S. NEWTON SCH. CORP. BD. OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES v. S. Newton Classroom …

• Decision Date: 29 August 2001
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-0101-CV-4.,49A02-0101-CV-4.
• Citation: 762 N.E.2d 115
• Parties: SOUTH NEWTON SCHOOL CORPORATION BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES, Appellant-Defendant, v. SOUTH NEWTON CLASSROOM TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Appellees-Plaintiffs.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

762 N.E.2d 115

SOUTH NEWTON SCHOOL CORPORATION BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES, Appellant-Defendant, v. SOUTH NEWTON CLASSROOM TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Appellees-Plaintiffs.

No. 49A02-0101-CV-4.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

August 29, 2001.

Publication Ordered October 4, 2001.

Transfer Denied February 15, 2002.

D. Michael Wallman, Rund & Wunsch, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Lisa F. Tanselle, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Amicus Curiae, Indiana School Boards Association.

Richard J. Darko, Eric M. Hylton, Lowe Gray Steele & Darko, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.

OPINION

KIRSCH, Judge.

South Newton School Corporation Board of School Trustees ("School Board") appeals the trial court's decision reversing the finding of the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board ("IEERB") that the School Board did not engage in an unfair labor practice when, without bargaining, it required the teachers, represented by the South Newton Classroom Teachers Association ("Association"), to perform two days of non-instructional work following the waiver of two instructional days in the 1998-1999 school year. The School Board contends that the trial court used the wrong standard when reviewing the IEERB's decision and therefore erroneously determined that the School Board committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

IC 20-10.1-2-1(c) requires public schools to provide 180 days of instruction to their students each year. Accordingly, when inclement weather forces schools to close and cancel classes for the day, if that day causes the school corporation to fall below 180 instructional days, the day must be made up or the school corporation risks losing state funding. IC 20-10.1-2-1(d). Under some extraordinary circumstances, a school corporation may apply for and receive a waiver of missed student instructional days. IC 20-10.1-2-1(e). If the waiver is granted, the school corporation will not lose state funding as a result of providing fewer than 180 instructional days. Id.

The Association is the collective bargaining unit representing public school teachers employed by the South Newton School Corporation ("School Corporation"). Under the collective bargaining agreement and individual teacher contracts for the 1998-1999 school year, teachers were required to work 185 days. The contracts did not distinguish between instructional and non-instructional days, but the school calendar provided for 180 instructional days and five non-instructional days.

During the 1998-1999 school year, school administrators cancelled eight student instructional days because of hazardous weather. Although class was not held, the teachers were paid for these eight days. Because IC 20-10.1-2-1(c) requires public schools to provide 180 days of instruction to their students, school administrators scheduled make-up days for six of the missed days to bring the total to 178 instructional days. The School Corporation applied for and received a waiver of the remaining two days from the Indiana Department of Education (IDOE), and students were therefore not required to make up those days.

The School Board, however, determined that the School Corporation teachers should be required to work the two days that were waived for the students. Thus, the School Board decided that teachers should fulfill the two-day requirement during the summer following the students' school year by attending professional development activities for two days. The superintendent compiled a list of approved activities and also allowed individual teachers to plan their own activity, subject to the School Board's approval. Although this arrangement was fully discussed by the Association and the School Board, it was not bargained.

The Association filed a claim of unfair labor practices against the School Board with the IEERB, alleging that the issue of the two professional development days and the length of those days should have been collectively bargained. After a hearing, the IEERB issued a decision and final order determining that the School Board had not committed an unfair practice. The Association appealed this decision to the trial court, which reversed the IEERB and found that the School Board had committed an unfair practice in its treatment of the two days. The School Board now appeals.¹

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The School Board argues that the trial court's decision that it committed an unfair labor practice is erroneous and contrary to law. Appeals from the IEERB's decision are governed by the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act. See Clendening v. Indiana Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 715 N.E.2d 903 (Ind.Ct.App.1999); Eastbrook Cmty. Schs. Corp. v. Indiana Educ. Employment Relations Bd., 446 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ind.Ct.App.1983). Under the Act, a court may grant relief from an administrative determination if the determination is: arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law; contrary to a constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or short of a statutory right; without observance of procedure required by law; or unsupported by substantial evidence. IC 4-21.5-5-14; Rynerson v. City of Franklin, 669 N.E.2d 964, 971 (Ind.1996).

The School Board alleges that the trial court used the wrong standard in reviewing the IEERB's decision. Specifically, the School Board alleges that as the agency entrusted to settle disputes between public school teachers and their employers, the IEERB should be afforded due deference to its expertise and thus to its decisions. This court stands in the position of the trial court in reviewing administrative actions. State, Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Thrush, 690 N.E.2d 769, 773 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied. We neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment on factual matters for that of the agency. Id. We must accept the facts as found by the administrative body. Partlow v. Indiana Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 717 N.E.2d 1212, 1214 (Ind. Ct.App.1999). " `An interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the duty of enforcing the statute is entitled to great weight, unless this interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute itself.' " Weiss v. Indiana Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., Div. of Disability, Aging & Rehabilitative Servs., 741 N.E.2d 398, 406 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied (2001) (quoting LTV Steel Co. v. Griffin, 730 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Ind.2000) (citations omitted)). If an agency misconstrues a statute, there is no reasonable basis for the agency's ultimate action. Noland v. Indiana Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., Div. of Disability, Aging & Rehabilitative Servs., 743 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), clarified on reh'g on other grounds 750 N.E.2d 401 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001). Therefore, the trial court is required to reverse the agency's action as being arbitrary and capricious. Id.

Here, the parties do not dispute the salient facts. Rather, at issue is solely the IEERB's interpretation of the law. Because the IEERB's conclusions of law are entitled to no deference and we stand in the shoes of the trial court on appellate review of administrative decisions, whether the trial court used the wrong standard of review is of no consequence. Rather, we make our own independent determination of whether the IEERB's decision was contrary to law.

Under IC 20-7.5-1-4, public school corporations are obligated to collectively bargain with teachers on issues related to salary, wages, hours, and salary and wage related fringe benefits. Other issues, such as working conditions, are subject to an obligation to discuss. IC 20-7.5-1-5. In this case, the School Board and the Association fully discussed the professional development days, but did not bargain them. The School Board argues that it had no obligation to do so, because the professional development days did not relate to wages or hours because the teachers were already contractually obligated to work those days under their 1998-1999 contracts. The School Board notes that its contract with the Association requires the teachers to work 185 days. Under the original calendar, teachers would have worked 180 student instructional days, as mandated by state law, and five teacher-only days. Because two days of student instruction were waived by the IDOE, the teachers taught only 178 days and had five teacher-only days. Accordingly, the School Board contends that the teachers are contractually obligated to work an additional two days. The School Board maintains that the waiver of student instructional days by the IDOE has no bearing on this dispute, but rather, relates only to funding and accreditation. Instead, the School Board asserts that its actions amounted only to the rescheduling of days the teachers were already obligated to work, which is not bargainable.

The Association's argument, on the other hand, begins with IC 20-6.1-5-9 ("School Closing statute"), which provides that teachers must be paid when school is closed by order of the school corporation or health authorities, but that "whenever a cancelled student instructional day ... is rescheduled to comply with [the 180 day minimum] ... each teacher ... shall work on that rescheduled day without additional compensation." (Emphasis added.) The Association argues that because the statute specifies only rescheduled student instructional days, it does not include non-rescheduled, i.e., waived student instructional days. Accordingly, the Association asserts that the statute impliedly addresses the issue of waived days and does not require teachers to work with no additional compensation on those days. The Association then reasons that its members taught 178 days, worked five teacher-only days and by virtue of the School Closing statute, were entitled to compensation for the two...