Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago And St. Louis Railway Company v. Marshall
| Decision Date | 09 June 1914 |
| Docket Number | 22,381 |
| Citation | 105 N.E. 570,182 Ind. 280 |
| Parties | The Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company et al. v. Marshall |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied October 13, 1914.
From Superior Court of Marion County (88,657); Charles J. Orbison Judge.
Action by Hugh Burton Marshall against The Cleveland, Cincinnati Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Frank L. Littleton, Charles P. Stewart and Bailey & Young, for appellants.
Henry W. Bullock and Louis Herbst, for appellee.
The evidence in this cause shows that on September 16, 1912, appellee was employed by appellant railway company as a locomotive fireman. The contract of employment was oral, with no fixed period of continuance. Appellee was discharged on October 16, 1912, and, in the meantime, had worked during nearly all of the intervening period, as fireman on a switching engine in the railway company's yards at Indianapolis. During the remainder of the time he acted as fireman on locomotives employed in interstate commerce. On October 8, 1912, appellee purchased a watch of appellants Charles W. and Stella C. Scanlin, partners conducting a retail jewelry business in Indianapolis, under the name of Capitol City Jewelry Store, and, at the time executed the following written instrument:
7.00
In case I leave your employ voluntarily, lay off, am discharged, or any doubt arises about my being retained in service, I authorize you to deduct the sum of all unpaid installments from any balance of money due me.
(Signed), Hugh Burton Marshall."
A duplicate of the above was delivered to appellant railway company on October 10, 1912. When appellee was discharged, he went to the jewelry store, and offered to return the watch, and pay $ 8 in full settlement of the contract. The offer was refused. When discharged he had earned, in October, the sum of $ 42.75. Of this sum $ 22.70 was earned previous to October 9. He made a demand on appellant railway company for the $ 42.75, which the latter refused, because of the watch order. The company thereupon tendered appellee $ 4.75, in full payment of its liability to him. The tender was refused.
Appellee was a married man, living with his wife. The latter never consented, in writing, to the attempted assignment of appellee's wages. When appellee was employed he was given a book of rules, which contained the following: "Watches that have been examined and certified to by a designated inspector must be used by conductors, enginemen, yard-conductors, yard-enginemen and other employes required by special instructions." It does not appear that appellee received any special instructions, from the company, relating to a watch, or that the matter of carrying a watch, was mentioned in any conversation between appellee and any officer of the railway company. Whether appellee had a watch previous to October 8, 1912, is not disclosed by the evidence. Appellants Scanlin and Scanlin were designated by the railway company as inspectors of watches carried by its employes. They were in no wise engaged in loaning money, directly or indirectly, to employes, or wage earners, but, in connection with their retail jewelry business, they frequently sold, inspected and certified watches to appellant railway company's employes, under wage assignment contracts similar to this one. Appellee, in this action, sued the railway company for the $ 42.75 wages, and the Scanlins for a cancellation of the wage assignment contract. There was a finding and judgment for appellee against appellants. Separate motions for a new trial, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, were overruled, and each appellant separately assigns errors here. The same questions are presented by the rulings on demurrers to pleadings, and the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to support the court's findings, and consequently they are considered together.
Appellee, in commencing this action relied on § 4, of an act relating to the assignment of wages, approved February 27, 1909 (Acts 1909 p. 76, § 7999 Burns 1914), and reading as follows: Appellants contend that the provisions of said act of 1909 apply only to wage brokers--a class to which appellant partnership does not belong. While the provisions of §§ 2 and 3 of the act (Acts 1909 p. 76, §§ 7997, 7998 Burns 1914), are so limited, we are of the opinion that § 4, supra, clearly manifests an intent to prohibit assignments of wages, whether earned or to be earned, by a married man who is a resident householder of this State, to any person, regardless of occupation. While statutes of this character are subject to the rule of strict construction, because in derogation of common-law rights, such rule can have no application, where, as here, the legislative intent is free from doubt. Where the language of a statutory provision is plain, there is no room for construction. Cheney v. State, ex rel. (1905), 165 Ind. 121, 125, 74 N.E. 892, and authorities cited.
Appellants urge the invalidity of § 4, supra, of the act because in conflict with § 1, Art. 1, of our State Constitution and the provisions of the 14th amendment of the Federal Constitution which deny to the states the power to deprive a person of property without due process of law. They cite Republic Iron, etc., Co. v. State (1903), 160 Ind. 379, 66 N.E. 1005, 62 L. R. A. 136, and Massie v. Cessna (1909), 239 Ill. 352, 88 N.E. 152, 130 Am. St. 234, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1108, in support of such proposition. In the last case above cited the supreme court of Illinois held invalid a statute that purported to prohibit, except under certain conditions, the assignment of "wages or salary". The ruling was grounded on the theory that the police power of the state did not extend to the restriction of the freedom of contract in relation to all salaries; that the statute applied as well to persons earning salaries of $ 20,000 per annum as to those earning wages in small amounts, and that as to the former class it was merely arbitrary and without any reasonable basis. It is fairly inferable from the opinion that if the statute had applied only to wages it would have been upheld by a majority of the court. It is evident that in enacting § 4, supra, of the act of 1909, our legislature was controlled by the same purpose which led the framers of our Constitution to command, by § 22 of our bill of rights (Art. 1, § 22, Constitution), that liberal exemption laws be enacted, and which inspired the subsequent enactment of our many statutes designed for the protection of the wives and children of resident householders. The Illinois statute, in its scope and purpose, differs so greatly from our act of 1909, as to make the reasoning in the opinion in Massie v. Cessna, supra, inapplicable to the question here presented. In Republic Iron, etc., Co. v. State, supra, 389, the action was in the name of the State to recover wages and a penalty under the provisions of §§ 1 and 2 of the act of February 28, 1899 (Acts 1899 p. 193, § 7984 Burns 1914). It was held by this court that the statutory provisions which attempted to take from "both the employer and employe, whether in the shop, in the store, or on the farm, all power to contract for labor, except upon terms of weekly payment of wages in cash, is an unreasonable, and therefore an unconstitutional restriction." The legislation was held an unwarranted exercise of the State's police power, and in conflict with § 1, Art. 1, of the State Constitution, and with the 14th amendment to the Federal Constitution. The opinion was not based on the theory that the legislature was powerless to regulate the payment of wages. On the contrary it is expressly stated that such power exists within reasonable bounds. The difference between the provisions of the act of 1899 held invalid, and those under consideration here are such that we are of the opinion that the decision in Republic Iron, etc., Co. v. State, supra, can throw little, if any, light on the question here considered. The opinion in Republic Iron, etc., Co. v. State, supra, was handed down at the November term, 1902, of this court. At the same term the case of...
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