Clayton v. Hurt

• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Denman
• Citation: Clayton v. Hurt, 32 S.W. 876, 88 Tex. 595 (Tex. 1895)
• Decision Date: 14 November 1895
• Parties: CLAYTON et al. v. HURT et al.

32 S.W. 876

CLAYTON et al. v. HURT et al.

Supreme Court of Texas.

November 14, 1895.

Certified questions from the court of civil appeals, First supreme judicial district.

Action by W. T. Clayton and others against Isaac S. Hurt and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appealed to the court of civil appeals, from which questions were certified to the supreme court.

L. E. Trezevant, for appellants. Spencer & Kincaid, for appellees.

DENMAN, J.

In this cause the court of civil appeals of the First supreme judicial district have certified to us, with the accompanying statement, the following questions: "On December 9, 1893, the appellee Isaac S. Hurt, under oath, filed in the justice court, precinct No. 1, for Galveston county, a complaint in writing, in which he alleges that complainant demised certain premises, in this complaint duly described, to W. T. Clayton, on the 7th of September, 1893, for one month, and thereafter for another month, and thereafter for another month, ending December 7, 1893; that being desirous, upon the termination of said term, to have and again repossess his said estate, complainant, on the 5th day of December, 1893, made a demand in writing of said Clayton for possession thereof, and the said Clayton has hitherto refused to comply with said demand, and willfully holds said premises. Upon this complaint, Clayton was duly cited to answer same. Clayton appeared in said justice court and excepted to the complaint on the ground, among others, that the complaint did not allege and that it did not appear that the complainant had given notice in writing, or otherwise, to defendant of the termination of the lease, or of the determination of the complainant's will, at such time as was reasonable and proper in law. These exceptions were overruled, and, upon trial in the justice court, judgment was rendered for complainant. Defendant appealed to county court, and judgment was again rendered for appellee, and under this judgment the defendant Clayton was ejected from the premises, and execution levied on the property of the sureties upon his appeal bond, the defendant being insolvent. Petition for injunction restraining the execution of the judgment of the county court against the defendant Clayton and his sureties was presented to the judge of the district court of Galveston county, * * * which being refused, they filed suit in the said district court against the complainant, Hurt, and the said justice of the peace. The object of this suit was to obtain relief from the judgments of the justice and county courts, upon the ground that the complaint was insufficient to authorize judicial proceedings for restitution of the premises against defendant, and the proceedings and the judgment rendered under the complaint were void. Hurt and the justice of the peace filed exceptions to the petition, asserting that the judgment in the county court was conclusive of the matters adjudicated therein, and that the plaintiff's petition was without equity. These exceptions were sustained by the district court, and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed, and from that judgment they prosecuted an appeal to this court. If it be the law of this state that a lease such as described in the complaint does not terminate until one month after notice given to the lessee to quit the premises, did or did not the failure to allege such notice in the complaint deprive the justice of the power to cite the lessee to answer the complaint, and render void the judgments of the justice of the peace and of the county court for restitution of the premises? As the complaint shows upon its face that the written demand for the possession of the premises was delivered to the lessee two days before the expiration of the lease, were or were not the proceedings and judgment had and rendered under such complaint null and void?"

Where a court of general jurisdiction, in the exercise of its ordinary judicial functions, renders a judgment in a cause in which it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and the subject-matter of the controversy, such judgment is never void, no matter how erroneous it may appear, from the face of the record or otherwise, to be. An analysis and application of this rule to the facts stated will answer the questions certified. Whether a court is to be classed as one of general or one of special and limited jurisdiction depends, not upon the classification of courts of similar names in other jurisdictions, but upon the duties and powers devolved upon it, and the manner of their exercise, as prescribed by the organic law. The constitution of this state, in distributing the judicial power of the government among the various courts, and defining their relation to each other, after providing for the division of the county into...