Clementson v. Minnesota Tribune Company

• Decision Date: 23 January 1891
• Citation: 47 N.W. 781,45 Minn. 303
• Parties: P. J. E. Clementson v. Minnesota Tribune Company
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

47 N.W. 781

45 Minn. 303

P. J. E. Clementson v. Minnesota Tribune Company

Supreme Court of Minnesota

January 23, 1891

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Hennepin county, Hooker, J., presiding, sustaining a demurrer to the complaint in an action to recover $ 25,000 damages for an alleged libel published in defendant's newspaper, of which amount the sum of $ 5,000 was claimed (under proper averments) as special damages for injury to plaintiff's business.

Judgment reversed.

O Mosness, for appellant.

Rea Miller & Torrance, for respondent.

OPINION

Mitchell, J. ^[1]

This was an action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, in which the plaintiff alleges and claims in his complaint actual, or, as they are sometimes termed, "special," damages -- that is, damages pecuniary in their nature, -- and also general damages -- that is, damages not pecuniary in their nature, such as to reputation, etc. The defendant interposed a general demurrer that the complaint did not state a cause of action, the ground of the objection to it being that it did not allege the service before suit of notice on the publishers of the newspaper, specifying the statements in the libellous article alleged to be false and defamatory, as provided by Laws 1889, c. 131. The trial court sustained the demurrer, and from this order plaintiff appealed.

Taking the first clause of this act by itself, and construing it literally, it would seem to sustain defendant's contention that in every case, regardless of the character of the damages sought to be recovered, such a notice must be served before any suit can be brought for the publication of a libel in a newspaper. But it is a cardinal rule of construction that the whole statute must be taken and construed together. The intention of the legislature is the important thing to be ascertained, and, in order to arrive at this, we are to look at the object sought to be attained, as well as the means to be employed. And while it is no doubt true that if the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, (at least, if its literal expression leads to no unjust or absurd consequences,) there is no room for construction or interpretation, yet it is also true that where a close or literal construction of a loosely-worded enactment would lead to unreasonable or absurd consequences, and the act is also fairly susceptible of another construction, the...