Clemans v. Bd. Of Educ.

• Decision Date: 22 November 1910
• Citation: 68 W.Va. 298
• Parties: Clemans, Sheriff, v. Board of Education.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

68 W.Va. 298

Clemans, Sheriff,

v.Board of Education.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted November 22, 1910. ^*

Decided November 22, 1910.

1. Schools and School Districts Statutes School Taxes Collection Special Laws.

The treasurer of the city of Wheeling is, under existing laws, the collector of school monies in the independent school district of Wheeling.

2. Statutes Repeal by Implication.

Repeal of a statute by implication is not favored. It is never admitted when the former act can stand with the new one. It will not be admitted unless there is irreconcilable conflict between the two statutes.

3. Same School Taxes Collection Statutory Provisions.

A statute treating a subject in a general manner, and not expressly contradicting a prior special act in relation to a detail of that subject, shall not be considered as intended to affect the more particular previous provision, unless it is absolutely necessary to give the latter act such construction in order that its words may have any meaning at all.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Ohio County.

Bill by William M. Clemans, Sheriff of Ohio County, against the Board of Education of the Independent School District of Wheeling and others. Decree for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

C. W. Dillon, J. B. Handlan, and T. C. Townsend, for appellant.

Henry M. Russell and Alfred Caldwell, for appellees.

Eobinson, President:

We must decide whether the treasurer of the city of Wheeling or the sheriff of Ohio county is the legal collector and custodian of school monies within the independent school district of Wheeling.

A special act of the Legislature, passed in 1872, provided that the city of Wheeling should constitute an independent school district, and prescribed many things in relation thereto: among them, that the taxes levied for school purposes "shall be collected and disbursed by the same officer by whom the city levies are collected." This act was amended in 1875, in 1882, and in 1901, but the original provision naming the collecting and disbursing officer of school levies has been held intact and remains in the law at the present time. In the re-enactment of 1901, it reads exactly as it did in the first instance.

The constitutionality of this special provision has been questioned in the argument. We hold that it was within the power of the Legislature to provide that the school taxes of the district should be collected and disbursed by the city officer. The provision is not violative of the constitutional inhibition against special laws; nor is the provision in conflict with the constitution wherein that instrument provides that all school levies shall be collected by the sheriff, or other collector. It is certainly in accord with the last named constitutional mandate.

The real question to be considered is: Has the provision of the special law applicable to Wheeling, in regard to the collector, been impliedly repealed by the re-enactment of the general school law of the state by the Legislature of 1908?

The special act originally contained another provision, which remains in it to-day. As it appears in the re-enactment of 1901, it reads: "The provisions of the general school law of the state, not included in this act, shall not he regarded as applicable to the district of Wheeling and all laws and acts heretofore existing which are in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of this act shall be void within said district." So we see clearly that at least until the general school law was re-enacted in 1908, it 'was particularly provided that the same should have no force in Wheeling. And until the re-enactment of 1908, the general law expressly excepted Wheeling from its provisions. Code 190G, chapter 4.5, section 75. Thus it appears that the special and the general law were independent of each other. The one stood uncontrolled by the other. That the two laws were so until 1908 cannot be doubted. Now, did the reenactment of the general law in that year work a change in this particular? If so, how was that change effected?

It is submitted that the new general law in many particulars applies to independent school districts. That may be true. The pertinent question with which we are dealing is: Does this general law repeal the provision of the prior special act that names the collector of school monies? We need not inquire whether it repeals some other provision of the special act, or how it affects that act generally. And the fact that the newgeneral law applies in some particulars to independent districts cannot be controlling, unless that new general law directly applies to the provision of the special act in relation to the collecting officer of Wheeling so as to repeal that provision.

Great reliance is laid on the provision of the new general law which says: "The sheriff of the county shall receive, collect and disburse all school money for the county and several districts and independent districts therein." But this enactment does not repeal the Wheeling law. It is no more than a general provision for collecting and disbursing. It does not say that Wheeling shall not have a different officer. It does not affirm that the sheriff of every county shall receive, collect and disburse all school money. There is nothing in the language to exclude an exception to the general rule stated. This enactment is merely a general rule that can stand with the excep- tion made by the Wheeling law and still serve its evident purpose in applying generally.

Then we are told that the section of the general law which excepted Wheeling therefrom was omitted in the re-enactment of 1908, and that the wiping out of that exception shows a purpose to include Wheeling. But without that sectio...