Clebanck v. Neely

• Decision Date: 07 July 1931
• Docket Number: 23214.
• Citation: 1 P.2d 239,163 Wash. 333
• Parties: CLEBANCK v. NEELY et ux.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

1 P.2d 239

163 Wash. 333

CLEBANCK v. NEELY et ux.

No. 23214.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 7, 1931

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Howard M. Findley, Judge.

Suit by Anna J. Clebanck against Robert Neely and wife. From the judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Philip Tworoger, of Seattle, for appellant.

Riddell Brackett & Fowler and Robert G. Cauthorn, all of Seattle, for respondents.

MAIN J.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover a money judgment and to foreclose a claimed landlord's lien on certain personal property. After the action had been instituted, at the request of the plaintiff a receiver was appointed to take charge of the property. The plaintiff was the owner of an apartment house in the city of Seattle. The defendants Robert-Neely and wife, were lessees thereof, and were, to a considerable amount, in arrears in the payment of rent. After his appointment, the receiver took charge of the furniture and furnishings of the apartment house, which had been removed therefrom and placed in a storeroom at 1206 Stewart street. In November, 1926, and prior to the institution of this action, Neely and wife had given to one Ethel J. Abbott a bill of sale covering the furniture and furnishings in question, which bill of sale was duly recorded in the office of the county auditor of King county. The plaintiff, at the time the action was instituted, had constructive notice that the bill of sale had been given. Subsequent to the appointment of the receiver in the present action, Mrs Abbott brought an action to determine the ownership of the furniture and furnishings, and to restrain the sheriff from selling the same upon the judgment which the plaintiff had recovered against Mr. and Mrs. Neely. To that action the plaintiff in the action now Before us, Mrs. Clebanck, the receiver, and the sheriff were made parties. It resulted in a judgment that the furniture and furnishings were owned by Mrs. Abbott. No other property or money came into the possession of the receiver. After the property had remained in storage for approximately two years, it was turned over to Mrs. Abbott. The owners of the storeroom in which it was placed filed in the receivership proceeding a claim for the rent of the storeroom for the period mentioned. The court found that the reasonable rental for that period was the sum of $500. It also fixed the receiver's compensation at $500, and that of his attorneys at $250. These three items, together with a small item which the receiver had expended, constituted the costs of the receivership proceeding. The court in its judgment charged all the items against the plaintiff, Mrs. Clebanck, and from this judgment she appeals.

No formal findings of fact and conclusions of law were made, and for this reason the appellant first contends that the judgment should be reversed. Whether findings of fact and conclusions of law are necessary depends upon whether the action is one at law or in equity. The appointment of a receiver is one of the prerogatives of a court of equity exercised in aid of its jurisdiction, in order to enable it to accomplish, as far as possible, complete justice between the parties Before it. Washington Iron-Works Co. v. Jensen, 3 Wash. 584, 28 P. 1019; 34 Cyc. 17. The action being one in equity, no findings of fact and conclusions of law were required. Colvin v. Clark, 96 Wash. 282, 165 P. 101; Darnell v. Salwt, 138 Wash. 353, 244 P. 563; Clifford v. Callarman, 157 Wash. 546, 289 P. 1013. The court did not err, therefore, in failing to make formal findings of fact and conclusions of law.

It is next contended that the court erred in entering in this...