Clayton v. State, Criminal 733
| Decision Date | 03 July 1931 |
| Docket Number | Criminal 733 |
| Citation | 38 Ariz. 466,300 P. 1010 |
| Parties | C. E. CLAYTON, Appellant, v. STATE, Respondent |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
On motion for rehearing on appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. Motion denied.
For former opinion, see ante, p. 135, 297 P. 1037.
Messrs Flanigan and Fields, for Appellant.
Mr. K Berry Peterson, Attorney General, Mr. Arthur T. La Prade Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Chas. A. Carson, Jr., City Attorney, and Mr. James E. Nelson, Assistant City Attorney for the State.
The Attorney General and the city attorney have filed a motion for rehearsing in which they express the fear that, if our opinion stands, Phoenix and other cities of the state will be deprived of many powers necessary for their welfare and protection. It is enough to say their apprehensions are unfounded.
They insist that provisions of the city charter which we overlooked in our opinion authorize the legislative body of the city to pass the ordinance in question. Our attention is called to subsection 14, section 2, chapter IV, of the charter, which authorizes the city to regulate the speed of automobiles and other vehicles. The ordinance in question was not passed under that authorization. It is not a speed ordinance. The driver, if under the influence of intoxicating liquor, is guilty of the offense denounced regardless of the rate of speed he is driving. Slow, careful and skilful driving will not relieve him.
Then it is said subsection 32 of the same section and chapter authorizes the city commission "to prevent and punish drunkenness and all offenses . . . and disorderly conduct in the City," and that under this provision the commission was empowered to pass the ordinance punishing persons who drive motor vehicles on state highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The object of the ordinance is not to suppress drunkenness and related delinquencies, but to make travel on the highways safe. The driver does not need to become drunk or intoxicated to incur the law's penalty. It is only necessary that he be under the influence, however slight, if it affects him either mentally or physically. Hasten v. State, 35 Ariz. 427, 280 P. 670.
It is said the city commission had authority under the general welfare clause of the charter, as found in section 9, chapter XXI, to pass the ordinance. The powers of the city under the public safety and welfare clauses are indeed very broad. It is said:
"The enumeration of special powers in a municipal charter is often concluded with...
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State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson
...Bolick applauds, infra ¶73–74) recognized as significant the distinction that he deems immaterial. See, e.g. , Clayton v. State , 38 Ariz. 466, 468, 300 P. 1010 (1931) (on motion for rehearing) (stating that where "the subject is of state-wide concern, and the legislature has appropriated t......
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Poynter v. Walling
...have declared such municipal ordinances invalid: Clayton v. State, 38 Ariz. 135, 297 P. 1037 (Ariz.Sup.Ct.1931), aff'd on reh. 38 Ariz. 466, 300 P. 1010; Price v. State, 39 Ariz. 59, 3 P.2d 1114 (Ariz.Sup.Ct.1931); Helmer v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.App. 140, 191 P. 1001 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1920......
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State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson
...§ 9-284 (repeating the substance of the 1912 Act's treatment of conflicts between a charter and state law); Clayton v. State , 38 Ariz. 466, 468, 300 P. 1010 (1931) (on motion for rehearing) (stating "[if] the subject [over which a charter city exercises authority] is of state-wide concern,......
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City of Bellingham v. Schampera
...P.2d 263; City of Fargo v. Glaser, 1932, 62 N.D. 673, 244 N.W. 905; Clayton v. State, 1931, 38 Ariz. 135, 297 P. 1037 (rehearing) 38 Ariz. 466, 300 P. 1010; Helmer v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 1920, 48 Cal.App. 140, 191 P. 1001. The following cases have upheld such ordinances, as......