Clayton v. Clement
Decision Date | 20 February 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 5,5 |
Citation | 33 N.Y.2d 386,308 N.E.2d 690,353 N.Y.S.2d 173 |
Parties | , 308 N.E.2d 690 In the Matter of Clarence A. CLAYTON, Appellant, v. William CLEMENT et al., Constituting the Board of Education of Central School Districtof the Town of Smithtown, Respondents. |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Alan D. Oshrin, Commack, for appellant.
Peter Caronia, Bayside, and Richard T. Haefeli, for respondents.
Petitioner-appellant, a high school teacher, was dismissed from his job by the local Board of Education for conduct unbecoming a teacher, neglect of duty, inefficiency, and incompetence. Specifically, the board found that appellant lied about being sick during a nine-day period when in fact he was selling used cars; that he provided certain pupils with answers to examinations; that he prepared illegible examinations and graded them arbitrarily, and that he wrongly inserted zeros into a pupil's record in order to fail him. The Appellate Division modified the board's determination by reducing the penalty to a suspension. Both parties appeal from that order.
On approximately June 16, 1970 appellant received notice of the charges filed against him. Appellant's hearing before the Board of Education was commenced on July 7, 1970. In the interim, on July 1 1970 the amendment to section 3020--a of the Education Law became effective.
Before the July 1, 1970 amendment, disciplinary hearings were held only before the Board of Education. The amended law provided that on request a teacher could receive a hearing before a panel of persons selected from a list provided by the Commissioner of Education (see Education Law, § 3020--a, subd. 3, par. b). The panel would then determine the facts, and recommend an appropriate penalty to the Board of Education. The board then 'shall determine the case' and 'fix the penalty or punishment, if any' (Education Law, § 3020--a, subd. 4).
Appellant's attorney requested that his client be given a hearing before a panel pursuant to this new provision of the Education Law. That request was denied and appellant objected. The sole issue of importance on this appeal is whether the board's refusal to utilize the new bifurcated procedure was error, and if so, whether the error mandates that this determination be vacated and the case remanded for a new hearing in compliance with the provisions of section 3020--a of the Education Law. We feel such a reversal is mandated.
Initially, it must be noted that respondent school board makes no allegation, nor does it submit proof, that it was unable for some legitimate reason to meet the mandates of the new law at the time of appellant's hearing. And even assuming there was such a problem (e.g., a panel list had not yet been devised), there was no allegation or showing why the board could not adjourn the hearing until the board could comply with the new law.
The sole reason the board did not comply with the mandates of the amended statute at the July 7 hearing is because it thought it did not have to comply. When appellant's attorney asked for a hearing under the new procedures, the presiding board member replied: 'Mr. Kaufman, the charges were filed prior to July 1, 1970' (the effective date of the statute).
Generally, it is up to the Legislature not the court to fix jurisdictional guidelines determining when a statute or amendment to a statute should become applicable (Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 437, 200 N.E.2d 427, 430). The Legislature clearly stated that the amendments in question here were to become effective on July 1, 1970.
The change in the law affected the procedure to be used in connection with petitioner's hearing. The substantive rights, those acts which would be considered grounds for punishment, were not changed by the applicable statutory changes. In this respect, the case at bar is similar to the case of Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288. That case involved the effect of a new law providing for State enforcement of arbitration clauses on pre-existing contracts and pending actions. The court (per Cardozo, J.) stated pre-existing contracts would be subject to the new provision though cases which were already under adjudication would not. In making the decision relating to the pre-existing contracts, the court stated that the new law 'vindicated by a new method the obligation then existing' (Id., at p. 270, 130 N.E. at p. 290). That is the precise situation which confronts us in the case at bar.
Respondent...
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