Clements v. T. R. Bechtel Co.

• Decision Date: 09 July 1954
• Citation: 273 P.2d 5,43 Cal.2d 227
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: CLEMENTS et al. v. T. R. BECHTEL CO. et al. S. F. 18632.

Page 5

273 P.2d 5

43 Cal.2d 227

CLEMENTS et al. v. T. R. BECHTEL CO. et al.

S. F. 18632.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

July 9, 1954.

As Modified Aug. 4, 1954.

Price, MacDonald & Knox and Orlando J. Bowman, Oakland, for appellants.

Royal E. Handlos, San Francisco, for respondents.

CARTER, Justice.

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment entered upon an order sustaining defendants' demurrer.

Plaintiffs' action was brought to foreclose a mechanic's lien against defendants and others who own, or claim an interest, in the described property on which plaintiffs performed work and labor and furnished materials for the paving and construction of certain roads and streets. Plaintiffs' work was completed on February 9, 1951. The pleadings show that an ordinance of Contra Costa County provided that all such work and materials furnished were subject to inspection and approval by the county surveyor of that county and that the work was never approved or accepted by the county surveyor. Plaintiffs filed their notice of lien in the county recorder's office allegedly in the manner and form required by law on August 9, 1951, prior to the commencement of this action.

All parties agree that section 1187 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as it read at that time) and which provides the time within which such liens shall be filed, is applicable to the case at bar. That section provides, in part, that '* * * all persons claiming the benefit of this chapter, shall have 90 days after the completion of said work of improvement within which to file their claims or lien.' The parties are in disagreement as to the date on which this 90 day period commences to run. Plaintiffs claim that it begins to run on the date of acceptance of the work by the county surveyor; defendants claim that it begins to run on the date of the completion of construction February 9, 1951. Section 1191, subd. (a), of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it then read, and which relates to road work, provides '* * * provided, that in cases where the improvement made or work done is subject to acceptance by any municipal board or officer, the time for filing claims of lien shall not commence to run until after such acceptance shall have been amde.' (Emphasis added.) If defendants' position is the correct one, then plaintiffs' claim was not filed within the time limited and defendants' demurrer was properly sustained on that ground. If plaintiffs are correct, then the claim was filed in time.

Plaintiffs argue that the legislative history of the section, Code Civ.Proc. § 1191, subd. (a), requires that the phrase 'municipal board or officer' be interpreted to include a county officer, and that the word 'municipal' means public or governmental and not city or town.

Legislative History:

Until 1913, section 1191 provided that 'Any person who, at the request of the owner of any lot in any incorporated city or town, grades, fills in, or otherwise improves the same, or the street or sidewalk in front of or adjoining the same, or constructs any area, vault, cellar, or room, under said sidewalk, or makes any improvements in connection therewith, has a lien upon such lot for his work done and materials furnished, notice of which containing the statement provided for in section eleven hundred and eighty-seven must be filed, as therein specified, within thirty days after the completion of such work.' Stats.1901, p. 190.

In 1913, this section was amended as follows: 'Any person who, at the request of the owner of any lot or tract of land, grades, fills in, or otherwise improves the same, or the street, highway, or sidewalk in front of or adjoining the same, * * * has a lien upon said lot or tract of and for his work done and materials furnished; provided, that in cases where the improvement made or work done is subject to acceptance by any municipal board or officer, the time for filing claims of lien shall not commence to run until after such acceptance shall have been made.' Stats.1913, p. 333, c. 189.

The above emphasized portions of the statute were added by the 1913 amendment after a decision by this court, Durrell v. Dooner, 119 Cal. 411, 51 P. 628, holding that section 1191 did not apply in the County of Los Angeles outside the city limits because of the phrase 'in any incorporated city or town'. The 1913 amendment also deleted the provision that the property improved must be within an incorporated city or town.

In 1951, sections 1187 and 1191 of the Code of Civil Procedure were repealed by the Legislature and section 1193.1 re-enacted section 1191. In the same year, section 1193.1 was repealed and re-enacted as 1193.1(3) which provides that if such work is subject to acceptance by any public or governmental authority, the completion of the work shall be deemed to be the date of such acceptance.

Plaintiffs argue, with merit, that the section was amended in 1913, after a decision of this court which refused to uphold a lien on county roads outside incorporated limits of the City of Los Angeles while the section provided for liens upon work done 'in any incorporated city or town' by deleting those words. Plaintiffs contend that the section was amended to enlarge its coverage to roads outside incorporated cities and towns and that the additional provision extending the time for filing until after acceptance of the work by a municipal officer or board, where such acceptance was required, could not mean other than an inclusion officer or board, officers, or boards, within the term. Plaintiffs argue, also, that the word 'municipal' is a general word which should be given a general construction. These arguments appear to be meritorious.

It has been held that where an amendment ot a statute consists of a deletion of an express provision, the presumption is that a substantial change in the law was intended, Southern Pacific Co. v. McColgan, 68 Cal.App.2d 48, 54, 55, 156 P.2d 81; Coker v. Superior Court, 70 Cal.App.2d 199, 200, 160 P.2d 885; People v. Weitzel, 201 Cal. 116, 255 P. 792, 52 A.L.R. 811; Loew's, Inc. v. Byram, 11 Cal.2d 746, 750, 82 P.2d 1. In addition, it has been held, Jensen v. Hugh Evans & Co., 13 Cal.2d 401, 404, 90 P.2d 72, that pertinent decisions may properly be considered as bearing upon the legislative intent and purpose in the adoption of an amendment. The elimination of a statutory clause after the rendition of a decision affecting the law (as is true of the statute here under consideration) is to be regarded as an indication of legislative intent to change the meaning of the law or to obviate objections to it. Oakland Paving Co. v. Whittell Realty Co., 185 Cal. 113, 120, 195 P. 1058; Whitley v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.2d 75, 78, 113 P.2d 449; In re Todd's Estate, 17 Cal.2d 270, 109 P.2d 913; Lundquist v. Lundstrom, 94 Cal.App. 109, 270 P. 696.

The 1913 amendment simultaneously added the provision '* * * that in cases where the improvement made or work done is subject to acceptance by any municipal board or officer, the time for filing claims of lien shall not commence to run until after such acceptance shall have been made.' (Emphasis added.) The deletion of the words 'incorporated city or town' has the effect of extending the coverage of the section to include road work done outside an incorporated city or town. If, as defendants argue, the words 'municipal board or officer's are held to include only incorporated city or town officers, then the latter provision would not affect work done which requires approval by a county officer as in the case at bar. We do not believe that such a construction was the one intended by the Legislature nor do we feel that it is a reasonable one. Had the Legislature intended to so limit the proviso, it could more easily have done so by providing that where work was done which required approval by a city or town board or officer (rather than a municipal board or officer), the time limited should commence to run upon such approval. As we said in People v. Weitzel, 201 Cal. 116, 118, 225 P. 792, 793, 52 A.L.R. 811, 'In United States v. Bashaw, 8 Cir., 50 F. 749, 754, it was said: 'The very fact that the prior act is amended demonstrates the intent to change the pre-existing law, and the presumption must be that it was intended to change the statute in all the particulars touching which we find a material change in the language of the art. " (Emphasis added.) See, also, Union League Club v. Johnson, 18 Cal.2d 275, 278, 115 P.2d 425; People v. Santa Fe Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 28 Cal.2d 675, 685, 171 P.2d 713; Whitley v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.2d 75, 113 P.2d 449; Young v. Three for One Oil Royalties, 1 Cal.2d 639, 36 P.2d 1065; People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121, 142, 169 P.2d 1. In addition, a statute should be read as a whole to determine the legislative intent, People v. Trieber, 28 Cal.2d 657, 663, 171 P.2d 1; People v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d 638, 642, 150 P.2d 888; 23 Cal.Jur. 760. Where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, the one which leads to the more reasonable result will be followed, Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California v. Adams, 32 Cal.2d 620, 630, 197 P.2d 543. And where the language of a statutory provision is susceptible of two constructions, one of which, in application, will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former construction will be adopted, Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629, 165 P.2d 889; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d 794, 799, 800, 147 P.2d 387. As we have seen, by deleting the words 'incorporated city or town' and adding the proviso relative to acceptance by a municipal board or officer, the statute is susceptible of two constructions. One of these is that only where a city or town improvement is concerned, will the time limited commence to run upon the approval by a city or town officer or board, and the other that where work is done either within, or...