Clerk of the Circuit Court & Comptroller of Collier Cnty. v. Doe

• Decision Date: 27 March 2020
• Docket Number: Case Nos. 2D19-2368,2D19-2620
• Citation: 292 So.3d 1254
• Parties: CLERK OF the CIRCUIT COURT & COMPTROLLER OF COLLIER COUNTY, Appellant/Petitioner, v. Jane DOE, Minor, and Jane Doe, parent, Appellees/Respondents.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

292 So.3d 1254

CLERK OF the CIRCUIT COURT & COMPTROLLER OF COLLIER COUNTY, Appellant/Petitioner,

v.Jane DOE, Minor, and Jane Doe, parent, Appellees/Respondents.

Case Nos. 2D19-2368

2D19-2620

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 27, 2020.

Anthony P. Pires, Jr. of Woodward, Pires & Lombardo, P.A., Naples, for Appellant.

Fred W. Baggett and M. Hope Keating of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae The Florida Association of Court Clerks.

Dan R. Stengle and Benjamin A.A. Russell of Associates & Bruce L. Scheiner, Fort Myers, for Appellees.

Theresa L. Prichard, Associate Director and General Counsel, and Jennifer L. Dritt, Executive Director, Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae Florida Council Against Sexual Violence.

BADALAMENTI, Judge.

In this consolidated opinion, we have for our review an appeal (2D19-2368) and a related petition for writ of certiorari (2D19-2620) challenging the trial court's nonfinal order denying the Clerk of the Circuit Court and Comptroller of Collier County's ("the Clerk") motion to dismiss Jane Doe's¹ negligence complaint on sovereign immunity and judicial immunity grounds. After careful review, we reverse the nonfinal order and hold that the Clerk does not owe a duty of care to Jane Doe pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.420(d)(1)(B)(xiii) or section 119.071(2)(h)(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2017). Because we reverse the denial of the Clerk's motion to dismiss on this basis, we need not reach the Clerk's petition for writ of certiorari challenging the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss on judicial immunity grounds. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.

Taking as true the facts set forth in the complaint, as we must, Jane Doe, Minor, was a victim of a crime in which her identity was to be kept confidential from public disclosure pursuant to sections 92.56, 119.071(2), and 119.0714(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2017). Jane Doe, Minor's first and last names were identified on a court document filed in the sexual assault criminal case in which she was the victim as follows: "On or about August 16, 2017, Defendant publicly revealed Plaintiff JANE DOE MINOR'S identity by publishing Jane Doe's name in an ‘Amended First Appearance Court Order’ on its website without redacting Plaintiff JANE DOE MINOR'S first and last name." Jane Doe alleged that the Clerk's failure to redact her name from that published court document "caused [her] severe emotional and mental harm requiring a physician's care for treatment of the same." Jane Doe alleged that the Clerk's "actions in revealing" Jane Doe, Minor's identity to the public "were negligent and in derogation of the prohibitions and mandates of sections 92.56, 119.07(2), and 119.0714(1)(h), Florida Statutes."

The Clerk filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and argued, in part, that the alleged negligent act of failing to redact Jane Doe, Minor's identity from a court document "is a function undertaken by the [C]lerk for the judiciary specifically and for the public generally," which thus shields the Clerk from liability under the sovereign immunity doctrine. More broadly, it argued that it did not owe a common law or statutory duty of care to Jane Doe, Minor. The Clerk further contended that the complaint has "not alleged and cannot allege any special duty owed by the Clerk to Jane Doe, Minor different from the duty owed [to] the general public, as no such special duty exists in Florida." The Clerk thus concluded that Jane Doe failed to allege a prima facie case for negligence, mandating dismissal of the complaint.²

The trial court denied the Clerk's motion to dismiss in a written, nonfinal order. It first held³ that the Clerk owed a duty of care to Jane Doe, Minor, because she is part of a specific class of individuals—victims of sexual assault—that the legislature has chosen to protect by prohibiting the release of their identities to the public. The trial court reasoned that the duty arose from the operation of rule 2.420(d)(1)(iii)'s⁴ mandate to maintain the confidentiality of information contained within a court record that protects the information of minor victims of sexual offenses, coupled with section 119.071(2)(h)(1)(b)'s directive that "any information that may reveal the identity of a person who is a victim of any sexual offense" is confidential. The trial court concluded that "the Clerk had no discretion, and was under a ministerial duty and obedience to [r]ule 2.420(d)(1)(xiii) and [ section] 119.07(2)(h)(1)(b) to redact identifying information of the minor Plaintiff." It similarly determined that the Clerk was not entitled to sovereign immunity from liability because rule 2.420(d)(1)(iii) and section 119.07(2)(h)(1)(b) create a special duty of care to protect Jane Doe, Minor's identifying information. The Clerk filed an appeal of the nonfinal order denying its motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds as a matter of law and a petition for writ of certiorari as to the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss the complaint on judicial immunity grounds.

"In order to establish that a defendant is liable for the tort of negligence, the claimant must establish that the defendant owed [the plaintiff] a duty of care, which it breached, thereby causing the claimant harm." Florez v. Broward Sheriff's Office, 270 So. 3d 417, 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). "If no duty of care is owed with respect to alleged negligent conduct, then there is no governmental liability, and the question of whether the sovereign should be immune from suit need not be reached." Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 932. Moreover, in the milieu of analyzing a negligence claim brought against an otherwise immune sovereign, our analysis as to whether a government agency had a legal duty of care owed to the plaintiff is "conceptually distinct from any later inquiry regarding whether the governmental entity remains sovereignly immune from suit." Pirate's Treasure, Inc., 255 So. 3d at 904 (quoting Wallace 3 So. 3d at 1044 ).

We now address the threshold question of governmental duty of care. Our supreme court has made clear that a governmental duty of care in tort arises from statute or underlying common law. Trianon Park Condo. Ass'n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 917 (Fla. 1985) ("[F]or there to be governmental tort liability, there must be either an underlying common law or statutory duty of care with respect to the alleged negligent conduct."); Dudley v. City of Tampa, 912 So. 2d 322, 325 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("There can be no governmental liability unless a common law or statutory duty of care existed that would have been applicable to an individual under similar circumstances." (quoting Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So. 2d 532, 535 (Fla. 1999) )); see also Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Chapman, 9 So. 3d 676, 689-93 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (discussing Trianon Park and the historical development of Florida's governmental liability law). Thus, in the absence of a statute or common law creating a governmental duty of care, an individual cannot pursue a cause of action for negligence against a governmental entity. See Dudley, 912 So. 2d at 325. And a statute that confers discretionary power for a governmental entity to enforce laws for the general public does not equate to a cause of action for individual citizens. See Trianon Park Condo. Ass'n, 468 So. 2d at 917 ("For certain basic judgmental or discretionary governmental functions, there has never been an applicable duty of care. ... Further, legislative enactments for the benefit of the general public do not automatically create an independent duty to either individual citizens or a specific class of citizens."). With these principles in mind, we turn to whether the trial court erred by determining that the Clerk owed a duty of care to Jane Doe, Minor under the facts alleged in the complaint.

In reviewing this nonfinal order, our precise, narrow focus is to review whether the trial court erred by determining that rule 2.420(d)(1)(B)(xiii) and section 119.071(2)(h)(1)(b) impose a legal duty of care on the Clerk to redact Jane Doe, Minor's name from the court document prior to its publication on the circuit court's publicly accessible website.⁵ See Trianon Park Condo. Ass’n, 468 So. 2d at 917.⁶

To provide context to our analysis, both rule 2.420(d)(1)(B)(xiii) and section 119.071(2)(h)(1)(b) implement article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution. See State v. Wooten, 260 So. 3d 1060, 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) ; Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office v. Sun-Sentinel Co., 226 So. 3d 969, 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). This constitutional provision grants "[e]very person ... the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting on their behalf." The general purpose of Chapter 119, known as the Public Records Act, is to "open public records so that Florida's citizens can discover the actions of their government." Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 226 So. 3d at 972. But "[a]ccess to judicial branch records is governed by the rules and decisions of the Florida Supreme Court, not chapter 119, Florida Statutes." Wooten, 260 So. 3d at 1069. Accordingly, "[t]he Florida Supreme Court implemented [ article I, section 24(a) ] by enacting what is now [R]ule 2.420." Id. at 1071. The rule governs public access to judicial branch records and provides that "[t]he public shall have access to all records of the judicial branch of government" except in limited circumstances. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.420(a).

Turning to the language of the provisions cited by the trial court, section 119.071(2)(h) provides that "[a]ny information that may reveal the identity of a person who is a victim of any sexual offense" is "confidential and exempt" from public inspection. Section 119.0714(1)(h), a related provision cited by Jane Doe in the complaint, provides that "[n]othing in [...