, which arose out of and in the course of his employment and caused an injury to his right hand; "that the injurious effect of said accident remained latent and dormant and did not develop or manifest itself or disable the employe until March 9, or 10, 1930." It was also found that notice of the accident and injury was given to relator on March 11, 1930. Compensation was allowed from the last named date; also for medical treatment. The evidence sustains these findings of fact.
The main contention is that, since no notice of the accident was given and relator had no knowledge thereof until 90 days after the day the accidental blow on the finger was received, compensation is barred. Our workmen's compensation act is contained in 1 Mason, 1927, §§ 4261 to 4337-5, and the references hereinafter will be to such of said sections as may be pertinent. The one particularly involved is § 4280 reading:
By § 4282 the time for instituting compensation proceedings is limited to two years after the receipt by the industrial commission of notice of the accident from the employer.
The right to compensation is given by § 4269, which decrees that every employer who is under the compensation act shall pay compensation, according to the schedules in the act, "in every case of personal injury or death of his employe, caused by accident, arising out of and in the course of employment, without regard to the question of negligence," with exceptions not here applicable.
It is to be noted that § 4280 attaches no importance to notice where the employer has obtained knowledge of "the occurrence of the injury" within 90 days. The question really comes to this: Do the words "accident" and "occurrence of the injury" mean the same thing under this act? "Accident" is defined by § 4326(h); but nowhere is "injury" or "occurrence of the injury" defined except as meaning compensable injury, which does not occur until disability ensues. It is common knowledge that accidents may injure some parts of the physical structure of the body not open to view nor suspected of having received an injury nor causing disability until long after the accident. The injury is there, but latent and hidden. There are accidents so trivial in apparent results at the time that neither the one who might witness the same nor the victim thereof would anticipate disability therefrom, yet the subsequent development thereof may cause not only loss of members but life itself. Examples of such appear in the decisions of this court. Walker v. Minnesota Steel Co. 167 Minn. 475, 209 N.W. 635; Hertz v. Watab Paper Co. 180 Minn. 177, 230 N.W. 481; Keane v. Arrowhead S.P. Co. 181 Minn. 359, 232 N.W. 621.
The workmen's compensation act does not contemplate the payment of damages for accidental injuries, no matter how painful. It is only the disability or loss of earning power which results from the injuries that calls for compensation. So when the act speaks of the occurrence of injury it refers to compensable injuries, and these occur when disability appears.
Section 4293 indicates the same purpose, for the employer is, under penalty, required to report to the industrial commission "any accident to any employe * * * which causes death or serious injury" within 48 hours of "the occurrence of such accident, and of all other accidents which occur to any employe in the course of his employment, and of which the employer or his foreman has knowledge within seven days after the occurrence of such accident, provided that such injuries are sufficient wholly or partially to incapacitate the person injured from labor or service for more than the remainder of the day, shift or turn on which the injury was sustained."
It is clear from this record that if the relator had witnessed the accident to respondent it would not have violated the law in failing to report it. Hence we must conclude that our workmen's compensation act intended to compensate employes for every disability or loss of earning power caused by any accidental injury received in the course of the employment, no matter whether the disability results immediately from the injury or is delayed because the latent hidden or dormant injury failed to heal as anticipated but ultimately developed serious consequences. That being so, it must follow that § 4280 should be so construed that the employe can have an opportunity to give the notice and secure his rights in cases of accidents causing nonanticipated, delayed incapacity or disability. We met the question in Young v. Melrose Granite Co. 152 Minn. 512, 189 N.W. 426, 29...
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