Clements v. Barnes
| Decision Date | 17 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. D-2205,D-2205 |
| Citation | 834 S.W.2d 45 |
| Parties | Bankr. L. Rep. P 74,700 Kay CLEMENTS, Petitioner, v. Robert F. BARNES, Respondent. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Kay Clements, pro se.
Israel Ramon, Jr., Edinburg, Thomas O. Matlock, Jr., Mission, for respondent.
We consider whether a no-answer default judgment was properly rendered against a court-appointed bankruptcy trustee. On appeal by writ of error, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of default judgment against the trustee, Kay Clements, 822 S.W.2d 658. We reverse the court of appeals and hold that because Clements' actions, as alleged, did not exceed the scope of her authority as trustee, default judgment was improper.
This case arises out of a bankruptcy proceeding brought in a Colorado bankruptcy court in which Clements, a Colorado attorney, was appointed interim trustee. The debtor in bankruptcy filed an adversary proceeding against Robert Barnes, a Texas resident, to bring a parcel of land into the bankruptcy estate. Barnes prevailed against the debtor. Subsequently, he brought the instant action against the debtor, Clements, and others, alleging that they wrongfully claimed ownership of the property and tortiously interfered with its sale.
Clements was served with citation in July of 1989. She did not file an answer, and default judgment was signed and rendered against her on April 6, 1990. 1 On October 5, 1990, within 6 months of the date judgment was signed, Clements, as a party who did not participate at trial, appealed the trial court's judgment by writ of error to the court of appeals. See TEX.R.APP.P. 45. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court. 2
Clements argues that she is protected from liability by derived judicial immunity as a court-appointed trustee. We agree. Courts have held that, because bankruptcy trustees are "arm[s] of the [c]ourt," they are immune from liability for actions grounded in their conduct as trustee. See Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir.1981) (per curiam). Only where the trustee acts in "the clear absence of all [her] jurisdiction" does she lose her derived immunity. See Mullis v. United States Bankr.Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040, 108 S.Ct. 2031, 100 L.Ed.2d 616 (1988). Consequently, it was error for the trial court to render default judgment when Barnes failed to allege that Clements acted outside the scope of her authority as trustee. See Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682-83 (Tex.1979) (). Because this error is apparent on the face of the record, Clements, as a party who did not participate at trial, is entitled to relief. See DSC Finance Co. v. Moffitt, 815 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.1991) (per curiam); TEX.R.APP.P. 45.
Accordingly, pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P. 170, without hearing oral argument, we grant Clements' application for writ of error to this court, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment setting aside the default judgment rendered against her by the trial court.
1 In rendering default judgment, the trial court severed Barnes' claim against Clements from the other defendants...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Luttrell v. El Paso Cnty.
...see also City of Houston v. Swindall , 960 S.W.2d 413, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (citing Clements v. Barnes , 834 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex. 1992) ). Therefore, even if Judge Woodard's contempt hearings did not conform to due process standards, and even if the costs he impo......
-
Luttrell v. El Paso Cnty.
...see also City of Houston v. Swindall, 960 S.W.2d 413, 417 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (citing Clements v. Barnes, 834 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex. 1992)). Therefore, even if Judge Woodard's contempt hearings did not conform to due process standards, and even if the costs he impose......
-
Byrd v. Woodruff
...of the court," bankruptcy trustees are immune from tort liability for actions grounded in their conduct as trustees. See Clements v. Barnes, 834 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex.1992). In the context of a friendly suit, the judge is absolutely immune from liability for any unfortunate decision made conce......
-
Delcourt v. Silverman
...commissioner absolutely immune). This type of absolute immunity is referred to as "derived judicial immunity." See Clements v. Barnes, 834 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex.1992). The policy underlying derived judicial immunity that protects participants in judicial and other adjudicatory proceedings is s......
-
CHAPTER 12 - 12-9 Examiners' Derived Judicial Immunity
...derived judicial immunity in Antoine [v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993),] comports with our decision in Clements [v. Barnes, 834 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex. 1992),] and the analysis that has been applied by our courts of appeals in varying contexts. Thus, we conclude that the functiona......