Clayton, Matter of

• Decision Date: 07 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 16759,16759
• Citation: 113 Idaho 817,748 P.2d 401
• Parties: In the Matter of the Suspension of the Driver's License of Donald CLAYTON, Defendant. STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Donald CLAYTON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 401

748 P.2d 401

113 Idaho 817

In the Matter of the Suspension of the Driver's License of Donald CLAYTON, Defendant STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Donald CLAYTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16759.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Jan. 7, 1988.

Dan J. Rude, Esq., Coeur d'Alene, for defendant-appellant.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

HUNTLEY, Justice.

In this case we must rule whether a police officer's conduct leading to an arrest for driving while intoxicated violated Donald Clayton's fourth amendment rights, and whether Clayton implicitly consented to an evidentiary test by being in actual physical control of his motor vehicle within the meaning of I.C. § 18-8002. For reasons explained below, we affirm.

In the early morning hours of December 13, 1985, a Coeur d' Alene Police Officer, Mike Moser, observed a vehicle in a parking lot adjacent to a bar. The vehicle's engine was running and the headlights were on, and an individual, later identified as Clayton, was sitting in the driver's seat behind the steering wheel, with his head slumped forward. Officer Moser testified he decided to approach the vehicle to determine whether the person was in need of medical attention, asleep or intoxicated.

Officer Moser opened the driver's side door, reached in, turned the motor off, and took possession of the keys. He then attempted to arouse Clayton by speaking to him loudly and shaking him. After several minutes, Clayton awoke and began talking, but Officer Moser was unable to distinguish any coherent speech. He testified that "all that came out was gibberish." Based on the location of the vehicle, the time of day and Clayton's conduct, Officer Moser suspected intoxication.

After a brief period, Clayton seemed to wake up, and hurriedly got out of the car, but had trouble maintaining his balance. At that time, Officer Moser first noticed the odor of alcohol. Clayton was placed under arrest and transported to the Kootenai County Sheriff's Office, where he was requested to take an evidentiary blood test. Clayton refused and his driver's license was seized pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002(4). After a show cause hearing before a magistrate, Clayton's driving privileges were suspended and he appealed to the district court. The district court, acting in an appellate capacity, affirmed the suspension. Clayton now brings this appeal.

The first issue is whether Officer Moser's conduct in performing his investigation complied with Clayton's fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. First, we note that the officer acted reasonably in investigating the situation. When he observed the vehicle with its motor running, lights on, and the driver slumped forward, he had a duty as a police officer to investigate, as stated in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973):

Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and also because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or involved in an accident on public highways, the extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or office. Some such contacts will occur because the officer may believe the operator has violated a criminal statute, but many more will not be of that nature. Local police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.

Here, at 1:30 in the morning, the vehicle was in a parking lot with its lights on and motor running, with the driver slumped forward. Tested upon practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable persons act, this situation falls outside the boundaries of normal conduct. The driver could have been hurt or sick, and in need of medical attention. Officer Moser acted prudently and satisfied his caretaking function when investigating the vehicle.

Nevertheless, Clayton contends a search occurred when the officer removed the keys from the vehicle, because at that time, he, even if he so desired, could not have left the scene. We disagree. Officer Moser's actions were consistent with his caretaking function. It is reasonable to assume that he acted out of concern for Clayton's safety in securing the vehicle.

In any event, even if Officer Moser's actions amounted to a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment, sufficient probable cause existed to conclude the removal of the keys was reasonable under the circumstances. Our Court of Appeals has discussed the fourth amendment standards applicable to seizures in Mason v. State Department of Law Enforcement 103 Idaho 748, 653 P.2d 803 (Ct.App.1982). There, Mason contended that his arrest for DUI was tainted by an unlawful seizure of his person because he was initially detained and asked to perform field dexterity tests. The Court set out the standards for permissible seizures:

It is true that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away--even briefly--the officer has 'seized' that person. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 688 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). However, such a 'seizure' is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if it is reasonable. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). An investigatory stop, such as occurred here, in order to be reasonable and permissible, 'must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in a criminal activity.' United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). The sufficiency of cause justifying an investigatory stop depends upon the totality of the circumstances. Based upon the 'whole picture,' the detaining officer must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity. Id. at 417-18, 101 S.Ct. at 695.

Mason v. State Department of Law Enforcement, supra, 103 Idaho at 750, 653 P.2d at 805 (Ct.App.1982).

A brief stop of a suspicious individual in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information may be reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1 at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-1880. It is clear that, under the instant circumstances, there was a sufficient and objective basis for Officer Moser to further investigate Clayton for a possible DUI violation. Thus, the removal of the keys was permissible. See also, Wibben v. N.D. State Highway Commissioner, 413 N.W.2d 329 (N.D.1987) (State's interest in determining whether person in control of automobile was intoxicated, before person had opportunity to actually drive in an...