Clemens v. Clemens
Decision Date | 11 December 1950 |
Docket Number | No. 41928,No. 2,41928,2 |
Citation | 361 Mo. 485,235 S.W.2d 342 |
Parties | CLEMENS v. CLEMENS |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Charles M. Spence, Harold I. Elbert, St. Louis, Frank W. Jenny, Union, Thompson, Mitchell, Thompson & Dougas, St. Louis, of counsel, for appellant.
Ralph C. Lashly, St. Louis, Leo A. Politte, Washington, for respondent.
BARRETT, Commissioner.
In this divorce suit the trial court has dismissed the husband's petition and granted the wife a divorce upon her cross bill and awarded her $30,000.00 alimony in gross, and additional attorneys' fees. In their petition and cross bill both parties, as grounds for divorce, rely solely upon 'such indignities to the other as shall render his or her condition intolerable'. Mo.R.S.A. Sec. 1514. The wife contends that she proved the requisite insufferable, intolerable indignities and thereby clearly and plainly established her right to a divorce. She urges, since the trial court has found for her, that it is this court's duty to defer to the trial court's finding, especially so in view of the conflicting evidence as to certain of the indignities upon which she relies, and sustain her decree. Hoecker v. Hoecker, Mo.Sup., 222 S.W. 387, 389. The husband urges that the evidence does not sustain the wife's right to a decree of divorce upon the ground of indignities but on the contrary demonstrates that it is he who has suffered the intolerable indignities and is the innocent and injured party entitled to a divorce. This court recognizes and adheres to the rule of deference, particularly so to the trial court in this case. But upon this, the husband's appeal, it is likewise this court's duty and responsibility, as it was with the trial court initially, to try the cause anew and enter such judgment as this court is compelled by the probative force of all the circumstances. Schulte v. Schulte, Mo.Sup., 140 S.W.2d 51, 54; Vincent v. Vincent, Mo.Sup., 123 S.W.2d 86; Bassett v. Bassett, Mo.App., 280 S.W. 430.
On the date of the trial, in January 1950, Mr. Edward Clemens, the husband, was sixty-five years of age. He started out in 1901 as a messenger boy for the Terminal Railroad and remained with that company in various capacities until 1932 when he was assigned the duty of managing its St. Louis Mart. In 1936 he became executive vicepresident of the Mississippi Valley Barge Lines Company and retired as its president on December 1, 1948. He was first married in 1912 and his wife died in 1942. In 1942, as a 'dollar a year man,' he was chosen director of waterway transportation for the Office of Defense Transportation and partially moved his residence to Washington, D. C. It was there that he met and married Lucille Davis, who was employed and made her own living. She was thirty-seven years of age at the time of the trial and had been twice married and twice divorced before her marriage to Mr. Clemens on February 9, 1945.
At the time of the trial Mr. Clemens had a net worth of about $100,000.00, all of which he had accumulated prior to his marriage to Lucille Davis. She claims that he is worth $140,000.00 In addition they own, as tenants by the entirety, a farm near St. Clair of the value of $25,000.00. Since his retirement he has an annual income, from retirement pay, annuities and stocks of $9600.00.
Immediately after their marriage they returned to St. Louis and lived in an apartment at 3308 Russell Boulevard. They spent week-ends on the farm near St. Clair and on January 1, 1949 they gave up their residence in St. Louis and moved to the farm. They had quite a lot of company, for the most part his old friends and business associates. They were convivial and gave and attended a great many dances, dinners and cocktail parties and it was out of these social engagements, principally, that the incidents upon which she relies as indignities occurred. She said that he was 'not too easy' a person to live with, that he always found fault with her, said that she wore too much lipstick and ridiculed her hats and clothes and was not always even tempered. She testified that he used vile and offensive language towards her but she could not recall any specific occasions at the moment. She said that he failed to provide her with the necessities and failed to properly support her. He gave her an allowance of $150.00 a month, however, and any sum she saved he matched with a like sum in a savings account which at the time of their separation amounted to about $2400.00. She bought her clothes from her allowance and was able to recall that the only other bills she ever paid were $20.00 for some aluminum, $125.00 for some Venetian blinds and $3.98 a pair for some curtains. Admittedly Mr. Clemens paid all the grocery bills, all other major items concerning the furnishing and upkeep of the house and, in fact, all other bills and expenses. But, as we have indicated, the acts and conduct upon which she principally relies as constituting intolerable indignities occurred after or grew out of cocktail parties and social engagements.
On October 15, 1948 they attended the Traffic Club party at the Chase Hotel and she says that he was quite drunk and kept dancing with another woman and left her stranded without a partner for the last dance. She said: This is her description of another incident: She testified that at these social events he frequently had lipstick on his face and handkerchief and that after their separation she found one of his undershirts with lipstick, rouge and other incriminating matter on it. She complained of his being drunk on Easter Sunday when they had some of his friends for dinner. Of this day he said: 'Easter Sunday, the day I had too much to drink, and which is admitted.' As to the lipstick and his kissing the ladies he said: He denied that he knocked her down after the Chase Hotel party or that he ever struck her.
This is his version of the December 28th party and its aftermath:
When he struck her, after the Halloween dance, she said 'I thought I was pregnant' and, in her judgment, as a result of the blow, she suffered a miscarriage. In connection with this testimony he offered in evidence hospital records which showed that she had entered the hospital on November 26, 1948 at 4:30 p.m. and was discharged at 11:00 a.m. on November 28, 1948. An obstetrician and gynecologist examined the record and testified that it showed 'dilation and curettage,' an operation for therapy but principally for diagnosis--'a procedure in which the entrance of the uterus is dilated so an instrument can be passed in the cavity of the uterus, and the lining wall of the uterus is scraped away, partially or completely.' She, as we understand the record, had said that she left the hospital on November 28th and that she did not thereafter menstrate until January 3, 1949. The doctor gave it as his opinion that 'the absence of menstrual flow from the date of the dilation and...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Reeves v. Reeves
...and that his testimony was 'lacking in that naturally compelling ring of sincerity manifesting innocent injury . . ..' Clemens v. Clemens, Mo., 235 S.W.2d 342, 346. Although it is our duty to review this court-tried case upon both the law and the evidence as in suits of an equitable nature,......
-
L v. N
...and unpersuasive support in her testimony, which (to put it charitably) lack the 'naturally compelling ring of sincerity' [Clemens v. Clemens, Mo., 235 S.W.2d 342, 346; Price v. Price, Mo.App., 281 S.W.2d 307, 311], and otherwise were wholly Our courts long ago recognized the impossibility ......
-
Graves v. Wooden
...removal to Gainesville, 'I (plaintiff) am seeing she attends church,' lacks the 'naturally compelling ring of sincerity' [Clemens v. Clemens, Mo., 235 S.W.2d 342, 346] and leaves us Turning to defendant, we find persuasive evidence of his commendable and continuing concern for Dyana's welfa......
-
Frederick v. Frederick
...alleged indignities, all of the detailed circumstances must be considered in the appropriate setting of their background (Clemens v. Clemens, Mo., 235 S.W.2d 342, 346); it being impossible to formulate any all-encompassing rule, each action for divorce on the ground of alleged indignities n......