Clay County v. Brown Lumber Co.

Citation119 S.W. 251
PartiesCLAY COUNTY v. BROWN LUMBER CO.
Decision Date10 May 1909
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas

Appeal from Circuit Court, Clay County; Frank Smith, Judge.

Application by the Brown Lumber Company against Clay County for the refundment of certain taxes. Judgment for petitioner, and the County appeals. Reversed, and petition dismissed.

Hal L. Norwood, Atty. Gen., C. A. Cunningham, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Hunter & Cantleberry, of counsel), for appellant. Spence & Dudley, for appellee.

FRAUENTHAL, J.

On July 10, 1908, the Brown Lumber Company applied by petition to the county court of Clay county for an order refunding to it certain taxes which, it alleged, had been erroneously paid by it on certain real estate owned by it and situated in the town of Rector in said county, and which it claimed, had been erroneously and excessively assessed for the year of 1907. The county court denied said petition, and an appeal was duly taken by the petitioner to the circuit court. Upon the trial of the matter in that court, the evidence tended to prove: That the appellee was the owner of lot "O" in said town of Rector; that for the year of 1907 the assessor of said county assessed said lot at $2,000; that the board of equalization of said county at its meeting duly and regularly held in September, 1907, raised the valuation and assessment of said lot "O" to $5,000. The county clerk of said county testified that within the time prescribed by law, and prior to the first Monday of October, 1907, notice of said increase of the valuation of said lot was given by postal card through the mails and directed to appellee at its domicile at Paragould, Ark. The secretary and treasurer of appellee company testified that no notice of the increase of valuation by the board of equalization was received by the appellee. The evidence tended to prove that $2,000 was a reasonably fair, and that $5,000 was an excessive, valuation of said lot. The circuit court, after setting out substantially the above findings, entered further the following finding and judgment: "The court further finds that it is immaterial as to whether plaintiff was notified by said board of the raise placed upon said lot or not. The court further finds that petitioner filed its petition in the county court at the July, 1908, term thereof, and which was the first term of said court held after petitioner became aware of said raise by said board, to refund to it the following excessive and erroneous taxes, to wit: State taxes, $20.25; school taxes, $21; county taxes, $15; road taxes, $9; city taxes, Rector, $15 — total, $80.25. The court further finds that any person who has paid taxes erroneously, as hereinbefore referred to, upon satisfactory proof being given, is entitled to have an order refunding to such person such taxes so erroneously assessed and paid. The court further finds that plaintiff was not barred from obtaining the relief herein sought by not appearing at the October term of the county court, and would only be barred by lapse of time granted for appeal, as in all other cases appealed from the county, and which time the court finds in this case had not expired at the time the appeal was taken herein." From the judgment thus rendered in favor of appellee, Clay county prosecutes this appeal to this court.

It thus appears that the only ground upon which the appellee seeks to have these taxes refunded to it is that an overvaluation or excessive assessment was placed on said lot by the board of equalization, and therefore this, in effect, is a proceeding to obtain a reduction of that valuation or assessment. The proceeding is founded on section 7180 of Kirby's Digest, which provides: "In case any person has paid or may hereafter pay taxes on any property real or personal, erroneously assessed, upon satisfactory proof being adduced to the county court of the fact, the said court shall make an order refunding to such person the amount of the county tax so erroneously assessed and paid." And also makes provision relative to the refunding of the state tax. In order to determine the object and effect of this section, it is necessary to decide when and where, under our assessment laws, an application must be made for a reduction of an alleged overvaluation or excessive assessment of real estate. The Legislature has plenary power to prescribe the manner in which property shall be assessed and its valuation fixed for the purposes of taxation. Article 16, § 5, of the Constitution of 1874 provides: "All property subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its value, that value to be ascertained in such manner as the general assembly shall direct, making the same equal and uniform throughout the state."

It is common knowledge that one of the most difficult and perplexing undertakings of government is to fix an equal and uniform valuation on property throughout the state. Intelligent men differ as to the value of the most common objects before them, and the most that can be expected from legislation is an approximation to this end of equality, uniformity, and fairness of valuation. The jurisdiction to fix this valuation is by legislation ordinarily placed with some officer or board, and boards or courts of revision are sometimes established; but the entire proceedings are statutory, and the statutory remedies provided to a party aggrieved by an overvaluation made within the jurisdiction of the particular officer or board must be pursued. As is said in the case of Stanley v. Supervisors of Albany, 121 U. S. 535, 7 Sup. Ct. 1234, 30 L. Ed. 1000: "A party who feels himself aggrieved by overvaluation of his property for purposes of taxation and does not resort to the tribunal created by the state for correction of errors in assessment cannot maintain an action at law to recover the excess of taxes paid beyond what should have been levied on a just valuation." When legislation, in accomplishing the necessities of government, makes provision that certain officers or boards shall fix the assessment of property, it does not violate the right of due process of law. Now while, ordinarily, appeal is granted from such officer or board to some court or board of...

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