Clendening v. INDIANA FSSA
| Decision Date | 24 August 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 54A01-9810-CV-376.,54A01-9810-CV-376. |
| Citation | 715 N.E.2d 903 |
| Parties | Nichole CLENDENING, Appellant-Petitioner, v. INDIANA FAMILY AND SOCIAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Appellee-Respondent. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Jim Bowlin, Crawfordsville, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Janet Brown Mallett, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
Nichole Clendening appeals the dismissal of her petition for judicial review of a final agency action by the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration ("FSSA") denying her medical assistance claim. Clendening raises two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as one: whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Clendening's petition.
We affirm.
On December 22, 1997, Clendening filed her petition for review of FSSA's final agency action denying her medical assistance claim. The next day, the trial court ordered the record to be filed within thirty days. On February 10, 1998, after the thirty-day time period for submission of the record had expired, Clendening filed a request for an extension of time in which to file the record. The trial court granted the motion and extended the time until April 17, 1998. On April 14, 1998, Clendening requested a second extension, which the trial court granted until May 18, 1998. After this time had elapsed, Clendening filed a third request for an extension on May 26, 1998, the same day she filed the record. The court granted the extension and accepted the record. Subsequently, FSSA filed a motion to dismiss the petition for judicial review on the basis that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. FSSA argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the record had not been filed within thirty days of the petition having been filed and Clendening had not requested extensions for filing the record in a timely manner. The trial court dismissed Clendening's petition; Clendening appeals.
Judicial review of agency action is governed by the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act ("AOPA"). The AOPA requires a party who petitions for judicial review to file the agency record within thirty days of filing the petition. IND.CODE § 4-21.5-5-13 (1998). The trial court is required to grant extensions of this time period where good cause is shown. IC 4-21.5-5-13(b). Furthermore, the AOPA provides: "Failure to file the record within the time permitted by this subsection, including any extension period ordered by the court, is cause for dismissal of the petition for review...." Id.
It is well-established that the time provisions of IC 4-21.5-5-13 are mandatory and a condition precedent to a court acquiring jurisdiction to consider a petition for judicial review. Park v. Medical Licensing Bd. of Indiana, 656 N.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. Ct.App.1995),trans. denied; Crowder v. Rockville Training Ctr., 631 N.E.2d 947, 948 (Ind.Ct.App.1994),trans. denied; Indianapolis Yellow Cab, Inc. v. Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n, 570 N.E.2d 940, 942 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991),trans. denied. If the petitioner neither files the record within thirty days of filing her petition nor requests or receives an extension within that thirty-day period, the trial court must dismiss the petition for review because it lacks further jurisdiction to consider it. See Park, 656 N.E.2d at 1179; Crowder,631 N.E.2d at 948. One day after Clendening filed her petition, the trial court ordered that the record be filed within thirty days. Thus, Clendening had until January 22, 1998 to either file the record or request an extension. Clendening first requested an extension on February 10, 1998. Although the trial court granted this request and subsequent requests for extensions, it was too late. The court lacked jurisdiction and was required to dismiss the appeal.1 Clendening argues that Park, Crowder, and Indianapolis Yellow Cab, among other cases, are not good law regarding whether a trial court is required to dismiss a petition due to the petitioner's failure to file the record in a timely manner. In support of her argument, Clendening refers to changes that have occurred in the statutory law governing judicial review from an agency action.
In 1986, the AOPA was enacted. 1986 Ind. Acts 478-525, P.L. 18-1986. Contemporaneously, the Administrative Adjudication Act ("AAA"), which had governed judicial review of agency decisions, was repealed. 1986 Ind. Acts 524, P.L. 18-1986. IC 4-21.5-5-13, the subject of this case and part of the AOPA, effectively replaced IND.CODE § 4-22-1-14 (Supp.1986), which had been part of the AAA. Clendening contends that the post-1986 cases interpreting IC 4-21.5-5-13, including Park, Crowder, and Indianapolis Yellow Cab, ultimately rely on earlier interpretations of the repealed IC X-XX-X-XX. Furthermore, Clendening contends that IC 4-21.5-5-13 differs significantly from IC X-XX-X-XX, and that the AOPA grants a trial court discretion that did not exist under the AAA to consider a petition for judicial review despite the fact that the record, or a request for an extension, has not been timely filed.2
IC X-XX-X-XX(d) provided in pertinent part:
Any party or person so filing such verified petition for review with such court shall within fifteen (15) days thereafter secure from such agency a certified copy of the transcript of said proceedings before the agency, including the order or administrative adjudication sought to be reviewed, and file the same with the clerk of such court in which such action for review is pending. An extension of time in which to file such transcript shall be granted by said court in which such action for review is pending for good cause shown. Inability to obtain such transcript within time shall be good cause. Failure to file such transcript within said period of fifteen (15) days, or to secure an extension of time therefor, shall be cause for the dismissal of such petition for review by the court or on petition of any party of record to the original proceeding.
(emphasis added). IC 4-21.5-5-13 provides in pertinent part:
(emphasis added).
First, Clendening places emphasis on the underlined language of IC 4-21.5-5-13(a). She contends that this language, which is not contained in the initial portion of IC 4-22-1-4, grants the trial court unlimited discretion to expand the time within which the record may be filed regardless of the timeliness of a request for an extension. We do not agree. This...
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