Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. City of Cleveland

• Decision Date: 25 March 1985
• Docket Number: 58623,Nos. 48565,s. 48565
• Citation: 492 N.E.2d 861,24 Ohio App.3d 16,24 OBR 38
• Parties: , 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3289, 24 O.B.R. 38, 1984-86 SERB 393 CLEVELAND POLICE PATROLMEN'S ASSOCIATION, Appellee and Appellant, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND et al., Appellants and Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 16

24 Ohio App.3d 16

492 N.E.2d 861, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3289, 24 O.B.R. 38,

1984-86 SERB 393

CLEVELAND POLICE PATROLMEN'S ASSOCIATION, Appellee and Appellant, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND et al., Appellants and Appellees.

Nos. 48565, 58623.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

March 25, 1985.

Syllabus by the Court

A binding arbitration provision in an agreement between a city and one of its employees' unions does not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative powers which would invalidate a wage increase arbitration award rendered pursuant to such arbitration provision, where the city council establishes through legislative policy and reasonably precise standards, an intelligible principle to which an arbitration panel must conform and further establishes a procedure whereby exercise of the discretion can be reviewed effectively.

Cozza & Steuer and John T. Price, Cleveland, for Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Assn.

John D. Maddox, Director of Law, Peter N. Kirsanow and Donald F. Black, Cleveland, for City of Cleveland et al.

PRYATEL, Judge.

The Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Association (hereinafter "CPPA") appeals the denial of damages in the form of interest on a retroactive wage increase granted to patrolmen by the city of Cleveland (hereinafter "city") pursuant to an arbitration panel's binding award that was adopted by Cleveland City Council.

The city appeals the ruling that a provision for binding arbitration in a CPPA-city agreement is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power and that the city's tardiness in implementing the arbitration award constituted a breach of contract.

We affirm in part and modify in part for the reasons given below.

This action arose when the CPPA filed (1) an application for confirmation of an arbitration award, (2) complaint that the city had breached its contract with CPPA, and (3) complaint for an injunction to enjoin the city from continued breach of contract.

The CPPA and the city had entered into a 1979-1980 Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter "agreement") which provided for binding arbitration in the event the two parties reached an impasse on any issue. The agreement was adopted by the Council of the city of Cleveland on March 13, 1978 by passage of Ordinance No. 427-78.

The CPPA and the city reached an impasse in negotiations on a wage increase for the calendar years 1979 and 1980. In accordance with the agreement, the CPPA made a written demand, acceded to by the city, to submit their differences to final and binding arbitration. Following hearings before a panel comprised of the impartial arbitrator and representatives selected by the CPPA and the city, an arbitration award was issued on September 7, 1979. The city's representative on the tripartite arbitration panel concurred in the award, but the CPPA representative dissented. Inter alia, the award provided for a wage increase for some sixteen hundred patrolmen to be effective January 1, 1980, upon passage of an applicable ordinance.

The wage increase was not placed into effect by the city on January 1, 1980. On April 10, 1980, the CPPA filed an application with the common pleas court for confirmation of the arbitration award pursuant to R.C. 2711.09.

While the case was pending, the Cleveland City Council adopted an ordinance in June 1980 implementing the arbitration award with the wage increase retroactive to January 1, 1980, thus reducing the CPPA's claims to one for interest on the retroactive pay.

On April 9, 1984, the trial court found, inter alia, that (1) the city council had not unlawfully delegated legislative power by approving the provision for binding arbitration; and (2) that the city breached its contract with the CPPA by its failure to implement earlier the wage increases granted in the arbitration award. The court declined to award interest on the deferred pay increase due to the city's "perilous financial condition," and because it would "offend the court's notion of public policy and sound judicial discretion."

The city appeals the trial court's finding that (1) the binding arbitration provision did not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative powers, and (2) the city's failure to implement earlier the arbitration award constituted a breach of contract, while CPPA appeals the denial of interest. The appeals were consolidated and submitted for our review. ¹

We shall begin with the city's assignments of error, the first of which is critical to the determination of the remaining issues.

City's Assignment of Error No. I

"I. The trial court erred in ruling that the binding arbitration provision of the 1979-1980 memorandum of understanding between the Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Association and the city of Cleveland did not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative powers which would invalidate a wage increase arbitration award rendered pursuant to such binding arbitration provision."

The city contends that the binding arbitration provision of its agreement with the CPPA violates the city's charter and the doctrine that legislative powers may not be delegated.

Section 191 of the Cleveland Charter provides in pertinent part:

"The salary or compensation of all officers and employees in the unclassified service of the City shall be fixed by ordinance, or as may be provided by ordinance. The salary or compensation of all other officers and employees shall be fixed by the appointing authority in accordance with ability, fitness and seniority within the limits set forth in the Council's salary or compensation schedule for which provision is hereinafter made. The Council shall by ordinance establish a schedule of compensation for officers and employees in the classified service, which schedule shall provide for like compensation for like services and shall provide minimum and maximum rates (which may be identical) of salary or compensation for each grade and classification of positions determined by the Civil Service Commission * * *. For the guidance of Council in determining the foregoing schedule the Civil Service Commission shall prepare salary or compensation schedules, and the Mayor or any director may, and when directed by Council shall, prepare suggested salary or compensation schedules." (Emphasis added.)

The language of Section 191 of the charter places a duty upon council to establish a salary or compensation schedule, but authorizes the preparation of suggested salary or compensation schedules by the civil service commission, the mayor or any director.

Thus, delegating the determination of suggested schedules is permissible as long as council establishes, through legislative policy, intelligible principles to which the arbitration panel must conform. In this case, they were provided by council in its adoption of Ordinance No. 427-78 which set out the following standards to be considered by the panel:

"(i) The lawful authority of the City;

"(ii) The interest and welfare of the citizens of the City; and the financial ability of the City to meet the costs of any proposal considering the other costs and obligations of the City;

"(iii) A comparison of the wages, hours, benefits, and conditions of employment of the Patrol Officers with the wages, hours, benefits and conditions of employment of employees of other comparable police departments in the State of Ohio performing similar services and with other employees generally;

"(iv) The overall compensation and benefits received by Patrol Officers, including direct wages, vacations, holidays, sick time, leave time, insurance, pension, medical and hospitalization benefits and the continuity and stability of their employment compared with other employees in both the public and private sectors;

"(v) The operating problems of the City and the protection of the rights of Patrol Officers to fair treatment in working conditions."

It was the intent of the city and CPPA that the agreement comply in every way "with applicable legal statutes, charter requirements and governmental regulations which have the effect of law, and judicial opinions * * *." Memorandum, Article XXIII.

The arbitration panel made its award effective January 1, 1980, but provided that it would go into effect "upon passage of an applicable or- 012cents=' Under state law, if the panel exceeded its power or otherwise violated its trust, ² either party could avail itself of the procedure in the Revised Code which authorizes the filing of a motion in the common pleas court to vacate an arbitration award. ³

Notwithstanding that alternative, the council in June 1980 adopted the arbitration award as issued.

By authorizing submittal of impasse issues to binding arbitration, the council did not unlawfully delegate its legislative powers, since it retained its powers and properly exercised them by carefully setting out the standards that were to govern the arbitration. Not all delegations of legislative power are unlawful. To the contrary, an ordinance does not unlawfully delegate legislative power if it establishes, through legislative policy and such standards as are practical, an intelligible principle to which an arbitration panel must conform and further establishes a procedure whereby exercise of the discretion can be reviewed effectively. Cf. Blue Cross v. Ratchford (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 256, 260, 416 N.E.2d 614 .

The rule that a legislative body may fix a standard and then lawfully delegate authority under that standard was enunciated in this state as early as 1929. State ex rel. Srigely v. Woodworth (1929), 33 Ohio App. 406, 169 N.E. 713. Delegation of authority to zoning and licensing boards and administrators consistently has been upheld. See 38 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d (1959) 663, Municipal Corporations, Section 263. In In re Appeal of Clements (1965), 2 Ohio App.2d 201, 213, 207 N.E.2d 573 , we held that power may be delegated as long as it is made subject to a standard or rule. See, also, State ex rel....