Clearwater Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Sampson

• Decision Date: 28 July 1976
• Docket Number: No. 48158,48158
• Citation: 336 So.2d 78
• Parties: CLEARWATER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. Joseph E. SAMPSON, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 78

336 So.2d 78

CLEARWATER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. Joseph E. SAMPSON, Respondent.

No. 48158.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 28, 1976.

Dennis P. Thompson and Emil G. Pratesi, Richards, Nodine, Gilkey, Fite, Meyer & Thompson, Clearwater, for petitioner.

William J. Castagna, MacKenzie, Castagna, Bennison & Gardner, Clearwater, for respondent.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This cause is before us on certiorari granted to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in ,Sampson v. Clearwater Federal Savings and Loan Association, denying a motion to quash appeals in the cause, which purportedly conflicts with Wagner v. Bieley, 263 So.2d 1 (Fla.1972), and Home News Publishing Co. v. U-M Publishing Co., Inc., 246 So.2d 117 (Fla.App. 1, 1971).

Petitioner, Clearwater Federal, filed an action in the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County to foreclose a mortgage encumbering certain motel property in Clearwater against respondent. By agreement of the parties a 'quasi receivership' was established to continue operation of the motel. Funds arising from operations of the Sea Captain Motel were to be deposited in the court's registry, pending further order of the court. Final judgment of foreclosure was entered on April 18, 1974. The mortgagors objecting to the sale procedure appealed the judgment of foreclosure to the District Court of Appeal, Second District. (In Bloznalis v. Clearwater Federal Savings and Loan Assoc., 306 So.2d 219 (Fla.App. 2, 1975), the District Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed the judgment of foreclosure.) During the pendency of the interlocutory appeal of the judgment of foreclosure, petitioner filed a motion directed to the funds held in the court's registry requesting that the balance of the funds in the registry be paid to petitioner. After hearing, the trial court denied portions of the request without prejudice.

Subsequent to the District Court of Appeal's, Second District, affirmance of the sale procedure, petitioner renewed its motion directed to the remaining funds in the registry. By order dated April 9, 1975, filed April 10, 1975, the Circuit Court entered a 'Second Order on Motion to Direct Payment' holding that petitioner was entitled to the funds remaining in the registry. Within 10 days, respondent filed a petition for rehearing directed to the order permitting payment of the funds to petitioner. By order dated May 22, 1975, the trial court denied the petition for rehearing. Respondent thereupon filed his notice of interlocutory appeal and notice of appeal from the 'Second Order on Motion to Direct Payment' which notice was timely if measured from denial of the motion for rehearing and untimely if measured from the order directing payment. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the appeal as untimely filed since both notices of appeal were filed more than 30 days from the rendition date of the order being appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, consolidated the notices of appeals and denied the motion to quash appeals.

An interlocutory order entered after judgment, post decretal, order, is not to be confused with one entered during the pendency of the proceedings before final judgment. Cf. Wagner v. Bieley, supra. Post decretal orders are not true interlocutory orders, and perhaps the term 'interlocutory' is a misnomer. Where an order after judgment is dispositive of any question, it becomes a final post decretal order. To the extent that it completes the judicial labor on that portion of the cause after judgment, it becomes final as to that portion and should be treated as a final judgment, and, therefore, a petition for rehearing could be properly...