Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. Levco Constr., Inc.

Decision Date26 January 2012
Docket NumberNo. 01–11–00530–CV.,01–11–00530–CV.
PartiesCLEVELAND CONSTRUCTION, INC., Appellant, v. LEVCO CONSTRUCTION, INC., Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Joshua Nathaniel Bowlin, Jennifer Roberson Bickley, Kevin D. Jewell, Chamberlain Hrdlicka White Williams, Judd M. Treeman, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Houston, TX, for Appellant.

Gregory N. Jones, Jennifer Lynn Hebert, Matthew S. Veech, Boyar & Miller, P.C., Houston, TX, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices KEYES, HIGLEY, and MASSENGALE.

OPINION

EVELYN V. KEYES, Justice.

Appellant, Cleveland Construction, Inc. (CCI), appeals the trial court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration. In two issues, CCI argues that the trial court erroneously denied its motion to compel arbitration because (1) the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies, the arbitration provision is valid, and the claim is within the scope of the arbitration provision, and (2) the law favors arbitration and the FAA preempts conflicting state law.

We reverse and remand.

Background

Whole Foods Market, Inc. (“Whole Foods”) hired CCI to serve as general contractor to construct a store in Houston, Texas (“the Project”). The contract between Whole Foods and CCI (“the Whole Foods Contract”) allowed CCI to hire subcontractors.

CCI contracted with appellee, Levco Construction, Inc. (Levco), as a subcontractor, to perform certain tasks related to the construction, including excavating, grading, digging for laying utilities, paving, and preparing the foundation (“the Construction Contract”). The Construction Contract contained the following arbitration provision:

Article 30. DISPUTE RESOLUTION

....

30.3 Any controversy or claims of CCI against Subcontractor [Levco] or Subcontractor against CCI shall, at the option of CCI, be resolved by arbitration pursuant to the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association in effect on the date on which the demand for arbitration is made. Any such arbitration shall be held in Lake County, Ohio. Any award arising out of such arbitration may be entered by any court having jurisdiction....

Levco also obtained a surety bond (“the Bond”) from Intervener, Insurors Indemnity Company (“the Surety”). Both the Whole Foods Contract and the Bond issued by the Surety provided that disputes were to be resolved in a court in the county in which the Project was built, Harris County, Texas. Specifically, the Bond provided, in part:

§ 4 When the Owner [CCI] has satisfied the conditions of Section 3 [requiring notice of Contractor Default and other conditions precedent triggering the Surety's obligations under the Bond], the Surety shall promptly and at the Surety's expense take one of the following actions:

§ 4.1 Arrange for the Contractor [Levco], with consent of the Owner, to perform and complete the Construction Contract; or

§ 4.2 Undertake to perform and complete the Construction Contract itself, through its agents or through independent contractors; or

§ 4.3 Obtain bids or negotiated proposals from qualified contractors acceptable to the Owner for a contract for performance and completion of the Construction Contract ... and to pay to the Owner the amount of damages as described in Section 6 in excess of the Balance of the Contract Price incurred by the Owner resulting from the Contractor's default; or

§ 4.4 Waive its right to perform and complete, arrange for completion, or obtain a new contractor with reasonable promptness under the circumstance....

....

§ 6 After the Owner has terminated the Contractor's right to complete the Construction Contract, and if the Surety elects to act under Section 4.1, 4.2, or 4.3 above, then the responsibilities of the Surety to the Owner shall not be greater than those of the Contractor under the Construction Contract, and the responsibilities of the Owner to the Surety shall not be greater than those of the Owner under the Construction Contract....

....

§ 9 Any proceeding, legal or equitable, under this Bond may be instituted in any court of competent jurisdiction in the location in which the work or part of the work is located and shall be instituted within two years after Contractor Default or within two years after the Contractor ceased working or within two years after the Surety refuses or fails to perform its obligations under this Bond, whichever occurs first....

After Levco had partially performed under the Construction Contract, disputes arose between CCI and Levco concerning the Project, and on, January 17, 2011, CCI sent a letter to Levco informing it that “CCI elects to terminate its Agreement with Levco Construction.” The work was subsequently completed by Levco under the provisions of the Bond.

On April 14, 2011, Levco filed suit against CCI and Whole Foods in Texas state court. According to its pleadings, Levco discovered upon beginning the work that CCI and Whole Foods had failed to obtain all necessary construction permits and that the building design and plans were not complete, so Levco was required to make numerous changes. Levco made multiple requests to change the scope of the contracted-for work to include the new work, including requests for additional time and compensation. Levco alleges that CCI and Whole Foods refused to consent to the changes Levco sought. Levco also alleges that CCI maintained unreasonable deadlines, interfered with Levco's work under the Construction Contract, failed to pay Levco for work it had completed from July 2010 to April 2011, and wrongfully terminated the contract in January 2011. Thus, Levco was unable to pay its subcontractors, resulting in liens being filed against the Project.

Levco alleges that CCI eventually reinstated Levco as a subcontractor pursuant to section 4.1 of the Bond, but CCI “continued to refuse to reinstate the [Construction Contract] itself.” Levco claims that because CCI refused to reinstate the Construction Contract between them it was left in the position of “working essentially as a subcontractor for the [S]urety” under the terms of the Bond. Specifically, Levco alleges that, in its role as the issuer of the Bond, the Surety mandated that Levco be allowed to continue to work on the Project, as provided in section 4.1 of the Bond, and made an agreement with CCI regarding payment of Levco and Levco's subcontractors, as provided in section 6 of the Bond. Levco alleges that the Surety and CCI agreed that the Surety would pay Levco's subcontractors money owed them in exchange for CCI releasing the corresponding payments it owed Levco once the subcontractors released their liens on the Project. Levco states that the Surety complied with this agreement and paid Levco's subcontractors, but that CCI did not comply and release the money it owed Levco or Levco's subcontractors. Nor did CCI reinstate the Construction Contract it had terminated. Levco contends that CCI and Whole Foods are “now improperly withholding more than $500,000 in funds owed to Levco.”

Levco claims that CCI breached its agreement with Levco; that CCI and Whole Foods breached their duties to perform with care in accordance with the terms of the Construction Contract (as provided in both the Construction Contract and section 6 of the Bond) and the Whole Foods Contract and to cooperate in performance of the contracts; that CCI and Whole Foods owe it damages under theories of quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel; that CCI and Whole Foods violated Property Code section 28.001; and that CCI misapplied trust funds received from Whole Foods for payment of obligations under the Construction Contract and the Bond.

In addition, Levco sought a declaratory judgment that the arbitration clause in the Construction Contract is invalid and does not require arbitration because it is illusory, or, alternatively, that the provision in the Construction Contract requiring arbitration in Ohio is void because it contravenes Texas law in that “it purports to require a subcontractor to a contract involving the improvement or real property in Texas to submit to arbitration in a state other than Texas.” Finally, Levco sought attorney's fees pursuant to Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 37.009 and chapter 38 and Property Code section 28.005, and it sought a temporary restraining order or temporary injunction prohibiting CCI and Whole Foods from releasing any funds related to the Project.

On April 14, the trial court granted Levco's temporary restraining order until April 29, 2011, and it set a hearing on Levco's request for a temporary injunction for April 29.

CCI filed an arbitration demand with the American Arbitration Association, alleging, under “nature of the dispute,”

Respondent [Levco] is a subcontractor to Claimant [CCI] on the construction of a Whole Foods Market located in Houston, Texas (“Project”). Levco breached the subcontract and was terminated by CCI. Levco was bonded on the Project and the surety, Insurer's Indemnity Company utilized its option to have Levco complete the work on the Project; however, further breaches have occurred [and] CCI has been damaged by Levco's breach in [an] amount not yet fully determined but in [an] amount that CCI does not anticipate will exceed $150,000.

CCI requested that Lake County, Ohio be the arbitration locale.

On April 26, 2011, Levco filed an emergency motion to stay the arbitration proceeding.

On May 11, 2011, CCI answered Levco's suit with a general denial and asserted the affirmative defenses that a valid contract precluded Levco's quantum meruit claims, that CCI had paid Levco under the Construction Contract, that Levco failed to meet all conditions precedent to payment under the Construction Contract, that CCI was entitled to the defenses of “excuse” and “justification,” and that Levco lacked standing to assert its claims against CCI, had failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and was the first to breach the Construction Contract.

CCI alleged that...

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