CLEAN v. City of Spokane
| Decision Date | 13 November 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 65262-7,65262-7 |
| Citation | 947 P.2d 1169,133 Wn.2d 455 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | CLEAN (Citizens for leaders with Ethics and Accountability Now!), a Washington nonprofit corporation; Spokane Research & Defense Fund, a Washington nonprofit corporation; coalition for a new Spokane, a Washington nonprofit corporation; Priorities First, a Washington political committee; Richard Adams, John Talbott, and Margaret Leonard, Appellants, v. CITY OF SPOKANE, a Washington first class charter city; the Spokane City Council; and Spokane Public Development Authority, a City of Spokane public corporation, Respondents, and Citizens Realty Company, a Washington corporation; and Lincoln Investment company, a Washington corporation, Respondents. |
Stanley M. Schwartz, Laurie Connelly, Asst. City Attys., Perkins, Coie, Thomas F. Kingen, Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, Duane M. Swinton, Spokane, for Respondents.
CLEAN et al. challenge by direct review a Spokane ordinance providing public support for a new parking garage in downtown Spokane.
Respondents/Intervenors Citizens Realty Company and Lincoln Investment Company (Developers) own River Park Square shopping mall and garage in downtown Spokane. In early 1995, the Developers approached the City of Spokane (City) asking for assistance with the renovation and expansion of the mall parking garage as part of a plan to redevelop River Park Square (RPS). The redevelopment includes a new Nordstrom store to replace the existing store on which Nordstrom's lease will expire January 31, 1999. Nordstrom has not stated for the record whether it will remain downtown if the RPS project fails to materialize. Project proponents predict that the RPS redevelopment will create jobs, increase tax revenue, and improve cultural and recreational opportunities in downtown Spokane.
The Developers will renovate the parking garage and then sell it to the Spokane Downtown Foundation, a nonprofit corporation (Foundation). The Foundation intends to issue tax-exempt bonds on behalf of the City payable from garage revenues. The Foundation will lease the garage to the Spokane Public Development Authority (PDA) When the bonds issued by the Foundation are retired, the City will acquire ownership of the garage at no cost. The City has contingently pledged parking meter revenue to cover the garage operating expenses and the ground lease payments in the event garage revenues are insufficient to meet the facility's expenses.
which will operate the facility. The Developers will lease the land to the Foundation and the Foundation will assign that lease to the PDA.
The City applied for an Economic Development Grant (EDI) and a section-108 guaranteed development loan from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD has awarded the City a $1 million EDI grant. The section-108 loan application was still pending as of the date the Respondents' brief was submitted to this court. The City has pledged its future Community Development Block Grant funds to repay the section-108 loan if the Developers default.
The Developers submitted a State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) checklist to the City. The City issued a Mitigated Determination of Nonsignificance for the project on July 2, 1996. This decision was not appealed administratively.
On January 27, 1997, the Spokane City Council approved Ordinance C31823 (the Ordinance) which authorizes City support for the RPS garage. On January 30, 1997, Appellant Priorities First presented a referendum petition to the Spokane City Clerk, seeking to overturn the Ordinance. Although referendum proponents collected over 8,000 signatures, the City refused to honor the referendum petition because the City Council declared that an emergency existed when it adopted the Ordinance, rendering the Ordinance effective immediately and precluding a referendum.
CLEAN et al. (Appellants) brought this action in Spokane County Superior Court to challenge several aspects of the City and PDA's participation in the project, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court The standard of review of a trial court's order granting summary judgment is de novo. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Summary judgment is appropriate where the parties' pleadings, affidavits, and depositions establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Wilson, 98 Wash.2d at 437, 656 P.2d 1030. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court shall consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wilson, 98 Wash.2d at 437, 656 P.2d 1030.
granted summary judgment to the City, PDA and Developers (Respondents). This court granted direct review on May 9, 1997.
(1) Has the City acted in excess of its municipal authority under the off-street parking statutes--RCW 35.86.050 and RCW 35.86.010?
Appellants first argue the City violated RCW 35.86.050 because it failed to develop a comprehensive parking plan before enacting the Ordinance. The statute provides:
In the establishment of off-street parking space and/or facilities, cities shall proceed with the development of the plan therefor by making such economic and physical surveys as are necessary, shall prepare comprehensive plans therefor, and shall hold a public hearing thereon prior to the adoption of any ordinances relating to the leasing or acquisition of property....
RCW 35.86.050.
Respondents correctly observe that the statute does not discuss the level of specificity required of a comprehensive plan. The only case interpreting RCW 35.86.050 is In re Petition of City of Auburn, 65 Wash.2d 560, 398 P.2d 723 (1965). In City of Auburn, this court observed that, "there seem to be no guiding principles for the preparation of 'comprehensive plans.' " 65 Wash.2d at 563, 398 P.2d 723. Respondents Lacking case law interpreting the level of specificity required by this particular statute, the trial court relied by analogy upon Hutchinson v. Port of Benton, 62 Wash.2d 451, 383 P.2d 500 (1963). In Hutchinson, we held the Port of Benton had satisfied a statutory requirement that it adopt a comprehensive harbor development plan before expanding the port because it had given "a fairly detailed picture" of what the project entailed. Hutchinson, 62 Wash.2d at 457, 383 P.2d 500. We acknowledged that the plan was not a "model of preciseness," but upheld the project because the plan was sufficient to inform the taxpayers of how their money was to be spent. Hutchinson, 62 Wash.2d at 457, 383 P.2d 500.
argue that, if the Legislature had so intended, it could have prescribed a very specific set of criteria for municipalities to follow when preparing comprehensive plans under RCW 35.86.050, as is evidenced by the specificity called for in the Growth Management Act (RCW 36.70A.070).
The trial court in this case held the City had complied with RCW 35.86.050 because the statute does not require a specific checklist but rather a process that provides the public with specific information about the project. Because the City commissioned both a parking study and a financial feasibility study and held three public hearings to elicit comments on the plan, the trial court found the City had complied with RCW 35.86.050.
Respondents point out that, in addition to these measures, the City has adopted a Downtown Spokane Development Plan (Plan), which addresses downtown parking needs. In their Reply Brief, the Appellants claim the RPS facility violates this Plan because the Plan calls for parking at the Davenport Hotel. This assertion is false. The Plan encourages the development of a parking facility "near" the Davenport Hotel and the Opera House/Convention Center. Ex. 6 at 13. The RPS garage is two blocks to the north of the Davenport Hotel.
Appellants' argument that the City violated RCW 35.86.050 is not persuasive. The City has held hearings Appellants also contend the City lacks the authority to purchase the parking garage because the RCW requires city parking facilities to serve, as their primary purpose, persons who use the park or civic center facilities. RCW 35.86.010 states:
and commissioned studies for the project and has also established that the facility conforms to the City's comprehensive plan. These steps satisfy the requirements of RCW 35.86.050, given case law defining "comprehensive plan."
Cities ... are authorized to provide off-street parking space and facilities located on land dedicated for park or civic center purposes, or on other municipally-owned land where the primary purpose of such off-street parking facility is to provide parking for persons who use such park or civic center facilities. In addition a city may own other off-street parking facilities and operate them in accordance with RCW 35.86A.120.
Appellants' argument is without merit. The second sentence of RCW 35.86.010 plainly authorizes a city to own "other off-street parking facilities." Appellants contend that, because this portion of the statute requires such facilities to be operated in accordance with RCW 35.86A.120 and because chapter 35.86A RCW allows cities to establish parking commissions, the City is not allowed to own "other off-street parking" unless it has created a parking commission. RCW 35.86.010 merely states that such facilities must be operated in accordance with RCW 35.86A.120 (), not that such a facility can be acquired only after a city appoints a parking commission. The trial court properly found the City was not required to create a parking commission as a prerequisite to owning the RPS garage.
(2) Has the City failed to comply with the State Environmental Policy Act?...
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